PHIL 4110: Philosophy of Law
Dr. Robert Lane
Lecture Notes: Monday January 22, 2007

 

[1.3.2.] John Rawls.

 

·         1921-2002; born in Baltimore, MD

·         graduated from Princeton, then served in the army during WWII before returning to Princeton, from which he received the Ph.D. in philosophy in 1951

·         he first taught at Cornell and MIT before settling at Harvard, where he taught from 1962-1991, when he retired from teaching

·         two major works: A Theory of Justice (1971, revised 1999) and Political Liberalism (1993).

·         belongs to the social contract tradition of ethical and political philosophy anticipated by Plato/Socrates and initiated in the modern era by Thomas Hobbes.

 

 

[1.3.2.1.] The Importance of A Theory of Justice.

 

A Theory of Justice was a landmark in moral philosophy. Through the first half of the 20th century, ethicists did not concern themselves with practical questions, e.g., questions concerning war, racism, capital punishment, abortion, etc. Philosophy was primarily concerned with the analysis of language, e.g., “Can we derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’?”, “What is meant by the word ‘good’?” These sorts of questions belong to meta-ethics, an area that asks theoretical questions about the nature of morality and moral language but offers no practical advice about how people should live.

 

During the 1960s, there was considerable pressure on college professors to address subjects more practical than logical analysis. Furthermore, advanced medical technology was creating a whole batch of brand new moral questions, e.g., questions about abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering, etc.

 

In the late 1960s, college teaching jobs became very scarce. Philosophy graduate programs were turning out Ph.D.s who couldn’t find jobs. Meanwhile, medical schools began teaching courses in medical ethics. People other than philosophy professors began writing articles about euthanasia, abortion, etc. There was an explosion of practical articles by philosophers around 1972, and applied ethics was born.

 

Rawls’ book helped to instigate this explosion. It was a throwback to the way ethics had been conducted in earlier centuries, a return to normative ethics (which advises how we should behave) and an abandonment of meta-ethics.

 

 

[1.3.2.2.] Philosophical Context of Rawls' Work

 

In addition to belonging to the social contract tradition, Rawls belongs to the another important tradition, that of liberalism:

 

liberalism (df.) the political viewpoint that values individual liberty/freedom as being more important than the state. On this view, the function of the state is to protect individual liberty and freedom, and individuals should be allowed to pursue their own goals. The state should respect diversity and should not attempt to impose a single lifestyle on all individuals

 

 

How is individual freedom best defended? The question allows for a spectrum of answers, the two ends of which roughly coincide with two different conceptions of freedom:

 

negative conception

of freedom/liberty

(freedom from):

greatest threat to personal liberty is

unwarranted interference by

other human beings

 

John Locke

John Stuart Mill

Robert Nozick

 

positive conception

of freedom/liberty

(freedom to):

greatest threat to personal liberty is unjust distributions of wealth, resources, and opportunity

 

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Karl Marx

John Rawls

 

The sort of justice with which Rawls is concerned is social justice:

·         Social justice is not a trait of particular actions or decisions (e.g., the decision of a jury in a given criminal case)

·         Rather, it is one of the traits[1] possessed by a good “basic structure of society.” This is his technical term for “...the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. (TJ p.7)

·         Rawls uses “major social institutions” to mean a society’s “political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social institutions.” (TJ p.7, emphases added)[2]

 

Society is just when it is structured according to principles that do two things (TJ p.4-5):

·         assign rights and duties to individuals in a non-arbitrary manner

·         properly distribute the "benefits and burdens of social cooperation"

But of course, this leaves lots of room to disagree about what counts as a non-arbitrary distinction and as a proper distribution; i.e., it leaves room for various different theories or concepts of justice.

 

A theory or concept of (social) justice can be liberal, but it need not be:[3]

·         liberal theory of (social) justice: a theory that (a) specifies how rights, duties, and resources are to be distributed in a society and that (b) prioritizes the individual and his/her freedom above the well-being of the state

·         illiberal theory of (social) justice: a theory that (a) specifies how rights, duties, and resources are to be distributed in a society and that (b) prioritizes the well-being of the state above the individual and his/her freedom.

 

Even if it is assumed that a liberal account of justice is preferable to an illiberal account, there is still room for disagreement on the details.

 

Rawls will give a liberal theory of justice, but his emphasis on positive freedom will place him towards the left on the spectrum of liberalism.

 

 

[1.3.2.3.] The Original Position.

 

As we have seen, Rawls belongs to the social contract tradition of political philosophy. But the contract with which his theory begins is not an agreement to leave the state of nature and enter into civil society.

 

Rawls begins by considering an initial agreement that individuals living outside of all social institutions would make among themselves in order to establish such institutions.

 

He calls such a situation the Original Position.

 

People in the Original Position are:

 

1.       behind a Veil of Ignorance. This is the position that we would be in if we had no knowledge about our particular personalities and positions in society. Imagine that we don’t know any particular feature about ourselves (sex, race, intelligence, talent, etc.). We still have knowledge of humans in general and of these general differences; we just don’t know which particular classes we belong to.

 

Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. (TJ p.12)

 

2.       rational, in that they use the most effective means to reach their goals.

 

3.       mutually disinterested, in that none of them takes any interest in the well-being of other people.

 

4.       equal, in that they “all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on.” (TJ p.19)

 

According to Rawls, the principles of justice are those that would be chosen by people in the Original Position, people in a position of ignorance with respect to their own circumstances. They are the principles that people in the original position would want to guide society once the veil of ignorance is lifted.

 

The idea behind using the Original Position to identify principles of social justice is this: If you don’t have knowledge about what your own particular personal characteristics are, then you cannot set up institutions to protect the interests of those who have those characteristics.

 

An example from Rawls:

 

…if a man knew that he was wealthy, he might find it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary principle. To represent the desired restrictions one imagines a situation in which everyone is deprived of this sort of information. One excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices. (TJ 18-19)

 

This is the role that fairness plays in Rawls’ theory: “the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.” (TJ 12).

 

For this reason, Rawls calls his theory “Justice is Fairness.”

 

 

[1.3.2.4.] The First Principle of Justice: Liberty.

 

So what principles would people in the Original Position choose?

 

The first principle they would choose has to do with liberties:

 

The First Principle of Justice. Each person should have the maximum amount of liberty compatible with the same amount of liberty for everyone else.

 

The idea behind this principle is that liberty is the top priority among all goods. If you don’t have freedom to pursue your conception of the good life, then no other good things matter very much.

 

Rawls has in mind the following liberties:

·         “political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office)”

·         “freedom of speech and assembly”

·         “liberty of conscience and freedom of thought”

·         “freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person)”

·         “the right to hold personal property”

·         “freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure” (TJ rev. ed. p.53)

 

 

[1.3.2.5.] The Second Principle of Justice: Distributive Justice.

 

The second principle that people in the Original Position would choose has to do with how social and economic goods (i.e., wealth, authority and responsibility) are distributed.

 

The Second Principle of Justice: Inequalities in the distribution of goods (wealth, authority, etc.) are justified only if (a) they work to the advantage of the worst off persons in society and (b) the positions to which greater goods and authority accrue are open to all persons.

 

...an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. (TJ p.4)

 

…social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society. (TJ pp.14-15)

 

Clause (a) is known as the Difference Principle; clause (b) is known as the Equal Opportunity Principle.

 

 

[1.3.2.6.] The Equal Opportunity Principle.

 

Again, this principle asserts that social and economic inequalities are morally justified only if they are “attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” This seems to be the straightforward requirement that all individuals are to be equally eligible for the positions and offices which bring greater pay and authority.

 

But this principle requires action on the part of society to make all individuals equally eligible:

 

...fair equality of opportunity means a certain set of institutions that assures similar chances of education and culture for persons similarly motivated and keeps positions and offices open to all on the basis of qualities and efforts reasonably related to the relevant duties and tasks. (TJ rev. ed. 245-6)[4]

 

This principle reflects the importance that the positive conception of liberty/freedom plays in Rawls’ thinking. For example, justice requires not only that no one prevent you from getting a high-paying job; it also requires that you be provided with the educational opportunities you must have in order to become qualified for such a job. A society which is structured in such a way that some people do not have such educational opportunities is, on his view, an unjust society.

 

 

[1.3.2.7.] The Difference Principle.

 

Again, this principle asserts that social and economic inequalities are morally justified only if they are of “the greatest benefit to the least advantaged.”

 

By “greatest benefit to the least advantaged,” he means that the inequality makes those who are worst off better off than they would be in the hypothetical state in which all social goods (wealth, income, rights, responsibilities) are equally distributed. If a specific inequality in the distribution of some social good makes the worst off better off than they would be otherwise, then it is a justified inequality.

 

For example, the existence of well-paid doctors lifts up the conditions of everybody, including those who are worst off (the sick and the poor). If doctors were not well-paid, then the most capable people would not be motivated to become doctors, and the quality of health care available to the sick and the poor would decrease. Since having well-paid doctors makes the worst-off people in society better-off, it is morally permissible that doctors make more money than most other people.

 

--

 

It is within this framework of thought about social justice that Rawls will confront the questions: what is civil disobedience, and when is it morally justified?

 

 

Stopping point for Monday January 22. For next time, read pp.19-22, an excerpt from A Theory of Justice in which Rawls discusses civil disobedience.

 

 

 

 



[1] Other characteristics of good social institutions mentioned by Rawls are efficiency and liberality; e.g. TJ p.9.

 

[2] Rawls himself acknowledged that the concept of a society's basic structure is "somewhat vague. It is not always clear which institutions or features thereof should be included." (TJ p.9)

[3] I take from Talisse, On Rawls pp.19-20, the basic point that Rawls' description of what counts as a theory or concept of justice is consistent with both liberal and classical (e.g. Aristotelian) theories / concepts of justice. Talisse does not use the term "illiberal," however.

[4] This is a point emphasized by Talisse in On Rawls, pp.42-43.



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