[2.2.5.] Frege’s New (1892) Solution: The Sense / Reference Distinction.[1]

 

The new solution Frege proposes in “On Sense and Reference” begins with his distinction between two different aspects of meaning:

 

                It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called the reference of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. (21)

 

 

reference [Bedeutung] (df.): the thing that an expression refers to. E.g., the reference of “Barack Obama” is the man Barack Obama.

 

sense[2] [Sinn] (df.): the way an expression picks out its reference. Frege calls it the expression’s “mode of presentation.” The sense of an expression is given by one or more definite descriptions...

 

definite description (df.): a descriptive phrase which uniquely picks out a single individual, or which appears to do so, e.g., “the tallest student in this class,” “the first dog in space,” “the winner of the 2009 Oscar for Best Motion Picture,” etc.

 

So the sense of the name “Barack Obama” is given by the following list of definite descriptions: “the 44^rd President of the United States, who is married to Michelle Obama, and who is a former Senator from Illinois.”

 

Frege applies this distinction to solve the puzzle about identity statements…

 

“The Morning Star” and “the Evening Star” have the same reference but different senses, i.e., they refer to the same thing, but they have different ways of picking out that reference...

 

 

The fact that “the Morning Star” and “the Evening Star” have different senses explains why  “The Morning Star = the Evening Star” is informative in a way that “The Evening Star = the Evening Star” is not.

·         To learn that the a posteriori sentence “The Morning Star is the Evening Star” is true, is to learn that the last star to disappear in the morning is the first star to appear at night, an important astronomical fact.

·         To learn that the a priori sentence “The Morning Star is the Morning Star” is true, is to learn something utterly trivial, that the last star to disappear in the morning is the last star to disappear in the morning; in fact, you can tell that it is true without knowing anything about astronomy.

 

 

[2.2.6.] Customary Reference vs. Indirect Reference.

 

Having introduced the distinction between sense and reference, Frege makes an important point about words in reported speech (p.22). Reported speech consists of words that are being reported as having been spoken by someone else, e.g.,

·         “Hannity said that G. W. Bush is a great President.”

·         “Smith shouted that the house is on fire.”

·         “CNN reported that the economy is in trouble.”

In these examples, the italicized words are the reported speech.

 

 

In reported speech, an expression (either a name or an entire sentence) does not have its customary reference.

 

Instead it has an indirect reference, which is the customary sense of the expression (the sense that the expression normally has).[3]

 

E.g., in “Hannity said that G. W. Bush is a great President”...

·         “G. W. Bush” does not have its customary reference, viz. the man G. W. Bush;

·         rather, it has an indirect reference, namely, the customary sense of “G. W. Bush,” which is something like “The 43^rd President of the United States who was once Governor of Texas and who is the husband on Laura Bush.”

 

Frege does not say very much about this here. But this point about reported speech will be essential to a defense of Frege’s views against an important criticism. (We will consider this next time.)

 

 

[2.2.7.] Further Points About Sense and Reference.

 

Senses are not mental. They are not psychological phenomena in anyone’s mind. Rather, they are public and external to the mind. A sense “may be a common property of many and therefore is not a part of a mode of the individual mind.” (22)

 

In particular, senses are not the same as ideas. Frege distinguishes senses, which are non-mental, from ideas, which he takes to be the “internal images” a person associates with expressions, e.g., the mental image I have of Barack Obama. My idea of Barack Obama must be different (that is, not numerically identical) than yours, since mine is in my mind and yours is in your mind. But you and I may both “grasp” the same sense of the name “Barack Obama.” Says Frege, two individuals “are not prevented from grasping the same sense; but they cannot have the same idea.” (22)

 

Sense determines reference. In other words, the reference of an expression (if in fact it has a reference) depends on the sense of the expression; e.g.,

·         it is because the sense of the name “Barack Obama” is what it is that that name refers to Obama and not anyone else;

·         it is because the sense of “Santa Claus” is what it is (something like “The magical jolly fat man who lives at the North Pole and delivers toys all over the world on Christmas Eve”) that the expression “Santa Clause” does not refer to anything at all.

 

And as that last example illustrates…

 

All meaningful expressions have a sense, but they don’t all have a reference. E.g., “Santa Claus” has a sense but no reference (since there is no real thing that that definite description describes).

 

 

Stopping point for Friday January 16. For next time (Wednesday January 21), read “On Sense and Reference” pp.23-25 (to the end of the first column). Questions for next time:

·         According to Frege, what is the sense of a declarative sentence?

·         According to Frege, what is the reference of a declarative sentence?