[2.1.2.] Four Characteristics of Cartesianism.

 

Peirce opens “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” with a list of four characteristics of Cartesianism (p.70):

 

C1.  Philosophy should begin with universal doubt.

 

C2.  “the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness.”

 

C3.  In philosophy, it is acceptable to support claims with “a single thread of inference depending upon inconspicuous premises.”

 

C4.  There are “absolutely inexplicable” facts—facts that can never be explained—“unless to say ‘God makes them so’ is to be regarded as an explanation.”

 

Peirce rejects all four claims of Cartesianism and counters each claim with a claim of his own (pp.70-72):

 

P1. “We cannot begin with complete doubt.”

 

P2. “...to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious.”

 

P3. Philosophy should “proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and ... trust to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one.”

 

P4. The supposition that something is “absolutely inexplicable ... is never allowable.”

 

We will examine these one by one...

 

 

[2.1.3.] The Method of Doubt is Impossible.

 

C1.  Philosophy should begin with universal doubt.

 

P1.     “We cannot begin with complete doubt.”

 

According to Peirce Descartes’ Method of Doubt test is impossible. We cannot actually do what it recommends.

 

It involves a policy of deliberate doubt, in that Descartes tries to doubt as much as he can. But genuine doubt is not deliberate or voluntary; any deliberate or voluntary doubt is bound to be fraudulent. The “doubt” that Descartes’ method relies on is no such thing—it is fake doubt.

 

Real doubt and real belief are involuntary. We cannot begin to doubt at will, as Descartes claims to be doing.[1] So we cannot begin inquiry (whether philosophical or any other kind) by deliberately doubting everything. We must begin inquiry with the beliefs we already have:

 

We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. (70-71)[2]

 

On Peirce’s view, it is no coincidence that Descartes winds up back with his old beliefs (e.g., that God exists, that the mind is not the same thing as the body) by the end of the Meditations—because his claim to have given those beliefs up was “mere self-deception.” He never really gave them up in the first place.

 

A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. (71, emphasis added)

 

 

Stopping point for Friday August 26. For next time, study all of the lecture notes from this week’s three class meetings, and read (again) pp.69-72. We will discuss the second, third and fourth principles of Cartesianism and Peirce’s responses to each of them on Monday.