[5.5.2.] The Traditional Argument Against Abortion.

 

The slide from one sense of “human” to the other is made in the following traditional pro-life argument:

 

1. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings.

2. Fetuses are innocent human beings.

3. So, it is wrong to kill fetuses.

 

In order for this to be a valid argument, “human being” has to mean the same thing in both premises. Otherwise the truth of the premises would not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

If “human being” means something different in each premise, then the argument commits the fallacy (a fallacy is a mistake in reasoning) called equivocation:

 

equivocation (df.): an argument commits this fallacy when it uses an ambiguous term in different ways in different premises, resulting in the argument being invalid. For example…

 

All banks are financial institutions.

The edge of the Flint river is a bank.

Therefore, the edge of the Flint river is a financial institution

 

 

Interpreting the argument to mean “human being” in the genetic sense...

 

If the argument uses “human being” in the genetic sense, premise 1 means: it is wrong to kill anything genetically human.

 

This amounts to another fallacy: the fallacy of begging the question:

 

begging the question (df.): an argument makes the mistake of begging the question when it assumes in its premises the very claim that it is supposed to be proving. Here are other examples of arguments that commit this same mistake…

·         Some cases of begging the question are obvious; the conclusion says the same thing as one of the premises, e.g.:

 

1.       John sets people’s houses on fire just to watch them burn.

2.       Therefore, John is an arsonist.

 

·         But other cases are not so obvious; for example…

 

1.       The Bible contains the claim that God exists.

2.       Every claim contained in the Bible is true.

3.       Therefore, God exists.

 

So, if “human being” is interpreted in the genetic sense, then premise one just means: it is always wrong to kill innocent beings that are genetically human. But this begs the question; the pro-choice defender denies that it is always wrong to kill innocent beings that are genetically human, and the pro-life person needs to argue that this is true.

 

 

Interpreting the argument to mean “human being” in the moral sense...

 

On the other hand, suppose the argument uses “human being” in the moral sense (“a full-fledged member of the moral community”), premise 2 means: “fetuses are full-fledged members of the moral community.”

 

But now it is premise two that begs the question. The pro-choice person denies that fetuses are members of the moral community, and the pro-life person needs to argue that this is true.

 

So the only way for the traditional argument to avoid begging the question is to mean the moral sense in premise 1 and the genetic sense in premise 2... but in that case, the argument commits the fallacy of equivocation and is invalid.

 

 

[5.5.1.] The Moral Community and Personhood.

 

Warren rejects the view that the moral community should consist of all genetic human beings.

 

Instead, she believes that it should consist of all and only persons.

 

She does not attempt a complete account of personhood, or an exhaustive list of all characteristics that could possibly be relevant to the question whether a being is a person.

 

Instead, she maintains that “[a]ll we need is a rough and approximate list of the most basic criteria of personhood, and some idea of which, or how many, of these an entity must satisfy in order to properly be considered a person.” (RTD 111-12)

 

Thought experiment: imagine you’re a space explorer and you come across a race of alien beings. How do you decide whether they are “members of the moral community”? It seems unreasonable to expect a DNA test to decide this question; it is much more plausible to base your reasoning upon whether they are persons. So, what characteristics would we look for in trying to decide whether they are persons?

 

            I suggest that the traits which are most central to the concept of personhood, or humanity in the moral sense, are, very roughly, the following:

 

1.         consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain;

2.         reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems);

3.         self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control);

4.         the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics;

5.         the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both.

 

… We needn’t suppose that an entity must have all of these attributes to be properly considered a person; (1) and (2) alone may well be sufficient for personhood, and quite probably (1)-(3) are sufficient. Neither do we need to insist that any one of these criteria is necessary for personhood, although once again (1) and (2) look like fairly good candidates for necessary conditions, as does (3), if “activity” is construed so as to include the activity of reasoning.

All we need to claim, to demonstrate that a fetus is not a person, is that any being which satisfies none of (1)-(5) is certainly not a person. (RTD 112-13, emphasis added)[1]

 

 

On Warren’s view, “all and only people have full moral rights.” (101) So if an organism has none of (1)-(5), it does not have full moral rights.

 

What’s more, “if (1)-(5) are indeed the primary criteria of personhood, then it is clear that genetic humanity is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing that an entity is a person.” (101)

·         it is not necessary: aliens and very sophisticated robots might count as people

·         it is not sufficient: permanently incapacitated or defective genetic humans do not count as people, and neither do fetuses

 

 

[5.5.4.] The Fetus as Similar to an Actual Person.

 

Warren asks: “How like [a normal adult human being, who is a paradigmatic example of a person], in particular how far advanced since conception, does a human being need to be before it begins to have a right to life by virtue … of being like a person?”[2]

 

Her response:

·         The more like a person it is, the more of a right to life it has.

·         But we must remember that the relevant characteristics are (1)-(5)… not things like detectable brain activity, viability (ability to survive outside the fetus) or human facial or other characteristics.

·         In terms of these characteristics, “a fetus, even a fully developed one, is considerably less personlike than is the average mature mammal, indeed the average fish. … [I]t cannot be said to have any more right to life than, let us say, a new born guppy …, and … a right of that magnitude could never override a woman’s right to obtain an abortion, at any stage of her pregnancy.” (RTD 114)

 

 

[5.5.5.] The Fetus as a Potential Person.

 

Although a fetus is not enough like an actual person for its rights to outweigh those of an actual person, perhaps the fact that it is a potential person is enough.

 

But Warren thinks otherwise: “the rights of any actual person invariably outweigh those of any potential person, whenever the two conflict.” (115)

 

She argues this point by continuing her space explorer thought experiment:

 

Suppose that [a] space explorer falls into the hands of an alien culture, whose scientists decide to create a few hundred thousand or more human beings, by breaking his body into its component cells, and using these to create fully developed human beings, with, of course, his genetic code. We may imagine that each of these newly created men will have all of the original man’s abilities, skills, knowledge, and so on, and also have an individual self-concept, in short that each of them will be a bona fide (though hardly unique) person. Imagine that the whole project will take only seconds, and that its chances of success are extremely high, and that our explorer knows all this, and also knows that these people will be treated fairly. I maintain that in such a situation he would have every right to escape if he could, and thus to deprive all of these potential people of their potential lives; for his right to life outweighs all of theirs together, in spite of the fact that they are all genetically human, all innocent, and all have a very high probability of becoming people very soon, if only he refrains from acting. (RTD 115-16)

 

Warren goes on to claim that the space explorer would not be obligated to allow the aliens to “turn him into other people” even if…

·         it was not his life that was at stake, but only a year, or a day, of his time;

·         he was captured because of his own carelessness; or

·         he was captured on purpose, in full knowledge of the consequences.

 

 

[5.5.6.] Objection: Doesn’t This View Justify Infanticide?

 

Warren is concerned to show that, even though her view is that newborns are not persons and therefore not members of the moral community, it is nonetheless still immoral to kill them (at least, she writes that “infanticide is much more difficult to justify than abortion”).

 

She gives the following reasons for thinking that, even though abortion is morally permissible, infanticide is usually wrong in our society:

 

1.       “[N]eonates are so very close to being persons that to kill them requires a very strong moral justification—as does the killing of dolphins, whales, chimpanzees, and other highly personlike creatures.” (RTD 117)

 

2.       “[I]f the newborn’s parents do not want it, or are unable to care for it, there are (in most cases) people who are able and eager to adopt it and to provide a good home for it. ... The needless destruction of a viable infant inevitably deprives some person or persons of a source of great pleasure and satisfaction, perhaps severely impoverishing their lives.” (RTD 117)

 

3.       With regard to severely handicapped infants, even if there is such an infant who no one wants to adopt, still, most of us value infants’ lives and are willing to pay taxes to support institutions that will care for them.

 

Having listed these reasons, she considers the following objection: these points all apply to late-term fetuses as well! So why don’t these points count as an argument against abortion?

 

Her response:

 

... once the infant is born, its continued life cannot (except, perhaps, in very exceptional cases) pose any serious threat to the woman’s life or health, since she is free to put it up for adoption, or, where this is impossible, to place it in a state-supported institution. While she might prefer that it die, rather than being raised by others, it is not clear that such a preference would constitute a right on her part. ...

                In contrast, a pregnant woman’s right to protect her own life and health clearly outweighs other people’s desire that the fetus be preserved—just as, when a person’s life or limb is threatened by some wild animal, and when the threat cannot be removed without killing the animal, the person’s right to self-protection outweighs the desires of those who would prefer that the animal be harmed. (RTD 117-118)

 

 

Stopping point for Wednesday September 23. No new reading assignment for next time. On Firday we will review for your first exam, which is Monday September 28. Come to class prepared to ask any questions you have about the material we’ve covered so far.