[2.3.4.4.] Competing Theories: Frege.

 

Russell describes two competing theories of the meaning of denoting terms: those of Alexius Meinong (Austrian, 1853-1920) and Frege. We will examine only what Russell says about Frege.[1]

 

Russell reminds us of the following:

·         Frege distinguishes between denotation, a.k.a. reference (the very thing that an expression picks out or refers to) and meaning, a.k.a. sense (the way in which that expression picks out its reference).

·         The distinction provides an explanation of the fact that “it is often worth while to assert identity.” (35)

 

E.g., “Scott = the author of Waverely.” Frege would say that this sentence has cognitive significance because “Scott” and “the author of Waverley” have different senses, whereas “Scott = Scott” lacks cognitive significance.[2]

 

But, says Russell, Frege’s account has a big problem: it does not deal well with non-referring terms, e.g., “The present king of France.” If Frege’s view is correct, this expression has sense but no reference, and so a sentence in which it occurs (e.g., “The present king of France is bald”) “ought to be nonsense; but it is not nonsense, since it is plainly false.” (35)

 

Here Russell seems to be assuming that the sense of an expression like “the king of France” is not enough to keep a sentence like “The king of France is bald” from being non-sensical. Perhaps this is because Russell is translating Frege’s term “Sinn” as “meaning” rather than as “sense.” So, on Russell’s understanding of Frege’s theory, when a term lacks a Sinn, it lacks a meaning and should thus be meaningless, nonsense.

 

Frege actually says that sentences with non-referring terms, like “Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep” and “The present king of France is bald,” are neither true nor false.

 

So this is a central disagreement between Frege and Russell:

·         Frege takes sentences that contain non-referring expressions to be neither true nor false.

·         Russell takes them to be false.

 

[Russell gives a long, difficult argument against Frege’s sense-reference distinction, one involving the example of the first line of Gray’s Elegy, at pp.36-37.]

 

 

[2.3.4.5.] Puzzle #1: Substitutivity and Propositional Attitude Reports.

 

Russell intended the Theory of Descriptions to solve three philosophical puzzles. (He describes them on p.36.)

 

The first is a puzzle about co-referring terms in reports of propositional attitudes.

 

propositional attitude (df.): a psychological relationship that a person can have with a proposition (e.g., believing that, knowing that, hoping that, wishing that, desiring that, fearing that...)

·         Remember that, on the standard view, a report of a propositional attitude creates an intensional context, i.e., a context in which the Principle of Substitutivity fails. See lecture notes 2.2.8.1, 2.2.8.2 and 2.2.8.3.

 

Russell uses the following sentence to illustrate the puzzle:

 

(A) “George IV wanted to know if Scott is the author of Waverley.” [true]

 

Scott (i.e., Sir Walter Scott) is in fact the author of the historical novel Waverley. So “Scott” and “the author of Waverley ” seem to refer to the same thing.

 

So according to the Principle of Substitutivity the truth value of (A) should not change if we replace “the author of Waverley ” with “Scott.”

 

But that truth value does change:

 

(B) “George IV wanted to know if Scott is Scott.” [false]

 

George IV does not want to know if Scott is Scott—he knows that Scott is Scott. So (A) is true and (B) is false. How do we explain this apparent failure of the Principle of Substitutivity?

 

 

[2.3.4.6.] Solving Puzzle #1.

 

Frege would say that words that occur in reports of propositional attitudes do not have their customary reference; rather, they have an indirect reference, which is their customary sense [see lecture notes 2.2.8.5].

 

Russell will answer the question differently. On his view,

 

(C) “Scott was the author of Waverley.”

 

should be translated as follows:

 

(D) “One and only one entity wrote Waverley, and Scott was identical with that one.” (pp.37-38)[3]

 

The expression “the author of Waverley” has been analyzed away. The same will happen when we translate (A) “George IV wanted to know if Scott was the author of Waverley.”

 

So how should it be translated? Russell says that the sentence is ambiguous and can be translated in either of two ways:

 

(E1) “George IV wished to know whether one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott was that man.” (38)[4]

·         In order for this to be true, George IV must know that there is a written work known as Waverley, and he must want to know whether Scott wrote that work.

 

(E2) “One and only one man wrote Waverley, and George IV wished to know whether Scott was that man.” (38) I.e., “George IV wished to know, concerning the man who in fact wrote Waverley, whether he was Scott.”[5]

·         This could be true even if George IV never heard of Waverley. For example, suppose that George IV sees someone walking towards him and wonders, “Is that guy walking toward me Scott?” He could wonder this without knowing anything about writing or books, and without wondering whether Scott had written a book.

 

But neither of these translations contains an expression that refers to Scott (except, of course, the expression “Scott”). So the problem about the Principle of Substitutivity does not arise for either of these translations.[6]

 

In general, Russell’s solution is this: when the sentence is accurately translated, the words that seem to be co-referring expressions with and that pose the problem for the Principle of Substitutivity disappear. Accurate translations eliminate threats to the Principle of Substitutivity.

 

Stopping point for Wednesday February 4. For next time, finish reading Russell’s “On Denoting” (pp.39-40). Come prepared to answer:

1. What are the second and third puzzles that Russell’s Theory of Denoting Terms is supposed to solve?

2. How does Russell think he solves them?