[1.7.2.2.] Kant on International Law.

 

Relevant works by Kant:

·         Perpetual Peace (1795)[1] [“PP”; discussed in your textbook]

·         The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) [excerpted in your textbook; not to be confused with The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), which you may have read in your Introduction to Philosophy course].

 

On Kant’s view, the Categorical Imperative (in all of its different formulations) holds for all rational beings at all times.

 

For this reason, morality is universal and without exception.

 

Because Kant takes this view of morality, he holds that the laws governing the interactions between and among nations should reflect universal moral principles.

 

In particular, Kant will argue that in order for a given state to participate in a system of international law, it must meet a specific universal standard of moral legitimacy. In particular, it must be (what Kant called) a republic.

 

 

[1.7.2.2.1.] Forms of Sovereignty and Government.

 

Kant described two ways to categorize nations:

 

(a) according to how political power within the nation is distributed; these are the three possible forms of sovereignty:

·         autocracy: one person has all the power

·         aristocracy: many people, but not all, share the power

·         democracy: all people share the power equally

 

(b) according to how political power within the nation is exercised; these are the possible forms of government

·         republicanism: “the political principle of the separation of the executive power (the administration) from the legislative.” (PP) In other words, the party that enforces the law is different from the party that makes the law. In a republic, the people rather than a ruler determine what laws will govern them.

·         despotism: “the autonomous execution by the state of laws which it has itself decreed.” (PP) That is, one and the same entity makes the laws and enforces them [2]

 

 

[1.7.2.2.2.] A Moral Standard for Individual Governments.

 

Says Kant, “the only rightful constitution [is] that of a pure republic.” (43) The reason is that it is the only one that follows from the idea of a social contract: “The only constitution which derives from the idea of the original compact, and on which all juridical legislation of a people must be based, is the republican.” (PP) [Like Socrates, Hobbes, and Rawls, Kant is a social contract theorist.]

 

On Kant’s view,

·         a government is legitimate only if its form is “representative” (by which Kant seems to mean that the political will of the citizens is represented, not by themselves, but some other entity); and

·         a representative government must be a republic (and vice versa):

·         “Any true republic ... is and cannot be anything other than a representative system of the people whereby the people’s rights are looked after on their behalf by deputies who represent the united will of the citizens.” (43)

·         “To conform to the concept of law ... government must have a representative form, and in this system only a republican mode of government is possible; without it, government is despotic and arbitrary, whatever the constitution may be.” (PP)

 

In §55, Kant offers us a hint as to why a representative republic is the only legitimate form of government. It has to do with the second version of the CI:

 

...a citizen must always be regarded as a co-legislative member of the state (i.e. not just as a means, but also as an end in himself), and he must therefore give his free consent through his representatives not only to the waging of war in general, but also to every particular declaration of war. (45)

 

So, unless those holding political power genuinely represent the will of the citizens, those citizens are not being treated as ends in themselves; their autonomy is not being respected; the CI has been violated; and the government is illegitimate.

 

Kant’s view here is very different from Hobbes’:

·         According to Kant, a state is morally legitimate only if it is a republic. By its very existence, a despotism is in violation of morality. (Simon calls this Kantian idealism.)

·         For Hobbes, all actual states are “sovereign” and equally legitimate. It doesn’t matter how morally bad a governing power seems to be. So long as it is actually the ultimate political power within a state, it is sovereign and is therefore legitimate. (Simon calls this Hobbesian realism).

 

 

[1.7.2.2.3.] “International Right.”

 

The German word Kant uses, which is here translated as “right,” is Recht, which can also mean law. So on some occasions, when he refers to “international right,” we should read him as referring to international law.

 

Kant views individual, sovereign states as being related to each other as individuals are related in Hobbes’ state of nature. The “natural” condition of states is a condition of war. (As with Hobbes, Kant does not mean constant battle, but a condition in which there is always the threat that fighting will break out.)

 

So “international right” (read: international law) is concerned, in part, with “the right to make war, partly with the right of war itself, and partly with questions of right after a war, i.e. with the right of states to compel each other to abandon their warlike condition and to create a constitution which will establish an enduring peace.” (44)

 

In §54, Kant identifies the following “elements of international right”:

 

(1)    With regard to each other, individual states exist in a situation “devoid of right,” just like individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature.

(2)    In this state of war, no state can act unjustly towards another; but the situation itself is unjust, because it suggests that no state wants anything better; so each state is obligated to get out of this situation.

(3)    “it is necessary to establish a federation of peoples in accordance with the idea of an original social contract, so that states will protect one another against external aggression while refraining from interference in one another’s internal disagreements.” (45)

(4)    “this association must not embody a sovereign power as in a civil constitution, but only a partnership or confederation.” (45)

 

 

[1.7.2.2.4.] Perpetual Peace.

 

On Kant’s view, the ultimate goal of all international “right’ (law) is perpetual peace.

 

A state of perpetual peace will be attained only if...

·         there arises a confederation (partnership) of republican states [not a world government]...

·         governed by an ethical international law...

·         stemming from a compact among those republics...

 

Unfortunately, perpetual peace is “an idea incapable of realisation” (47). This is because it is possible only within a

 

universal union of states... But if an international state of this kind extends over too wide an area of land, it will eventually become impossible to govern it and thence to protect each of its members, and the multitude of corporations this would require must again lead to a state of war. (47)

 

However, Kant thinks that we should still put into place the political structures and agreements among states that would bring us as close as possible to perpetual peace:

 

...we must simply act as if it could really come about (which is perhaps impossible), and turn our efforts towards realizing it and towards establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose (perhaps that of republicanism in all states, individually and collectively). ... And even if the fulfillment of this pacific intention were forever to remain a pious hope, we should still not be deceiving ourselves if we made it our maxim to work unceasingly towards it, for it is our duty to do so. (48)

 

One way of putting Kant’s point is to say that the idea of perpetual peace among a republic of nations (each of which is itself a republic) is a regulative ideal, something that should guide our political thought and behavior, something that we should always strive for, but not something that we should realistically expect ever to be achieved.

 

 

Stopping point for Wednesday January 31. For next time, read pp.49-52.