[6.3.5.3.] What About the Argument from Mercy?

 

Doerflinger goes on to say that many defenders of PAS (physician-assisted suicide) do not, in fact, make autonomy their most important moral value. [Remember, in this article Doerflinger is not making a distinction between physician-assisted suicide and physician-assisted dying; by “physician-assisted suicide” he means both cases in which a patient is already dying and cases in which a patient has a terrible but non-fatal disease.]

 

Rather, they attempt to incorporate happiness or avoidance of misery into their justification of assisted suicide as well, since they advocate assisted suicide only for those who are suffering terribly. In other words, they incorporate an element of utilitarianism into their argument.

 

Although Doerflinger isn’t terribly clear on this, he seems to suggest that defenders of PAS who incorporate autonomy and mercy into their arguments face a dilemma:

 

·         Either autonomy is the overriding moral value, in which case people other than the terminally ill and suffering have the right to PAS (including, perhaps, clinically depressed people who are not physically ill or suffering physical pain);

·         Or happiness / avoidance of misery is the overriding moral value, in which case people who choose to live despite the fact that they are suffering terribly “will not easily be seen as rational, thus will not easily receive understanding and assistance for this choice.” (RTD 315)

 

 

[6.3.5.4.] Slippery Slope Arguments.

 

Doerflinger gives a number of so-called slippery slope arguments against PAS. Before we consider those arguments, we should first consider slippery slope arguments in general.

 

slippery slope arguments

 

There are two sorts of slippery slope argument:

 

A)    conceptual/theoretical: arguments having the following form.

 

1.      There is no general principle on which we can permit x without also permitting y; i.e., there is no way to justify x without also justifying y.

2.      We should not permit y.

3.      Therefore, we should not permit x.

 

For example, a conceptual/theoretical slippery slope argument against same-sex marriage might go as follows: If we allow men to marry each other, then we will also have to allow men to marry goats, or box-turtles, or inanimate objects. But of course we don’t want to allow men to marry any of those things, so we should not allow them to marry each other.

 

(This argument does not assume that there are men who actually want to marry goats or box turtles... it does not predict that such marriages will actually happen. It only claims that if we were to allow men to marry each other, then we would also have to let men marry goats etc., since there is no good reason for allowing one but not the other.)

 

 

B)     empirical/practical: arguments having the following form:

 

1. If we allow x, then as a matter of actual fact, y will happen as well.

2. We should not allow y to happen.

3. Therefore, we should not allow x.

 

For example, an empirical/practical slippery slope argument against same-sex marriage might go as follows: If we allow men to marry each other, then eventually the courts will rule that polygamists have the legal right to marry more than one woman. But we should not act so as to bring about legal polygamy. So we should not allow men to marry each other.

 

(This argument does assume that there will be an actual consequence of legalizing same-sex marriage, and it says that in order to avoid that actual consequence, we should not legalize such marriage.)

 

 

The so-called “slippery slope fallacy” is committed when a person uses a slippery slope argument in the absence of a good reason for believing the first premise in that argument (the premise that denies that x can be justified without also justifying y, or that predicts that allowing x will inevitably result in y).

 

 

Stopping point for Wednesday October 7. For next time:

·         read EMP ch.8 pp.109-111

·         study today’s notes

·         pop quiz possible