[2.] Peirce’s Negative Account of Inquiry.

 

[2.1.] Against Cartesianism.[1]

 

In a series of papers published in the 1870s, Peirce gave a positive account of inquiry. Many philosophers define inquiry as an attempt to discover truth. As we will see, Peirce defined it somewhat differently.

 

But before we look at Peirce’s own account of inquiry, we need to understand the view of inquiry he was reacting against.

 

Peirce rejected the account of inquiry put forward by René Descartes (1596-1650; French rationalist).[2] This criticism occurs at many different places throughout Peirce’s writings.[3] For present purposes, we will be examining Peirce’s criticism of Descartes in 1868’s “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” Some of the other anti-Cartesian passages will come up later in the semester.

 

 

[2.1.1.] Descartes: Method of Doubt, Quest for Certainty.

 

One of Descartes’ goals in the Meditations was to show that skepticism is false.

 

skepticism (df.): the view that knowledge of the world is impossible

 

His strategy was to set aside all of his current beliefs and start from scratch. He wanted to identify the most basic, fundamental beliefs, those which are certain (which absolutely cannot be false), and build up from there.

 

certainty (df.): S is certain that p when S believes that p and S cannot possibly be mistaken in that belief; certainty requires the impossibility of error.

·         There are other senses of the word “certainty”; certainty in the sense defined above is sometimes called epistemic certainty.

 

It is as if his current beliefs are an unstable building, and he wants to knock the entire thing down so that he can identify a stable foundation upon which he can build something new.

 

How did he intend to identify these certain beliefs? Descartes employed a test to discover which beliefs are certain, i.e., which are stable enough to serve as a foundation for the rest of his knowledge.

 

This test is his “Method of Doubt”:

·         try to think of a reason to doubt a belief. It doesn’t have to be a plausible reason… it just has to be possible.

·         if you can come up with a reason to doubt it—any reason at all, no matter how unlikely that reason is to be true)—then you set that belief aside. It cannot be part of a stable foundation.

·         Whatever beliefs are left “pass” the method of doubt test and are absolutely certain: they cannot be false.

·         There is no guarantee that there will be any beliefs that pass the method of doubt test.

 

As it happens, Descartes thinks that he has found a reason to doubt just about everything:

·         it is possible that there is an evil demon deceiving us about anything and everything.[4]

 

The MOD test now asks: since it is possible that there is an all-powerful demon who has the power to fool us about anything, is there any belief which we can hold with certainty?

 

But, says Descartes, here is at least one thing about which an evil demon could not fool me:

1. I am having thoughts and experiences.

If it seems to you that you are having an experience, then you are having an experience. What that experience represents to you may be completely false, but it is still the case that you are having an experience.

 

And this leads to another belief in which I can be certain:

2. I exist.

If I did not exist, it would be impossible for me to experience or think anything.

 

Among our ideas is the idea of God. But (says Descartes) this is different than our ideas of desks and books and clouds... etc. The idea of God is the idea of a perfect being—and a being that does not exist is not perfect. So Descartes thinks he has yet another belief that is immune from doubt:

3. God exists.

 

And this is the key to dispelling doubt about the bulk of our beliefs regarding the world outside our minds. Since God is perfect, he is not a deceiver, and he would not create us in such a way as to allow us to be completely and systematically deceived. So he can be certain that

4. I am not being fooled by an evil demon.

 

Once he has identified a group of beliefs that (he says) are certain, he asks: what it is about these beliefs that makes them certain?

 

His answer: his grasp of the belief that he is an existing thing that thinks is so clear and distinct that that belief cannot possibly be false.

 

So Descartes identifies this as the criterion of certainty: Any belief that is clear and distinct (like the belief that he is a thinking thing) is certain.

 

From this basis of first-person psychological beliefs, Descartes argued for various claims about the world outside his mind.

 

 

[2.1.2.] Four Characteristics of Cartesianism.

 

Peirce opens “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” with a list of four characteristics of Cartesianism (EP 1:28):

 

C1.  Philosophy should begin with universal doubt.

 

C2.  “the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness.”

 

C3.  In philosophy, it is acceptable to support claims with “a single thread of inference depending upon inconspicuous premises.”

 

C4.  There are “absolutely inexplicable” facts—facts that can never be explained—“unless to say ‘God makes them so’ is to be regarded as an explanation.”

 

Peirce rejects all four claims of Cartesianism and counters each claim with a claim of his own (EP 1:28-29):

 

P1. “We cannot begin with complete doubt.”

 

P2. “...to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious.”

 

P3. Philosophy should “proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and ... trust to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one.”

 

P4. The supposition that something is “absolutely inexplicable ... is never allowable.”

 

We will examine these one by one...

 

 

[2.1.3.] The Method of Doubt is Impossible.

 

C1.  Philosophy should begin with universal doubt.

 

P1.     “We cannot begin with complete doubt.”

 

According to Peirce Descartes’ Method of Doubt test is impossible. We cannot actually do what it recommends.

 

It involves a policy of deliberate doubt, in that Descartes tries to doubt as much as he can. But genuine doubt is not deliberate. Any deliberate or voluntary doubt is bound to be fraudulent. The “doubt” that Descartes’ method relies on is no such thing—it is fake doubt.

 

Real doubt and real belief are involuntary. We cannot begin to doubt at will, as Descartes claims to be doing.[5] So we cannot begin philosophical inquiry (or any other inquiry) by deliberately doubting everything. We must begin inquiry with the beliefs we already have:

 

We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. (EP 1:29, CP 5.264)

 

On Peirce’s view, it is no coincidence that Descartes winds up back with his old beliefs (e.g., that God exists) by Meditation III—because his claim to have given those beliefs up was “mere self-deception.” He never really gave them up in the first place.

 

A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. (EP 1:29, emphasis added)

 

Peirce’s attitude here anticipates a set of distinctions that he made later:

 

genuine inquiry vs. pseudo-inquiry: distinguished by motive.

 

genuine inquiry (df.): inquiry that is motivated by the desire to find the truth, no matter what that truth happens to be. [This desire is what Peirce called “the scientific attitude”]

 

pseudo-inquiry (“pseudo” = false) is motivated by the desire to make a case for a claim that has already been determined in advance; there are two kinds:

 

sham reasoning (df.): making a case for a claim your commitment to which is sincere (you care that the claim is true), but also immune to evidence or argument

 

fake reasoning (df.): making a case for a claim, not because you have a sincere commitment to it (you don’t really care whether the claim is true or false), but because you think doing so will be to your advantage.[6]

 

Deciding in advance of your thinking that God is real, and then seeking out evidence to support that belief, is sham reasoning, not genuine inquiry. Descartes does not seem to have consciously decided to work his way back to a belief in God no matter what. But to the degree that Descartes’ belief in God was unshakeable and immune to evidence and argument, Descartes was a sham reasoner about that belief.

 

 

[2.1.3.1.] In Descartes’ Defense.

 

It is possible that Peirce’s criticism is unfair, because it is based on a misunderstanding of what Descartes was actually trying to do. Descartes was really proposing that we examine our foundational beliefs to see which are dubitable, i.e., which we could have reason for doubting. He was not attempting to actually doubt his own beliefs, nor was he advocating that anyone else do so.

 

On this understanding of the MOD, we are to set aside (but not actually doubt) our dubitable beliefs while we continue to search for those which are indubitable. This is not the same as the deliberate doubt that Peirce criticized Descartes for endorsing.[7]

 

 

Stopping point for Monday August 20.  For next time, read (once again) EP1:28-29.