[5.1.3.] Objection from Mother’s Rights.

 

This objection to Marquis’s argument says that, although the argument is valid, and although premises 1 and 2 may be true, the argument is unsound because premise 4 is false. Here’s why…

 

The abortion issue does not concern just the interests of the fetus.

 

It also concerns a person’s basic moral right to control what happens in and to his or her body.

 

This includes a woman’s basic moral right to choose whether or not to continue a pregnancy.

 

So Marquis may be right that a woman has a prima facie obligation not to deprive her fetus of an FLO. But even if this is correct, that obligation is outweighed by her right to choose to end a pregnancy. So while it may be true that a woman has a prima facie moral duty not to end a pregnancy, it is false that in the vast majority of cases, there is no other moral consideration that outweighs that duty. Premise 4 is false.

 

 

 

[5.1.3.1.] Reply to the Objection from Mother’s Rights.

 

Marquis might try to defend premise 4 by arguing as follows. Clearly, we want each person to have as much freedom of choice as possible when it comes to living his or her life. But freedom of choice is not absolute. There are very many things you don’t have the moral right to do, even if you want to do them (kill Bill-the-40-year-old, for instance).

 

In order for abortion to be morally justified by the right of a mother to choose, the loss that the mother would suffer by continuing the pregnancy (loss of time, energy, money, comfort, etc.) would have to outweigh the loss suffered by the fetus if the pregnancy is aborted. But the loss suffered by the fetus is the greatest loss that a being can suffer: the loss of an FLO. And this loss seems to outweigh the loss of time, energy, etc. suffered by the mother.

 

So, according to this reply to the objection from mother’s rights, the right of the mother to choose does not outweigh the loss suffered by the fetus. So the Objection from Mother’s Rights does not show that premise 4 is false.

 

 

[5.4.] Judith Thomson’s Defense of Abortion.

 

Judith Jarvis Thomson is a philosophy professor at MIT.[1]

 

Her paper, “A Defense of Abortion,” was published in 1971, 18 years before Marquis published his pro-life argument.

 

However, what Thomson says can be construed as a criticism of Marquis’s FLO argument.

 

In particular, it can be understood as an argument against Marquis’s premise 4, which says the following: “In the vast majority of abortions, there are no other moral considerations that trump the prima facie obligation not to kill a fetus.”

 

She begins by granting that from the moment of conception, a fetus (in the broad sense of “fetus”) is a person with a right to life.

·         This is an important concession; not all pro-choicers agree that an early-term fetus is a person with a right to life.

·         Note that Thomson herself does not believe this; she says that “A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree.” (RTD 92) She is merely conceding the point for the sake of argument.

·         She grants this point because she wants to examine what follows from it. In particular, she wants to see whether the claim that a fetus is a person straightforwardly implies that abortion is immoral. She notes that pro-lifers spend most of their time trying to argue that a fetus is a person without then showing that this implies that abortion is wrong:

 

Perhaps they think the step too simple and obvious to require much comment ... I suggest that the step [from the claim that a fetus is a person to the claim that abortion is immoral] is neither easy nor obvious, that it calls for closer examination than it is commonly given, and that when we do give it this closer examination we shall feel inclined to reject it. (RTD 93)

 

So, having assumed that fetuses are persons, Thomson asks: does a fetus’s right to life outweigh a woman’s right to determine what will happen in and to her body?

 

She answers: sometimes it does; but sometimes it doesn’t.

 

 

[5.4.1.] The Violinist Analogy.

 

She begins to argue this point with the Violinist Analogy:

 

Suppose that you wake up one morning and find yourself in a hospital bed, connected by many tubes to another person, who is unconscious. The director of the hospital is there and explains to you that the person sharing your bed is a world-famous violinist. The violinist has a kidney disease and requires the use of someone else’s kidneys to extract toxins from his blood.

 

So how did you come to be connected to the violinist? The Society of Music Lovers (SML) examined all available medical records and determined that your kidneys are uniquely capable of saving the violinist’s life. So they kidnapped you and connected you in the appropriate ways to the violinist. The hospital director says that she never would have allowed this herself, but the SML people did it on their own, then dropped you off at the hospital. So far as the director is concerned, you are free to disconnect yourself from the violinist and go; but if you do so, the violinist will die. “How long will I have to stay connected to him, in order for him to live?” you ask.

 

Suppose the doctor says: nine months. Would you then think that it would be wrong to disconnect from the violinist? What if the doctor said nine years? Would it still be wrong to disconnect? What if the doctor says the rest of your life?

 

At this point, Thomson reasons as follows:

 

1.      If the violinist’s right to life always outweighs your right to determine what happens in your body, then it is always immoral to disconnect, no matter how long the violinist needs to use your body.

2.      But it is not always immoral to disconnect (e.g., if he needs your entire life, or nine years).

3.      So, the violinist’s right to life does not always outweigh your right to determine what happens in your body.

 

[This is a modus tollens argument, and it is therefore valid… are the premises true?]

 

Stopping point for Wednesday September 16. For next time, finish reading “A Defense of Abortion” by Judith Jarvis Thomson, (RTD ch.12), pp.102-108. As always, be prepared for a pop quiz over the reading and today’s lecture notes.