[6.6.] Utilitarianism.

 

According to utilitarianism, actions that produce the greatest good for the greatest number are moral; those that decrease the amount of good are immoral. No action is morally permissible or immoral in itself; its moral status always depends on its consequences.

 

But what counts as a good consequence? In other words, what consequence(s) or effect(s) does utilitarianism take to have intrinsic value?

 

·         intrinsic value (df.): something has intrinsic value when it is valuable for its own sake rather than because it can help you attain something else of value. The opposite is extrinsic value...

·         extrinsic value (df.):  something has extrinsic value when it is valuable as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself (a.k.a. instrumental value).

 

Every form of utilitarianism must identify something that has intrinsic value—something worth having for its own sake. Different forms of utilitarianism give different answers:

• classical (Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill): happiness, which Mill defined as pleasure and the absence of pain
• modern: well-being (including happiness, among other things)
• preference: satisfaction of people’s preferences [this sort of utilitarianism will play a prominent role in our coverage of business ethics; we will see soon the role that it plays in the defense of the free market theory of corporate social responsibility].

 

 

[6.6.1.] Utilitarianism and Executive Salaries.

 

Applied to the issue of executive salaries: weigh the consequences of the Income Equity Act (sponsored by Rep. Martin Sabo, D-MN), which would limit the amount of executive salary that a given corporation could claim as a tax deduction to some multiple of the average salary of the company’s workers. This would motivate the company to raise its average salary or lower the amount they pay their executives:

 

The U.S. tax code allows businesses to deduct “reasonable” employee compensation from their taxable income, but it does not allow the deduction of “excessive” compensation.  My bill defines the upper limit of “reasonable” compensation as being equal to 25 times the salary of the lowest paid full-time worker in a company.  For example, if the lowest paid worker at a firm makes $20,000 a year, that business can deduct up to $500,000 (25 x $20,000) in compensation per executive.[1]

 

The utilitarian approach will be to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and decide whether the net benefits of having such a law will outweigh the net benefits of not having it.

 

Possible benefits: increase average pay of workers; lower consumer costs.

Possible drawbacks: highly qualified executives will be less attracted to these jobs and U.S. companies will become less competitive, resulting in harm to everyone, including workers and consumers.

 

As this suggests, it is possible for utilitarians to agree on the desired outcome (increased well-being for all concerned) and yet disagree on the best means of attaining it (limited executive compensation, or not). Compare this disagreement to:

·         the disagreement between the respective approaches of Garrett Hardin and Peter Singer when it comes to fighting global poverty and disease;

·         the disagreement between the expert version and the market version of utilitarian business policy (see DesJardins pp.36-38)

 

And this brings to light a possible problem for utilitarianism in general: how can a utilitarian know which course of action will in fact have the best outcome (whether that outcome is understood in terms of happiness, well-being, or preference-satisfaction)? It may be very difficult, perhaps even practically impossible, to determine whether the Income Equity Act would have had an overall positive effect. (Because this is a problem about knowledge, we can say that it is an epistemological problem. Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge; the word derives from the Greek episteme, meaning knowledge or science.)

 

 

[6.6.2.] Rights-Based Criticisms of Utilitarianism.

 

DesJardins describes, in addition to the problem about knowledge described above, a number of other general criticisms of the utilitarian approach.

 

One is that utilitarianism shows no concern for personal rights. In general, if utilitarianism is the sole moral standard, then it is morally permissible to violate people’s personal rights when doing so will increase overall well-being.

 

the slavery argument:

… it might turn out that the overall happiness would be increased if we forced a small minority of the population into slave labor. Utilitarians could object to slavery, not as a matter of principle, but only if and to the degree that slavery detracts from the overall good. If it turns out that slavery increases the net overall happiness, utilitarianism would have to support slavery. In the judgment of many people, such a decision would violate the principles of justice, equality, and respect. (35, emphases added)

 

This suggests a criticism of Sabo’s Income Equity Act:

 

…critics of the Sabo Bill argue that businesses should be free to decide for themselves what to pay their executives. The income paid to executives belongs to the corporation, not to the government, and therefore such a law would violate their property rights. Rights function to protect certain central interests from being sacrificed for the greater overall happiness.  (35)

 

 

[6.7.] Deontological Ethics.

 

A brief review of key ideas from Kant’s deontological theory:

 

Consequences are irrelevant to morality. Morality is based on rationality, specifically, on a principle that all rational beings must accept: The Categorical Imperative. Here are two of versions of the Categorical imperative:

1.      “Act only according to that maxim [rule] which you can at the same time will to become a universal law.” I.e., be consistent in your treatment of others: don’t perform an action unless you can honestly will for anyone else in your same situation to do the same thing.

2.      “Act so as to treat other rational beings as ends, never as means only.” That is,, always treat people as being valuable in themselves; don’t use them only to try to bring about certain consequences that you desire. Respect their autonomy, their status as independent agents capable of, and entitled to, decide for themselves how their lives ought to go.

 

DesJardins nicely sums up Kant’s deontological emphasis on personal rights, respect and autonomy…

 

… on this Kantian theory our fundamental ethical duty is to treat people with respect, to treat them as equally capable of living an autonomous life. But since each person has this same fundamental duty towards others, each of us can be said to have the right to be treated with respect, the right to be treated as an end and never as a means only. I have the right to pursue my own autonomously chosen ends as long as I do not in turn treat other people as means to my ends. (39)

 

…and Kant’s view that human worth stems from our rationality:

 

…the human capacity to make rational choices is the distinctive human characteristic. Humans do not act only out of instinct and conditioning, they make free choices about how they live their lives, about their own ends. In this sense, humans are said to have autonomy. Humans are subjects in the sense that they originate action, they choose, they act for their own ends. To treat someone as a means or as an object is to deny to them this distinctive and essential human characteristic; it would be to deny to them their very humanity. (41)

 

 

 

[6.7.1.] Issue: Child Labor.

 

An issue on which utilitarianism and deontology might disagree is child labor.

 

A utilitarian might defend the practice by noting “that the children are better off with the jobs than without them, that they contribute to their own family’s income, and that they contribute to the overall welfare of their society” by providing cheap labor that helps to bring in more hard currency that can pay for food, medicine and education and reduce the country’s debt. (38)

 

From Kant’s deontological point of view, it is akin to slavery or child abuse. It is wrong on principle, even if it increases overall well-being.[2] So a Kantian would not be swayed by the beneficial consequences of child labor:

 

… the Kantian would object to child labor because such practices violate our duty to treat children with respect. We violate the rights of children when we treat them as mere means to the ends of production and economic growth. We are treating them merely as means because, as children, they are incapable of rationally and freely choosing their own ends. (40)

 

 

[6.7.2] Duties, Rights and Interests.

 

DesJardins (40-41) describes the relationships among the following concepts, all of which play a role in deontological ethics: duties, rights and interests.

 

For every right, there is a corresponding duty—and vice versa.

 

If you have a right to something, then someone has a corresponding duty to provide that thing for you. (This includes both positive rights — rights to receive something, like a payment for one’s work, or health care — and negative rights — rights not to be treated in certain ways, like the right not to be physically assaulted.)

 

Conversely, if I have a duty to do something for you, then you have a right against me that I should do that thing. In other words, you have a right to have that thing done by me.

 

Rights (and therefore duties) are generated by interests, not by mere wants.

 

Interests have to do with what benefits someone, with what is “objectively connected to what is good for that person.” (40) The difference between interests and wants is illustrated by the fact that “[p]eople don’t always want what it is in their interest to have.” (40) For example, you might want to smoke a cigarette, or to eat fattening food, but it is not in your best interest to do so.

 

So the simple fact that you want something does not create a right for you to have it, and thus does not create an obligation or duty for anyone to provide you with that thing.

 

For example: on one plausible view, downloading pirated music and video files. Artists and corporations have a serious interest in you not downloading such files for free, so you have an obligation not to do so, even if you have a strong desire to (your mere desire for free music and movies does not create a right for you to get them).

 

DesJardins acknowledges the danger inherent in the deontological / rights-based approach to ethics:

 

... It encourages people towards self-centered individualism, trying to privilege their own selfish wants by calling them rights. Anything that someone wants eventually gets called a right and thereby people come to expect society to provide this for them. (41)

 

and suggests that genuine rights stem only from people’s most important, fundamental interests.

 

And he suggests what two such rights might be:

·         the right “to make our own choices,” i.e., to act autonomously

·         the right to “equal treatment (or equal consideration)” (since all humans have the first right). (42)

 

 

 

Stopping point for Wednesday February 18. For next time, read DesJardins ch.3 pp.48-55.