If p, then q.
If p, then q.
naturalism (df.): “A view that locates human beings wholly within nature and takes the results of the natural and human sciences to be our best idea of what there is.”
· In philosophy, naturalism maintains that we should “do what good scientific practice itself does in deferring to our present background state of general scientific understanding as the best story we now have about the universe and its furnishings. It is no doubt a flawed, imperfect story still very much in progress, but far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology...”
A contemporary philosopher named Susan Haack has articulated the difference between genuine and pseudo-inquiry, based on some observations first made by the classical American philosopher Charles Peirce (1839-1914):
genuine inquiry vs. pseudo-inquiry: distinguished by motive.
genuine inquiry (df.): inquiry that is motivated by the desire to find the truth, no matter what that truth happens to be. This desire is what Peirce called “the scientific attitude.”
pseudo-inquiry (“pseudo” = false) is motivated by the desire to make a case for a claim that you have already settled on in advance; there are two kinds:
sham reasoning (df.): making a case for a claim your commitment to which is sincere (you care that the claim is true), but also immune to evidence or argument—no matter what the evidence shows, you will not change your mind about it.
fake reasoning (df.): making a case for a claim, not because you have a sincere commitment to it (you don’t really care whether the claim is true or false), but because you think doing so will be to your advantage.
Deciding in advance that God exists, emphasizing evidence for that claim, and ignoring or discounting any evidence against it, is sham reasoning, not genuine inquiry.
Stopping point for Thursday June 10. Reading for next time:
· Chapter 5 (pp.53-60). The very beginning of this chapter refers to some things in chapter 4, which we haven’t read. Don’t worry about that; just dive into the reading. By p.54, you should be able follow what’s going on without having read chapter 4.
· Chapter 6 (pp.61-75).
 For more on the general topic of induction, see James Hawthorne, “Inductive Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/logic-inductive/>.
 Sober gets this from A. Edwards (Likelihood, Cambridge UP, 1972), who calls it the Likelihood Principle; see Sober, Philosophy of Biology, pp.31ff.
 Norman Melchert, The Great Conversation, glossary, G-4.
 James Lenman, "Moral Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/naturalism-moral/ >.
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