[6.6.2.] Utilitarianism is Too Demanding.
1. If utilitarianism is true, then you are always obligated to do whatever will have the best overall consequences for everyone.
2. But you are not always obligated to do whatever will have the best overall consequences for everyone; at least sometimes, it is permissible to do trivial things that benefit only yourself.
3. Therefore, utilitarianism is not true.
An illustration: if utilitarianism is true, it is immoral for me to spend $15 for a ticket to see Art Brut play at the Earl, when I could cause a greater increase in the amount of well-being in the world by doing something else with that money. E.g., UNICEF estimates that more 15,000 children die each day due to conditions stemming from lack of nutrition[1], and that it costs only $15 dollars per month to save the life of one child. Clearly, I could raise the amount of well-being in the world more by saving a life than I can by purchasing a concert ticket for myself.
But according to moral common-sense, it is at least sometimes morally permissible for me to buy a concert ticket rather than give my money to the poor. Maybe it would be wrong for me to spend all of my money on relatively trivial items for myself; but utilitarianism implies that it would be wrong for me to spend any of my money on relatively trivial items for myself. (And in fact, this is the position that Peter Singer takes in “The Singer Solution to World Poverty,” one of your readings for next Monday.)
This argument is supposed to show that utilitarianism places too great a moral burden on us: it demands too much.
Another way of putting the point is to say that utilitarianism implies that many actions are obligatory when they seem to moral common-sense to be supererogatory.
[6.6.3.] Evaluating the Arguments Against Utilitarianism.
logical aspect
§ Both of these arguments are examples of modus tollens, and so they are both valid.
factual aspect
§ premise 2: in both arguments, this premise seems true to moral common-sense; but of course, that is no guarantee that these premises are true; the point is only that most people would have a very hard time giving these premises up.
§ premise 1: it definitely seems true. As we’re about to see, there is a defense of utilitarianism that admits that premise 1 and premise 2 are true, but goes on to change utilitarianism so that premise 1 no longer applies to it.
[6.7.] Act vs. Rule Utilitarianism.
In EMP ch.7, Rachels considers three ways to defend utilitarianism against the arguments we’ve considered.
Here we’ll examine the second defense he discusses (EMP 110-12). It goes as follows:
· The first premise in the Rights Argument, and the first premise in the Excessive Demand Argument, are both true.
· They are true because utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of performing specific, individual actions rather than on the consequences of general patterns of behavior.
· So we need to change the focus of the theory. Instead of asking the question, “What individual action will promote overall well-being?” we instead ask: “What general patterns of behavior can I engage in to promote overall well-being?”
· In other words we need to switch from the utilitarianism we’ve been examining up to now (which is called act utilitarianism) to a different theory: rule utilitarianism:
Act Utilitarianism (df.): the morality of an individual action depends on whether that specific action increases or decreases utility. If the action increases utility, it is moral; if it decreases utility, it is immoral.
Rule Utilitarianism (df.): the morality of an individual action depends on what rule the action follows. If in general, following the rule increases utility, an individual action that follows the rule is moral. If in general following the rule decreases utility, an individual action that follows the rule is immoral
[6.7.1.] Rule Utilitarianism and the Rights Argument.
The Rights Argument assumes that if utilitarianism is true, then it is moral to violate someone’s rights (e.g., her right to privacy) when doing so will increase overall well-being.
But imagine two different situations:
(A) Everyone strictly follows the rule: “Do not violate people’s right to privacy.”
(B) That rule is NOT strictly followed by everyone
So rule utilitarianism does not imply that it is sometimes morally permissible to violate someone’s right to privacy (e.g., by taking and distributing nude pictures of him or her without his or her permission). If the first premise of the Rights Argument refers to rule utilitarianism, then it is false.
A situation in which people always follow the rule “Don’t violate people’s rights to privacy” has a greater degree of well-being than a situation in which people do not follow that rule. So according to rule utilitarianism, you should always follow this rule; it is never moral to break it.
[6.7.2.] Rule Utilitarianism and the Excessive Demand Argument.
The Excessive Demand Argument assumes that if utilitarianism is true, then it is never moral to do anything but whatever will have the best overall consequences for everyone—so it is never moral do to even trivial things to benefit oneself (e.g. buy a new CD).
But imagine two different situations:
(A) Everyone strictly follows the rule: “Never do anything trivial to benefit yourself if you can do something else that will result in a greater increase in overall welfare”
(B) That rule is NOT strictly followed by everyone.
Rule utilitarianism says: since well-being is greater in B than in A, you should not follow the rule.
So unlike act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism does not imply that it is always morally obligatory to do whatever will have the best overall consequences for everyone. So if the first premise of the Argument from Excessive Demand refers to Rule utilitarianism, then it is false.
A situation in which people follow the rule, “Sometimes perform actions that benefit yourself, whether or not they benefit anyone else,” has a higher degree of well-being than a situation in which people do not follow that rule.
According to rule utilitarianism, it is sometimes moral to fulfill relatively trivial wants of your own, even if you could instead fulfill relatively important wants of others.
Stopping point for Wednesday October 14. For next time (Monday October 19):
· read all of “9/11 and Starvation” (RTD ch.17);
· read all of “The Singer Solution to World Poverty” (RTD ch.18);
· study today’s lecture notes;
· you may have a pop quiz on this material.
[1] In 2004, 5.6 million children died from such conditions; that’s 15,868 children per day (that’s one child every 5.4 seconds). See http://www.unicef.org/media/media_36237.html .
This page last updated 10/14/2009.
Copyright © 2009 Robert Lane. All rights reserved.