[4.2.] Plato’s Dilemma.

 

Plato (c.427 - 347 BC), a Greek philosopher who lived centuries before the birth of Jesus, posed a question relevant to DCT. It occurs in one of his dialogues, the Euthyphro (available online at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html )

 

The question is: “whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods”?[1]

 

In more modern terms, the question is: Is conduct moral because God commands (or approves of) it (in which case DCT is true), or does God command (or approve of) it because it is moral (in which case DCT is false)?

 

Let’s call this question Plato’s Dilemma.

 

dilemma (df.): a situation in which you are required to accept one of two choices, but neither choice seems acceptable.  The two choices are called horns. There are three ways to respond to a dilemma: (1) “grasp” the first horn; (2) “grasp” the other horn; (3) “go between the horns” by finding a third alternative that hasn’t been considered yet (this is not always possible).

 

The two “horns” of Plato’s dilemma are:

1.      DCT is true: right conduct is right because God commands it (or approves of it) and wrong conduct is wrong because God forbids it (or disapproves of it);

2.      DCT is false: God commands (or approves of) right conduct because it is right and forbids (or disapproves of) wrong conduct because it is wrong.

 

Each option has consequences that most religious people will find troublesome.

 

Rachels describes three potentially troublesome consequences of the first horn:

1. DCT is “mysterious”

2. DCT “makes God’s commands arbitrary”

3. DCT “provides the wrong reasons for moral principles”

 

We will consider consequence (2), plus another consequence not mentioned by Rachels.

 

 

[4.2.1.] Horn A: DCT is true.

 

 

(A) DCT is true. There are at least two undesirable consequences of taking this position:

 

 

(1) God’s commands are morally arbitrary. This takes a bit of explaining…

 

If actions are right only because they are commanded by God, then there is nothing to an action being moral other than that it was commanded by God. This implies that God could command anything at all and it would be morally right. If God were to command rape or torture, then those things would become morally right.

 

If you are tempted to object: “But God would never command rape or torture!”, you have to answer the question: why not?  The answer can’t be: “Because rape and torture are wrong”—after all, if DCT is true, then something is wrong only if God forbids it (or disapproves of it)—there is nothing to immorality besides being forbidden by God.

 

If DCT is true, then God can have no moral reason for commanding us to do one thing rather than the exact opposite; in other words, God’s commands turn out to be morally arbitrary (not based on moral reasons). He cannot have a moral reason not to command rape and torture; this is because those things are not moral or immoral unless he commands or forbids them.

 

Yes, God might have some other, non-moral reason not to command those things. For example, his reason might be that he knows that doing such things will ultimately make (most of) us unhappy, and he wants us to be happy. But if God were very different, e.g., were he not to love us, he might command us to do things that were harmful to ourselves and others. Were he to have commanded those things, then those things would have been morally good.

 

The philosophical problem here is that if DCT is true, then no matter what God were to command (or approve of), that action would be morally good. It is irrelevant whether God has actually commanded things that make (most of) us happy in the long-run, whether God actually does love us, etc.[2]

 

 

(2) The doctrine of the goodness of God is empty or trivial.

 

The doctrine of the goodness of God says: God is a morally good being—in fact, God is a morally perfect being.

 

If DCT is true, then no matter how God behaves, he is morally good as long as he approves of himself. If this is the case, then to say that “God is morally good” means that “God approves of himself.”  The idea that God is morally good is a central doctrine of Christianity and seems to be a very important belief for most Christians. It is a primary reason why Christians believe that God is worthy of being worshipped: because he is so good. But if his goodness amounts to nothing but his approving of himself, it no longer seems a characteristic worth praising. If DCT is true, then this very important doctrine turns out to be utterly trivial.

 

Because DCT has these two unpleasant consequences, it is reasonable (especially for Christians) to think that DCT is false. But that “horn” of the dilemma is unattractive, too…

 

 

[4.2.2.] Horn B: DCT is false.

 

(B). DCT is false. There is an undesirable consequence to taking this position:

 

God commands actions because they are morally right. But then there is a standard of morality that is independent of God’s commands. God does not control morality; rather, he knows which actions are right or wrong and communicates that information to us in the form of commands. This threatens the claim that God is omnipotent.

 

omnipotent (df.): all-powerful; capable of doing anything.

 

(It does not threaten the claim that he is omniscient, i.e., all-knowing.)

 

 

[4.2.3.] The Platonic Argument Against DCT.

 

Here is a more formal presentation of the Platonic Argument Against DCT.[3]

 

1.      Suppose God commands us to do what is right. Then either (a) the right actions are right because he commands them or (b) he commands them because they are right.

2.      If (a) is true, then (c) God's commands are morally arbitrary, and the doctrine of the goodness of God is trivial.

3.      If (b) is true, then (d) there is a standard of right and wrong that is independent of God's will.

4.      Therefore, either (c) God's commands are morally arbitrary, and the doctrine of the goodness of God is trivial, or (d) there is a standard of right and wrong that is independent of God's will.

5.      From a religious point of view, it is undesirable to accept that (c) God's commands as morally arbitrary and the doctrine of the goodness of God as trivial.

6.      Therefore, even from a religious point of view, it must be accepted that (d) there is a standard of right and wrong that is independent of God's will.

 

Commentary:

 

1. This premise does two things: (i) it assumes the three claims about God implied by DCT (all rolled together into the claim that “God commands us to do what is right”); (ii) it takes this assumption to imply that either Horn A or Horn B is true.

 

4. A conclusion, supported by premises 1, 2 and 3.

 

6. A further conclusion, supported by 4 and 5.

 

Notice how this argument ends. In line 5, it is claimed that for a religious person, the consequences of accepting DCT are even worse than the consequences of rejecting DCT. So, the argument concludes, religious people should actually accept the consequences of rejecting DCT… and thus reject DCT itself.

 

 

Stopping point for Friday September 4. For next time, study today’s lecture notes and read EMP pp.57-61.