[3.8.2.] The Moral Consultation Argument.

 

This is Rachels’s second argument against MCR:

 

1.      If MCR is true, then we can discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standards of our society.*

2.      But we cannot discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standards of our society.

3.      Therefore, MCR is not true.

 

*For example, if MCR is true, Martin Luther King Jr. could simply consult the standards of 1950s America to determine whether discriminatory treatment of blacks was moral; if MCR is true, then Fauziya Kassindja could simply consult the standards of 1990s Togo to determine whether it was moral for a young woman to be forced to undergo female genital mutilation against her will.[1]

 

Is this argument sound? We will return to this question after we examine Rachels’s third argument against MCR.

 

 

[3.8.3.] The Moral Improvement Argument.

 

1.      If MCR is true, then a society cannot become morally better than it was before.*

2.      But a society can become morally better than it was before.

3.      Therefore, MCR is not true.

 

*There are many examples: the end of slavery in America; changes in America over the last four decades in the treatment of women and minorities; changes in Germany since the end of WWII... if MCR is true, then none of these constitutes a moral improvement of the society in question..

 

Is this argument sound? …

 

 

[3.9.] Assessing the Three Arguments Against MCR.

 

Each of Rachel’s three arguments against MCR is valid. Each has the same logical form or structure. This form is known as modus tollens (Lat., “method of denying”):

 

 

modus tollens

If p, then q.

Not q.

Therefore not p.

 

 

[3.9.2.] The First Premise of Each Argument: True.

 

Each of the three arguments begins by stating a consequence of MCR. In other words, each of the first premises simply states that if MCR is true, then there is a consequence of the theory that is also true:

 

Moral Inferiority: If MCR is true, then no customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own.

 

Moral Consultation: If MCR is true, then we can discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standards of our society.

 

Moral Improvement: If MCR is true, then a society cannot become morally better than it was before.

 

The first premise in each argument is true. MCR really does have those three consequences.

 

 

[3.9.3.] The Second Premise of Each Argument: ???.

 

A harder question: Is the second premise of each argument true?

 

Moral Inferiority. Some customs of other societies (e.g., slavery; anti-Semitism) are morally inferior to our own.

 

Moral Consultation: We cannot discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standards of our society.

 

Moral Improvement: A society can become morally better than it was before.

 

Since each argument is valid, and since each argument has a first premise that is true, the only thing that might be wrong with any of the arguments is that its second premise is false.

 

So a defender of MCR must “bite the bullet” and reject the second premise of each of these arguments, thereby accepting three unpleasant consequences of MCR.

 

Let’s take the Moral Inferiority Argument, for example. A defender of MCR must say that premise (2) is false. She must say that, in fact, slavery in contemporary Africa and the Middle East is morally no worse than the rejection of slavery in contemporary Europe and America.  Forcing people into slavery, and not forcing them into slavery, are morally equivalent.

 

The same sort of approach must be taken by the defender of MCR against the Moral Consultation Argument.  She must “bite the bullet,” say that premise (2) of this argument is false, and accept the consequence that a person (e.g., Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.) really can tell whether an action is morally right or wrong in his or her society simply by examining what is believed to be right and wrong in that society.

 

And the defender of MCR must also claim that premise (2) of the Moral Improvement Argument is false. For example, she must claim that today’s America is morally no better than the America of 150 years ago, that today’s Germany is no better than Nazi Germany, and so forth.

 

The bottom line: if you are going to accept MCR as an accurate account of morality, then you have to reject the second premise of each argument and accept all of the following:

1.      No customs of other societies are inferior to our own; e.g., it is not the case that slavery is morally inferior to the rejection of slavery. (This denies premise 2 of the Moral Inferiority Argument.)

2.      We can discover whether actions are moral or immoral just by consulting the standards of our society; e.g. Dr. King could have discovered whether institutionalized racism was moral or immoral simply by consulting the standards of 1960s America, and Fauziya Kassindja could have discovered whether forcing a young woman to undergo excision (or female genital mutilation) against her will is moral just by consulting the standard prevalent in Togo.[2] (This denies premise 2 of the Moral Consultation Argument.)

3.      A society cannot become morally better than it was before; e.g. American society today is, from a moral point of view, no better than it was 150 years ago. (This denies premise 2 of the Moral Improvement Argument.)

 

 

[3.10.] Lessons We Can Learn from MCR.

 

Rachels believes that MCR is false. But he also believes that we can learn the following lessons from our study of MCR (I have altered the two lessons described by Rachels a bit):

 

(1)  Not everything we take to be objectively moral or immoral really is objectively moral or immoral.

 

At least some of our cultural practices are simply peculiar to our society and are ultimately no morally better or worse than different practices in other societies, e.g.

·         funerary practices (Greeks burned their dead bodies, while the Callatians ate theirs; we either cremate or bury ours);

·         monogamous relationships, rather than polyamory (“having more than one loving partner, with the consent of everyone involved”; EMP 30)[3]; and

·         the bearing of female breasts in public, as in the Janet Jackson / Super Bowl fiasco of 2004.

 

However, the following caveat (a caveat is a warning, an explanation to prevent misinterpretation) should be kept in mind when considering this lesson:

 

The fact that some of our cultural practices are neither objectively moral nor objectively immoral does not imply that none of them are. MCR goes too far in saying that all of our practices are mere cultural products, neither objectively moral nor objectively immoral.

 

 

(2) Our moral beliefs are not necessarily “perceptions of the truth”; many of them result from cultural conditioning or inculcation rather than from unbiased examinations of the evidence and may well be wrong.

 

inculcation (df.): the process of teaching or impressing by urging or frequent repetition.

 

Over the course of our lives, we develop very strong feelings about morality. This can cause us to be very resistant to the suggestion that our moral views are incorrect. Rachels’s example: many of us may feel strongly that homosexuals are immoral or evil, not because we have engaged in a rational consideration of the reasons for and against thinking this, but because this has been the prevalent view of many people in our society, and we simply absorbed this view as we grew up. Many of us have strong feelings about this, and we can be resistant when someone suggests that our feelings are misguided. But we can overcome this resistance by remembering (what MCR points out,) that many of those views are the result of inculcation, not of rational consideration.

 

However, the following caveat should be kept in mind when considering this lesson:

 

The fact that many of our moral beliefs result from cultural conditioning rather than rational consideration does not imply that none of those beliefs are objectively true. MCR goes too far by saying that all moral beliefs are mere cultural prejudices that do not reflect any objective moral truths.[4]

 

 

Stopping point for Monday January 25. For next time, study today’s lecture notes and read EMP ch.4, pp.52-58.