[2.2.10.1.] A Defense, and a Rejoinder.

 

A defender of the Correspondence Theory (CT) might respond as follows: Frege is wrong to say that the Correspondence Theory leads us into an infinite cycle whenever we attempt to discover whether a sentence is true. For example, if we want to know whether the sentence “The mug contains water” is true, all we have to do is check to see whether the mug contains water. We don’t have to check whether there is a relation between that sentence and the world. So lines 2 and 3 do not follow from assumption 1.

 

But Frege might answer this objection as follows:

·         The defender of correspondence is right: we can check to see whether “p” is true without checking whether there is a relation between “p” and the world.

·         But in saying this, she is denying the Correspondence Theory. If we can check whether “p” is true without checking whether “p” stands in a certain relation to the world, then the truth of “p” must not be a relation to the world.

·         Furthermore, the fact that we can check that “p” is true simply by checking whether or not p (e.g., we can check that “The mug contains water” is true simply by checking whether or not the mug contains water) suggests that truth is not a property at all.

 

This conclusion suggests a different theory about truth, the Redundancy Theory. We will return to this shortly.

 

 

[2.2.11.] Thoughts as Immaterial, Imperceptible Truth-Bearers.

 

Contemporary philosophers use the term “truth-bearer” to refer to anything that can be true or false, be it a sentence, proposition, statement, belief, or anything else.

 

Frege’s position is that thoughts (i.e., propositions, the senses expressed by sentences) are truth-bearers:

 

... when we call a sentence true we really mean its sense is. From which it follows that it is for the sense of a sentence that the question of truth arises in general. ...

                Without wishing to give a definition, I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises. So I ascribe what is false to a thought just as much as what is true. So I can say: the thought is the sense of the sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of every sentence is a thought. The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought. (94)

 

So for Frege, sentences are not truth-bearers.

 

Rather, it is the sense expressed by a sentence that is a truth-bearer, i.e., that is capable of being true or false.

 

He goes on to make a few more negative claims about thoughts and truth:

 

A thought is something immaterial and everything material and perceptible is excluded from this sphere of that for which the question of truth arises. Truth is not a quality that corresponds with a particular kind of sense-impression. So it is sharply distinguished from the qualities which we denote by the words “red,” “bitter,” “lilac-smelling.” (94)

 

·         Thoughts are immaterial (non-physical).

·         Thoughts are imperceptible (cannot be seen, heard, etc.).

·         Truth, if it is a quality at all, is very much unlike perceptible qualities (colors, tastes, smells, etc.)

 

But now he considers an objection to that last claim, and a response to that objection:

 

[Objection:] But do we not see that the sun has risen and do we not then also see that this is true? [Response:] That the sun has risen is not an object that emits rays that reach my eyes, it is not a visible thing like the sun itself. That the sun has risen is seen to be true on the basis of sense-impressions. But being true is not a material, perceptible property. (94)

 

And finally, he points out that

 

·         We recognize some thoughts (propositions) to be true on the basis of sense impressions (e.g., the thought that the sun has risen), but not all (e.g., the thought that I do not smell anything right now).

 

 

[2.2.11.] The Redundancy Theory.

 

Frege does say something positive about truth:

 

It is also worthy of notice that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has just the same content as the sentence “it is true that I smell the scent of violets.” So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. (95)

 

·         When we say the that thought that p is true, we are saying nothing more than had we simply said that p.

 

He made the same point about a different true sentence in “On Sense and Reference”:

 

                One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought to the True not as that of sense to reference, but rather as that of subject to predicate. One can, indeed, say: ‘The thought, that 5 is a prime number, is true.’ But closer examination shows that nothing more has been said than in the simple sentence ‘5 is a prime number.’ (24)

 

What Frege says here resembles the

 

redundancy theory of truth (a.k.a. deflationism) (df.): the word “true” (as well as the word “false”) can always be eliminated from a linguistic context without loss of meaning.

·         For example, the sentence “It is true that Obama is President” means exactly the same thing as “Obama is President.” Other sentences require more complicated “translations” to eliminate the word “true”, e.g. “Everything Obama says is true” might mean the same as, “For any proposition p, if Obama says that p, then p.”

·         This theory derives primarily from 20^th c. British philosopher Frank Ramsey and has appeared in numerous different versions throughout the 20^th century.[1]

 

According to this theory, truth is not a relation between a proposition (or sentence, or belief) and the world; in fact, truth is not a property at all.

 

Frege’s example about the smell of violets clearly anticipates this theory: “It is true that I smell the scent of violets” means exactly the same as “I smell the scent of violets.” The phrase “it is true that” can be eliminated without changing the meaning of the sentence at all.

 

But note that he goes on to say some things that indicate he is not completely satisfied with the redundancy theory:

 

And yet is it not a great result when the scientist, after much hesitation and careful inquiry, can finally say ‘What I supposed is true’? The meaning of the word ‘true’ seems to be altogether unique. May we not be dealing here with something which cannot, in the ordinary sense, be called a quality at all? (95)

 

Which theory of truth is correct (if in fact any of them is) is still a matter of controversy.[2]

 

Stopping point for Wednesday January 28. For next time, no new reading. Review your lecture notes from the last two classes, and re-read pp.95-99 of “The Thought.”