[5.5.] Objection #1: Naturalism is Question-Begging.

 

Philosophical naturalism relies on “the methods and categories of common day activity and science.” In other words, it assumes that we can find out how things are in the same way that scientists do, which is the same way ordinary people go about their everyday, common-sense investigations of the world.

 

Hook considers the objection that this approach is question-begging[1]:

 

...since the methods and categories of common day activity and science—upon which naturalism relies—are designed to take note only of the existence of certain things, the existence of other things like immaterial entities, cosmic purposes, Gods, and disembodied souls are ruled out a priori. The assertion of their existence on the naturalist’s view must therefore be assumed to be not merely false but meaningless or contradictory. Since we are concerned here with questions of existential fact, the naturalist who naïvely believes himself to be imbued with a spirit of natural piety for a world he has not created, is taxed with the ironic charge of legislating for all existence. (533-34)

 

In other words, naturalism “arbitrarily imposes canons of rationality or intelligibility on human behavior and therefore denies certain important truths on a priori grounds.” (530)

·         Here, “canon” means an accepted principle or rule; so “canons of rationality” refers to accepted principles or rules of reasoning. To say that there are universal canons of reasoning is to say that there are principles of logic or reasoning in accord with which all people reason.

·         The assumption behind this criticism is that there are no universal, objective standards of rationality and no universal method of determining what is and is not rational belief, i.e., the criticism assumes rational-cultural relativism.

 

Hook’s response to the criticism that his view is circular begins by asking us to imagine the claim that a substance, which he calls “R,” exists:

 

Consider someone who comes to you and proclaims on the basis of some special personal experience that an all-pervasive R substance exists. It is neither physical nor psychical nor social, neither natural nor divine, nor can it be identified by, defined in, or reduced, in any sense of reduction, to any physical, psychical, or social terms. It is subject, so you are told, to no material conditions of determination whatsoever. The very request that these conditions be indicated is brushed aside as revealing a constitutional incapacity or blindness to grasp this unique entity to which all sorts of edifying qualities are attributed in an analogical sense, including a triune gender. It is granted by the believer in R that its existence cannot be logically inferred from whatever else is experienced, but he is quick to add that its existence cannot be logically disproved without assuming a question-begging philosophical position which rules out the possibility of this unique cosmic process. The next day he reports personal contact with another presence which he calls the analogical father, and the day after, the analogical grandfather, and so on, until even the most fervent supernaturalist finds himself confronted with an embarrassment of supernatural riches. (535)[2]

 

That is, the defender of R can say that any philosophical view that dismisses his claims about R is simply begging the question, assuming without argument that there is no such thing as R.

 

Hook’s view seems to be that if you think that there is something wrong with the view held by the defender of R and that pointing this out does not constitute begging the question, then you cannot accuse naturalism of begging the question against supernaturalism.

 

 

[5.6.] Universal Canons of Rationality.

 

Hook will not try to demonstrate that naturalism is superior to supernaturalism by appealing to a priori first principles, or by making a brute appeal to intuition.

 

Rather, he will attempt to show that the assumptions made by naturalism “can be made reasonable to ‘reasonable” men.’ (535)

 

What does Hook mean by “reasonable” and “rational”? He says the following:

 

1.      “Canons of evidence and relevance” are the same in philosophy, common-sense, and science. Primitive and modern man have something in common: “a universal pattern of intelligibility understood by everyone who grasps the problem which the tool or technical process is destined to solve,” (537) and that is exemplified in our “effective use of means to achieve ends” (531), e.g.,

• the law of contradiction (it is not the case both that p and that not-p);
• ability to “isolate and distinguish logically unrelated things or ideas”;
• “inhibition of impulses, power of attention, logical thinking, inventiveness.”

 

2.      As the above point indicates, the reasonable / rational is not merely the logical, which consists simply in drawing conclusions implied by premises, or in consistency (absence of contradiction). Even the paranoid schizophrenic can be logical.

 

3.      One “mark” of the reasonable person is

 

his willingness to take responsibility for his actions, to explain why he proceeds to do one thing rather than another, and to recognize that it is his conduct, insofar as it is voluntary, which commits him to a principle or belief rather than any form of words where the two seem at odds with each other. (535)

 

 

[5.7.] Science and Religion.

 

Religion is added to humanity’s “canons of evidence and relevance” when those canons are not enough to attain desired goals: “the depth of the religious sense is inversely proportionate to the degree of reliable control man exercises over his environment and culture.” (539) The less control that an individual (or a group) feels she has over her circumstances, the more likely she is to have deep religious feelings; and the more control she has, the less likely she is to have those feelings.

 

When religion competes with science and technology—when it attempts to deal with issues and situations with which science and technology can also deal—it becomes superstition.

·         A contemporary example, not mentioned by Hook: Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse any medical treatment that requires blood transfusion, including life-saving surgery.[3]

 

Science and religion take different approaches to “mysteries”:

·         Science tries to solve them; it assumes that they may be made less mysterious, even though they may never be completely solved; it assumes that there will always be some mysteries, although it doesn’t assume this about any specific mystery.

·         Religion assumes that some specific mysteries are final.

 

 

Stopping point for Friday November 6. For next time, begin reading the article by Putnam (621-28). Also, your fourth and final response paper, on Hook, is due on Monday, and that your term paper draft is due the following Monday, November 16.