[3.5.2.1.] Realism.

 

One answer to the problem of universals is:

 

realism (df.): there are universals, entities that have being independently of particular things and to which all particular things of a given kind relate.

·         Examples: all particular green things stand in a relationship to the universal greenness; all apples stand in a relationship to the universal apple; all samples of silver stand in a relationship to the universal silver.

·         Universals are separate from and independent of the particulars to which they relate.

·         While each particular can be at only one position in space at any one time, a universal can be wholly exhibited or exemplified by many different (spatially separate) particulars. It is not that one apple has 1/1000^th of the universal apple in it; rather, the entire universal is exhibited or exemplified in any given particular apple.

·         So according to this type of realism, one's ontology should include something over and above particulars: it should include universals.

 

*Important caveat: the word “realism” is used to refer to several different theories. We will soon encounter a different theory that goes by the same name, so be prepared to distinguish the two.

 

[3.5.2.2.] Conceptual Schemes.

 

Quine uses McX to illustrate realism:

 

Speaking of attributes, he [McX] says: “There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; this much is prephilosophical common sense in which we must all agree. These houses, roses, and sunsets, then, have something in common; and this which they have in common is all I mean by the attribute of redness.” (137)

 

Quine describes McX’s realism as being “basic” to his conceptual scheme:

 

conceptual scheme (df.): one’s conceptual scheme is the way in which he or she orders, or structures, or otherwise organizes, the content of his or her experiences, and thus renders those experiences intelligible.^[1]

 

On Quine’s view, your ontology is a fundamental part of your conceptual scheme:

 

One’s ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which he interprets all experiences, even the most commonplace ones. Judged within some particular conceptual scheme—and how else is judgment possible?—an ontological statement goes without saying, standing in need of no separate justification at all. (137)

 

 

[3.5.2.3.] Arguments for Realism.

 

Even though (according to Quine) one’s ontology is a basic part of her conceptual scheme, it is still possible to argue for or against an ontological claim. So Quine now considers what sort of argument McX might give to defend his view.

 

Quine says (based on the results he reached earlier) that the following sort of argument for realism will not do:

 

There must be universals, because otherwise expressions like “is green” (“is sweet,” “is an apple,” etc.) would be meaningless. I.e., we must posit the existence of universals in order to explain the meaningfulness of such terms.

 

Quine has already argued that terms can be meaningful even if there are no objects that they name; naming is one kind of meaning, but it is not the only kind. So he rejects this sort of argument.

 

He then considers a slightly different defense of realism:

 

...you admit they [i.e., expressions like “is red,” etc.] have meanings. But these meanings, whether they are named or not, are still universals, and I venture to say that some of them might even be the very things that I call attributes, or something to much the same purpose in the end. (137)

 

Says Quine in response:

 

...the only way I know to counter it is by refusing to admit meanings. However, I feel no reluctance toward refusing to admit meanings, for I do not thereby deny that words and statements are meaningful. (137)

 

In other words, the fact that a piece of language is meaningful does not imply that it “has” or corresponds to an entity that is its meaning. We can acknowledge the meaningfulness of language without allowing things called meanings into our ontology.

 

Quine suggests two different ways in which one could understand what meaning is without adding meanings to one’s ontology:

 

I remain free to maintain that the fact that a given linguistic utterance is meaningful (or significant, as I prefer to say so as not to invite hypostasis of meanings as entities) is an ultimate and irreducible matter of fact, or, I may undertake to analyze it in terms directly of what people do in the presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to it. (137, bold added)

 

hypostasis (df.): the process of converting an adjective (or other part of a predicate) into a substance or entity; e.g., one would do this if, from the fact that F is G, one were to infer that there is such an entity as G-ness.^[2]

·         What Quine wants to avoid is the move from the claim that a sentence is meaningful to the claim that there are entities called meanings.

 

 

[3.5.2.4.] Nominalism.

 

The first option that Quine suggests reflects the view he himself takes regarding the ontological status of universals:

 

nominalism (df.): there are no universals. The only things there are, are particulars. In other words, nominalism says that one's ontology should not include universals; it should only include particular things.

 

Quine acknowledges that individual apples, houses, etc. are red; but he denies that this requires there to be an entity, redness, existing independently of individual apples, houses, etc.

 

So how can we explain attribute agreement? Realism was proposed as an explanation of the seemingly mysterious fact that two individual things can share an attribute in common. If realism is not true, then how can we explain that fact?

 

Quine says: we can’t. Attribute agreement is an ultimate, irreducible fact.

 

That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held that McX is no better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits under such names as ‘redness.’ (137)

 

Quine’s view seems to be that we do not need to explain attribute agreement at all: it is a fundamental and non-analyzable aspect of the world.^[3]

 

 

Stopping point for Friday March 6.  We will finish our treatment of Quine next time.