[3.5.3.2.] Meaningless Words of Metaphysics.

 

As we have seen, Carnap uses “metaphysics” in a very broad sense, to include not only the philosophical investigation of being, existence, and what there is, but also “all philosophy of value and normative theory.” So for Carnap, metaphysics includes ethics.

 

Some alleged statements of metaphysics are meaningless because they contain meaningless words. (Again, there is a second way in which an apparent statement can actually be a meaningless pseudo-statement; we will examine this second way soon.)

 

Carnap applies his criterion of meaningfulness to two metaphysical terms: “principle” and “God.” We will focus on the latter.

 

First Carnap distinguishes three different uses of the word “God”:

 

mythological use: on this use “God” has a clear meaning: it refers to either

·         physical beings, or

·         non-physical, spiritual beings whose actions can have empirically detectable consequences;

Sentences that contain “God” used in this sense are empirically verifiable (there is empirical evidence that would show them to be true or false) and thus they have cognitive meaning.

 

metaphysical use: on this use “God” refers to something beyond experience and therefore violates both conditions of meaningfulness:

(1)   There is no specification of how it occurs in its elementary sentence. That sentence would have to be “x is a God”, but those who use the word would either (a) deny that this is the correct elementary sentence or (b) fail to specify the “syntactic category” of “x,” i.e., fail to specify whether x is a material thing, a number, a property, a relation, or what exactly.

(2)   There is no specification of which sentences it implies and which are implied by it (and remember, the words contained in those sentences would be subject to the same criteria of meaningfulness).

 

The third use is a hybrid of the mythological and metaphysical uses:

 

theological use

·         This use falls between the other two; it is not a specific, unique use on its own, but simply an “oscillation” between the mythological and metaphysical uses.

·         For this reason, some theological statements about God are mythological, therefore empirical, therefore “subject to the judgment of empirical science”—presumably Carnap thinks such statements are fated to be shown to be false by science.

·         Other theological statements are metaphysical pseudo-statements and are meaningless.

 

The Verification Principle is clearly at work here.

 

Carnap concludes that “[j]ust like the examined examples ‘principle’ and ‘God,’ most of the other specifically metaphysical terms are devoid of meaning...” (p.109-- see the rest of the paragraph)

 

 

 

 

[3.5.3.3.] Bad Logical Syntax of Metaphysics.

 

Now Carnap will consider the second sort of metaphysical pseudo-statement, those that “consist of meaningful words, but the words are put together in such a way that nevertheless no meaning results.” (109, emphasis added)

 

They are not meaningless in the way that “Caesar is and” is meaningless, but in the way that “Caesar is a prime number” is meaningless. The phrase “prime number” is a grammatical predicate, but it is a predicate of numbers, not of people. To predicate “prime number” of a person makes no sense.

 

Here Carnap makes a distinction between grammatical syntax and logical syntax. “Caesar is a prime number” does not violate grammatical syntax, but it does violate logical syntax. Sentences can be perfectly grammatical, and yet still be meaningless.

 

A famous example of this sort of sentence, from linguist Noam Chomsky, is: “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously!”

 

 

[3.5.3.4.] Heidegger as an Example of Bad Logical Syntax.

 

Carnap cites Heidegger’s claims about Nothingness as examples of pseudo-statements that violate logical syntax.

 

“Rain is outside” is grammatically and logically OK.

 

“Nothing is outside” is grammatically OK, although logically it is somewhat confused. But it is nonetheless meaningful, because it can be translated into a logically correct sentence: “It is not the case that there is an x such that x is outside.”

 

But consider the following claims made by Heidegger:

·         “We seek the Nothing.”

·         “We find the Nothing.”

·         “We know the Nothing.”

·         “The Nothing nothings.”

·         “The Nothing exists...”

Although they are grammatically OK, they are not logically OK. And unlike “Nothing is outside,” they cannot be translated into logically correct sentences. So according to Carnap, they are meaningless.

 

Says Carnap, in a logically correct language, we would not use a noun (like “nothing”) to deny the existence of something. Unfortunately, in English (and in German, the language in which Heidegger wrote), we do use a noun to construct such statements. And this makes it grammatically possible to use that same noun in predication statements (e.g., “We seek the Nothing.”) even when doing so makes no logical sense.

 

Not only does Heidegger use “Nothing” in predication statements when it makes no logical sense; he transforms the word into a verb: “the Nothing nothings.” So the sentence “The Nothing nothings” is meaningless for both reasons described by Carnap: not only is its logical syntax bad, but it also contains a meaningless word, viz. “nothing” used as a verb.

 

Carnap considers the possibility that Heidegger is using “Nothing” in an unusual sense, possibly “to refer to a certain emotional constitution, possibly of a religious sort, or something or other that underlies such emotions.” (112)  But he finds in Heidegger’s own text two reasons to reject this explanation. [see p.112]

 

 

Stopping point for Wednesday February 25. For next time, finish reading the Carnap article (pp.115-117, sec.7). Be ready to answer the following question: Explain what Carnap means by the claim that “Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability.”