Carnap considers the possibility that Heidegger is using “Nothing” in an unusual sense, possibly “to refer to a certain emotional constitution, possibly of a religious sort, or something or other that underlies such emotions.” (112)  But he finds in Heidegger’s own text two reasons to reject this explanation:

 

1.      “[T]he first sentence of the quotation at the beginning of this section proves that this interpretation is not possible.” (112) That first sentence is: “What is to be investigated is being only and—nothing else; being along and further—nothing; solely being, and beyond being—nothing.” (quoted at 110). So at least at the beginning of the passage in question, Heidegger is clearly using “nothing” in its ordinary sense.

 

 

2.      Heidegger “is clearly aware of the conflict between his questions and statements, and logic. ... [Heidegger] himself here states that his questions and answers are irreconcilable with logic and the scientific way of thinking.” (112) In particular, Carnap quotes Heidegger as saying that when it comes to the topic of “the Nothing,” “the law of prohibited contradiction ... destroys this question [i.e., question and answer in regard to the Nothing]”.

 

The law to which Heidegger is referring is:

 

Law of Non-Contradiction (df.): it is not the case that both “p” and “not-p” are true.^[1]

 

This is similar to but different from:

 

Law of Excluded Middle (df.): either “p” is true or “not-p” is true.

·         This is the form of LEM that Russell advocates in “On Denoting,” as well as the form that contemporary philosophers accept; the negation in “not-p” applies to all of “p” rather than just to its predicate. In this way it differs from the earlier statement of LEM, according to which either “A is B” is true or “A is not-B” is true.

 

Since anything whatsoever follows from a contradiction (i.e., from a statement of the form “p and not-p”), the idea that LNC does not apply to a given subject area is very radical. It is tantamount to saying that anything whatsoever is true (as well as false!) of that subject. In short, logic simply fails to apply.

 

 

[3.5.3.6.] What’s Left for Philosophy?

 

By counting metaphysics (as well as ethics and aesthetics—remember that Carnap includes “philosophy of value and normative theory” within his broad conception of metaphysics) as meaningless, Carnap and the other logical positivists eliminated much of what was traditionally thought to be the job of philosophy. What's left for philosophers to do?

 

Part of Carnap’s answer, and the answer of the Vienna Circle in general, is that philosophy becomes the clarification of concepts and propositions, especially for scientific and mathematical purposes:

 

                But what, then, is left over for philosophy, if all statements whatever that assert something are of an empirical nature and belong to factual science? What remains is not statements, nor a theory, nor a system, but only a method; the method of logical analysis. The foregoing discussion has illustrated the negative application of this method: in that context it serves to eliminate meaningless words, meaningless pseudo-statements. In its positive use it serves to clarify meaningful concepts and propositions, to lay logical foundations for factual science and for mathematics. (115)

 

 

[3.5.3.7] The Purpose of Metaphysics.

 

So metaphysics does not serve the purpose that metaphysicians think it serves: it neither conveys theories capable of being true or false nor contributes to human knowledge

 

But, says Carnap, it does serve some purpose: “the expression of the general attitude of a person towards life.”(116) This is the same purpose served by poetry, art, and music.

 

But the metaphysician makes a mistake that the poet, artist and musician do not make: he takes himself to be making statements, to be asserting something, to be describing states of affairs, to be saying things which are capable of being true.

 

So we find metaphysicians supporting their claims with (what looks like) argumentation and evidence; and we find them disagreeing with one another. (Compare poets: you’ll never find a poet attempting in his work to show that what some other poet has said in her work is false.)

 

Carnap concludes:

 

Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability. Instead they have a strong inclination to work within the medium of the theoretical, to connect concepts and thoughts. Now, instead of activating, on the one hand, this inclination in the domain of science, and satisfying, on the other hand, the need for expression in art, the metaphysician confuses the two and produces a structure which achieves nothing for knowledge and something inadequate for the expression of attitude. (116-17, emphasis added)

 

 

[3.5.3.8.] Objections to Logical Positivism.

 

The Verification Principle is no longer accepted by the vast majority of philosophers (perhaps it’s not accepted by anyone!). Here are three of the criticisms that helped kill logical positivism:

 

1. The Verification Principle does not meet the logical positivists’ own standard of meaningfulness.

 

Recall that the positivists recognized only two types of statement with cognitive meaning:

·         analytic a priori: have logical meaning

·         synthetic a posteriori: have empirical meaning

 

The Verification Principle says: “A sentence S is empirically meaningful if and only if S is verifiable by experience, i.e., can shown to be true or false by means of the senses.”

 

The Principle itself is not synthetic a posteriori, since it cannot be shown to be true or false by means of the senses; so it is not empirically meaningful.

 

Further, the Principle is not analytic a priori, since it is not logically true (or false); so it does not have logical meaning.

 

So according to this criticism, on the standards accepted by Carnap and the other members of the Vienna Circle, the Verification Principle itself lacks cognitive meaning.

 

 

2. Popper’s falsificationism.

 

Sir Karl Popper (Austrian, 1902-1994)^[2]

·         philosopher of science, political philosopher

·         as a young man, Popper was in Vienna during the 1920s and 30s, the heyday of the Vienna Circle, but never broke into that group of older (and at that time more successful) philosophers

 

Popper criticized the Vienna Circle for placing too much emphasis on the verification of empirical claims. He developed an influential view of science called falsificationism

 

falsificationism (df.): scientific theories cannot be verified (shown to be true); they can only be shown to be false.

 

Popper argued that no general statement (e.g., “all emeralds are green”; “all crows are black”) can be verified, no matter how many individual observations scientists make. They might observe thousands, even millions of green emeralds, but that does not rule out the possibility that the next emerald they observe will be a different color; and they might see any number of black crows, but it will still remain possible that some crow examined in the future will be non-black.

 

However, general statements can be falsified. For example, if we discover an emerald that is not green, then we have falsified the claim that all emeralds are green.

 

On Popper’s view, science is really interested in falsifying theories. Hypotheses are generated and rigorously tested. The ones that fail are rejected, but we hold on to the ones that continually pass the test. Science is self-correcting; it gives us a series of conjectures which we have no reason to accept right off the bat. All are subject to falsification.

 

According to Popper, the difference between real sciences (physics, chemistry, etc.) and pseudo-sciences (which on his view included astrology, psychoanalysis, and Marx’s account of history) is that pseudo-sciences make claims that cannot be falsified: their claims are always compatible with all possible observational evidence.

 

Popper was very influential, but his idea of falsification has been rejected. However, his concept of science as self-correcting is still popular.

 

Some members of the Vienna Circle thought that Popper made too big a deal of his differences from them; after all, the Verification Principle holds that a statement is empirically meaningful if and only if it is verifiable or falsifiable.

 

 

3. Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

 

The logical positivists assumed that there is a genuine distinction between analytic statements and synthetic statements.

 

In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951), one of the most famous and widely-discussed works in the history of analytic philosophy,^[3] W. V. O. Quine (a friend and student of Carnap) launched an attack on logical positivism. Part of his attack was a rejection of “the dogma” that there is a genuine distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.

 

The following summarizes his reasoning:

 

1.      If there is a real, legitimate distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, then we must be able to explain analyticity in a satisfying, non-circular fashion.

 

That is, we must be able to give a philosophically satisfying account of what it is for a statement to be analytic, an account which itself does not rely on the notion of analyticity.

 

2.      But analyticity cannot be explained in a satisfying, non-circular fashion.

 

·         it cannot be explained in terms of meaning;

·         it cannot be explained in terms of synonymy, since synonymy itself cannot be explained in a non-circular way (not in terms of definition, nor in terms of interchangeability without change of truth value);

·         it cannot be explained in terms of the semantical rules of an artificial language.

 

[Quine’s arguments in support of this second premise are quite complicated and abstract. Note that more than 50 years later, there is no consensus among philosophers as to whether Quine’s arguments in support of this premise work.]

 

3.      So, there is no real, legitimate distinction between analytic statements (those that are true in virtue of the meanings of their words) and synthetic statements (those that are true in virtue of BOTH the meanings of their words AND the facts).

 

At one point in his arguments, Quine asks: is the statement

 

“Everything green is extended.”

 

analytic or synthetic? He concludes that he cannot answer this question. The problem is not that there is something wrong with the word “green” or the word “extended.” The problem is with the distinction between analytic statements and synthetic statements. The fact that there is no answer to the question about the above sentence is a symptom of the illegitimacy of the analytic/synthetic distinction itself.

 

 

Stopping point for Friday February 27. For next time, begin reading the article by Quine in your textbook (pp.133-36). Be ready to answer the following questions:

1.      What is the problem that Quine calls “Plato’s beard”?

2.      How does McX solve that problem, and why does Quine think that he is mistaken?

3.      How does Wyman solve that problem, and why does Quine think that he is mistaken, as well?

4.      How does Quine think we should solve the problem?