[6.4.1.] Mill on Happiness.
John Stuart Mill’s thinking about morality begins with the concept of happiness…
· Mill defines happiness as: pleasure and the absence of pain.
· Mill includes both higher and lower pleasures in his definition of happiness:
· lower pleasures: physical pleasures, of which humans and non-human animals are both capable, e.g., not being hungry or thirsty, being physically comfortable (warm, dry, etc.), and sexual pleasure.
· higher pleasures: intellectual and emotional pleasures, e.g., friendship, knowledge; only humans are capable of these; these pleasures are of higher quality than the lower pleasures.
· Mill says:
...pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and … all desirable things ... are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. (“Utilitarianism,” RTD 30)
In other words pleasure and the absence of pain (i.e., “happiness,” as Mill uses that word) are the only things that have intrinsic value.
[6.4.2.] Classical Utilitarianism’s Three Components.
Mill referred to his fundamental moral principle as the “Greatest Happiness Principle”: “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” (RTD p.30)
The Greatest Happiness Principle is Mill’s statement of his version of utilitarianism, which is sometimes called classical utilitarianism. It consists of three independent claims:
1. consequentialism: what makes an action right or wrong are nothing but its effects.
2. impartiality: the interests of any being are just as important as the same interests of any other being.[1]
3. hedonism: pleasure and the absence of pain are the only things with intrinsic value
[Recall that Rachels is committed to impartiality... it is one-half of what he calls the Minimum Conception of Morality:
This is a hint as to what normative theory Rachels himself commits to...]
[6.5.] Modern Utilitarianism.
For reasons that Rachels discusses in EMP 8.2, modern utilitarians no longer focus on happiness/pleasure (see his examples of the concert pianist whose hands are injured and of the person whose friend makes fun of him behind his back).
For the most part, they focus on welfare or general well-being. The only difference between modern UT and classical UT is that modern UT replaces hedonism with an emphasis on welfare or general well-being.
modern utilitarianism (rough definition): the right thing to do is that which most increases the welfare or general well-being of all those who will be affected.
· When modern utilitarians use the word “utility,” they mean well-being or people being better-off.
Like Classical UT, Modern UT consists of three separate ideas combined into one:
modern utilitarianism (full definition):
· consequentialism: what makes an action right or wrong are nothing but its effects
· impartiality: the interests of any being are just as important as the same interests of any other being.
· that which has intrinsic value is well-being, or making people (and other creatures) better off (this may include increasing happiness/pleasure)
From here on, we’ll be talking about modern UT, not classical.
Two important things to note about modern utilitarianism:
· Sometimes the phrase “modern utilitarianism” is used in a very broad sense, to include utilitarian thinking as it began in the modern era with Bentham and Mill. (In fact, Bentham is frequently referred to as “the father of modern utilitarianism,” in this broad sense.) In this course, we are using the phrase in a narrower sense, to mean the 20th and 21st century form of the theory that designates well-being as that which has intrinsic value.
· Some modern utilitarians emphasize, not well-being, but preference satisfaction: the right thing to do is to act so that the maximum number of beings have their preferences satisfied to the greatest degree.
[6.6.] Arguments Against Utilitarianism.
Rachels gives a number of arguments that are supposed to show that utilitarianism is false. We will consider two of them.
[6.6.1.] Utilitarianism Doesn’t Take Rights Seriously.
The Rights Argument. (EMP 112-14)
1. If utilitarianism is true, then it is moral to violate someone’s right to privacy when doing so will result in an increase in overall well-being.
2. But there are some instances when it is not moral to violate someone’s right to privacy, even when doing so will result in an increase in overall well-being. [The examples of Angelynn York and of the successful peeping tom are supposed to illustrate this claim.]
3. Therefore, utilitarianism is not true.
This argument is supposed to illustrate that utilitarianism is incompatible with taking rights seriously: “The notion of a personal right is not a utilitarian notion. Quite the opposite: It is a notion that places limits on how an individual may be treated, regardless of the good purposes that might be accomplished.” (EMP 114)
· In general, violating a person’s right to privacy will decrease utility.
· But sometimes it will increase utility, and according to utilitarianism, on those occasions, violating a person’s right to privacy is morally permissible—perhaps even obligatory.
Similar arguments against utilitarianism can be constructed using other rights, including the right to life, e.g., involuntary organ donation to save the lives of multiple people.
This is why, in his argument in defense of active euthanasia (RTD 310), Rachels builds in consideration for rights. If utility is the only thing you take into account when deciding whether an action is right or wrong (i.e., if you think utilitarianism is a complete theory of morality), then people’s rights are morally irrelevant—including their right to decide whether or not to die.
Stopping point for Monday October 12. For next time, finish reading EMP ch.8 (116-123).
[1] Bentham: "Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one." [Bentham may never have written this; J. S. Mill attributes the saying to Bentham in ch.V of Utilitarianism; it is cited by Peter Singer in his defense of animal rights, RTD 124]
This page last updated 10/12/2009.
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