[2.2.4.1.] Frege’s Earlier Solution.

 

“On Sense and Reference” opens as follows:

 

Equality [i.e., identity] gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? (21)

 

Recall what a relation is:

 

relation: (df.) a property that holds between two or more objects or between an object and itself; e.g., being the brother of, being shorter than, being between, admiring

 

Assuming that identity is a relation, is it (1) a relation between the things our words mean, or (2) a relation between those words themselves?

 

Another way to put the question is as follows: Is the sentence “the Morning Star = the Evening Star” about...

 

(1)   a relation that Venus has with itself (namely, the relation of being the same object as), so that the statement “the Morning Star = the Evening Star” means “The Morning Star is the same object as the Evening Star”;

 

or is it about

 

(2)   a relation between the name “the Morning Star” and the name “the Evening Star” (namely, the relation meaning the same thing as), so that the statement “the Morning Star = the Evening Star” means “The name ‘the Morning Star’ means the same as the name ‘the Evening Star.’”

 

In 1879’s Begriffschrift, Frege had maintained that (2) was the correct answer: statements of identity express a relation between pieces of language. His view was that the sentence “a = b” does not make a claim about the thing that “a” and “b” stand for. Rather, it makes a claim about the names “a” and “b” themselves, namely, that they refer to the same thing.

 

And Frege thought that this is the only way to explain how “a = b” and “a = a” can differ in cognitive value when a really is identical to b:

 

The sentence “a = b” says that the name “a” and the name “b” refer to the same thing—and this is not obviously true; you can’t necessarily know that this is true just by understanding the meaning of “a = b”. For example, you cannot know that the names “the Morning Star” and “the Evening Star” refer to the same thing just by understanding the sentence “The Morning Star is the Evening Star.”

 

On the other hand, the sentence “a = a” says that the name “a” and the name “a” refer to the same thing—and this IS obviously true. For example, it is obviously true that the name “the Morning Star” and the name “the Morning Star” refer to the same thing... since they are the same name.

 

So on Frege’s earlier view, in order to explain the difference in cognitive value between “a = a” and “a = b” when a is identical to b, we need to understand identity as a relation between names of the same object, rather than as a relation in which that object stands with itself.

 

 

[2.2.4.2.] Frege’s Objection to His Earlier Solution.

 

By 1892’s “On Sense and Reference,” Frege had changed his mind. He describes the problem with his original solution as follows:

 

On his earlier interpretation of “a = b,” that sentence makes a claim about the names “a” and “b.”

 

The claim that it makes is that those names refer to the same thing.

 

But (says Frege) a speaker can use whatever he or she wants as a name of something. “Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something.” (21)

·         For example, I could take the expressions “the Eiffel Tower” and “Sarah Palin” both to name the man Barack Obama.

·         And when I do this, I can say “the Eiffel Tower = Sarah Palin” and this would be true... since all I would be saying is that “the Eiffel Tower” and “Sarah Palin” are both names of Barack Obama.

 

So if sentences like “a = b” are about names, then they do not express “proper knowledge.”

 

But such statements do express proper knowledge.[1]

 

An identity statement like “The Morning Star = the Evening Star” expresses something more important, something more substantial, than a mere claim about two expressions being names for the same object. It expresses an important astronomical discovery, something more important than the trivial fact that humans have just happened to use the expression “the Morning Star” and the expression “the Evening Star” to refer to the same thing.

 

If Frege’s original solution were correct, then that identity statement would express an extremely trivial fact about how people use two different expressions. But it doesn’t. It expresses an important, non-trivial astronomical discovery. So Frege now says that his original solution cannot be correct.

 

Stopping point for Friday January 16. For next time, read (for the second time) pp.21-23 (to the end of the final full paragraph). Be prepared to answer these questions in class:

1. What solution to the puzzle about identity does he now give?
2. According to Frege’s theory, what would be (a) the sense, (b) the reference, and (c) the idea associated with the name “Barack Obama”?