[4.] Epistemology.

 

[4.1.] Introduction to Epistemology. [1]

 

 

[4.1.1.] “Epistemology” vs. “Theory of Knowledge”.

 

Epistemology is the philosophical theory of knowledge.

 

In philosophy, the term “epistemology” is preferred over the expression “theory of knowledge.”  This is because “epistemology” refers to the philosophical theory of knowledge, in contrast to, say, psychological theory of learning or the sociology of learning, both of which have something to do with knowledge but neither of which consists of philosophical theory.

 

Another reason to use the term “epistemology” rather than “theory of knowledge” is that “epistemology” derives from the Greek language, and many of epistemology’s central questions go back to the Greek philosophers Socrates and Plato.

 

A third reason: “epistemology” has adjectival and adverbial forms (“epistemological” and “epistemically”), whereas “theory of knowledge” does not.

 

 

[4.1.2.] Three Different Uses of “Knowledge.”

 

Sometimes when speaking about knowledge, we say something like: “Smith knows Atlanta,” or “Obama knows Biden.” Such ascriptions of knowledge have the form “S knows x,” where “S” stands for a subject of knowledge (typically a person) and “x” stands for something (an object) that S knows. This is object knowledge.

 

But other times, we say things like: “Smith knows that Atlanta is the capital of Georgia,” or “Obama knows that Biden is Vice-President.” This kind of knowledge ascription has the form “S knows that p,” and “p” stands for a proposition. This is propositional knowledge.

 

In English there is a single term, “know,” for both types of knowledge.

 

But different terms remain in some other languages:

·         Spanish (“conocer” vs. “saber”)

·         French (“connaître” vs. “savoir”)

·         German (“kennen” vs. “wissen”)

 

There is yet a third way in which we use the word “knowledge”: when we say “Smith knows how to drive” or “Obama knows how to light a cigarette.” Such ascriptions have the form “S knows how to a,” where “a” stands for some action. This is know-how knowledge.

Epistemology tends to be primarily concerned with propositional knowledge rather than object knowledge and know-how knowledge.

 

 

[4.1.3.] Problems in Epistemology.

 

Epistemologists have concerned themselves with a number of different issues and questions involving knowledge:

 

1.      How should we define the word “knowledge” (in the sense of propositional knowledge)?

 

·         The traditional answer to this question is: knowledge is justified true belief, so that S knows that p if and only if

(i)                 S believes that p

(ii)               S is justified in believing that p, and

(iii)             it is true that p.

This is known as JTB Theory.

 

·         The reading by Edmund Gettier addresses this issue.

 

2.      How can we explain what it is to have good reasons for believing that p; i.e., how can we explain (epistemic) justification, i.e., (epistemic) warrant?

 

3.      Is certainty possible? This question involves epistemic certainty rather than psychological certainty:

 

epistemic certainty (df.): S is epistemically certain that p if and only if S believes that p and it is impossible that S’s belief that p is mistaken.

 

This is very different from

 

psychological certainty (df.): a feeling that a belief one has must be true, e.g., when I see the desks in this room and come to believe that the room contains desks, I feel certain that there are desks in the room.

 

It is possible to feel certain that p even if it is false that p; e.g., a gambling addict might feel certain that she is going to win the next hand of blackjack, even if in fact she is not.

 

Some philosophers deny that certainty is possible; they accept

 

fallibilism (df.): the view according to which any belief that anyone has could possibly be mistaken; even those beliefs about which we feel the most certain could possibly be false.

 

G. E. Moore [author of your next reading] is not one of those philosophers; he will argue that there are beliefs about which we can be epistemically certain.

 

4.      Questions about skepticism (df.): the view that we have very little knowledge, perhaps none at all.

 

·         One source of worries about skepticism in the modern era is the Meditations on First Philosophy by Rene Descartes and the evil demon thought experiment Descartes uses in attempt to discover whether he is capable of having certainty.

·         In the 20^th century, Descartes’ question whether there might be an evil demon who fools you about everything was replaced by the question whether it is possible that you are a brain in a vat. Hilary Putnam has argued against this sort of skepticism.[2]

 

5.      Questions about perception, e.g., how does it work, and what is its contribution to our having justified beliefs? What is it that we directly perceive when we have sense experiences?

 

·         That last question was alluded to in your reading from Carnap (1932’s “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language). Recall that in his discussion of observation sentences (sentences that contain the most basic words, i.e., the words to which all other empirically meaningful words can be “reduced”—see the “arthropod” example in the notes for February 25), he noted that those sentences refer to “the given,” that which is “given” to us in our sensory experience of the world. But he also noted that there is no consensus as to what the given is, i.e., no consensus about what it is that we are directly experiencing when we have a sensory experience: extra-mental things, the physical objects that exist apart from our sensing them, or the “simplest qualities of sense and feeling,” e.g., warmth, blueness, joy, etc.

 

6.      What principles or guidelines should we follow in conducting inquiry?

 

7.      Is there non-empirical knowledge? For example, is there mathematical knowledge? Is it about the world or about something else? How do we get it?

 

8.      Does science have a special epistemological status, and if so, why?

 

 

Stopping point for Friday April 3. For next time, begin reading the article in your textbook by G. E. Moore, “A Defense of Common-Sense.” Read pp.175-80.

 

The draft of your term paper (minimum 1500 words, emailed, in .doc or .rtf format only, not .docx) by 9am on Sunday April 12. (Class will not meet on Friday April 10, since I will be at a conference.)