[3.1.8.] The Method of Science and Realism.

 

Peirce describes the following four claims as constituting the “fundamental hypothesis” of the method of science (EP1:120, CP 5.384):

 

1.       “There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them” [this is a form of realism]

 

realism: (df.) there is a real world, one that has being apart from anyone’s thoughts or beliefs about it.

·         The word “realism” is used in a number of different ways in philosophy, not all of them having anything to do with the mind-independence of the world.

·         Sometimes, when the word “realism” is used to describe a position about the mind-independence of the world, it is still used to refer to a view different than the one that Peirce is describing here.[1]

 

2.        “those realities affect our senses according to regular laws”

 

3.       “though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are”

 

4.       “any man, if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion.”

 

 

 

[3.1.8.1.] The External and the Real.

 

Up to this point, has already stated the “new conceptions” introduced as each of the first three methods fail:

 

(I) “...another man’s thought or sentiment may be equivalent to one’s own”

(II) beliefs that are arbitrary and accidental are not immune to doubt.

(III) beliefs that are determined by something other than the facts are not to be trusted.

 

Says Peirce, the fourth “new conception” involved in the fundamental assumptions of the method of science is:

 

(IV) “reality”—i.e., there are realities, “things whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them.”

 

Peirce describes such things as real, and he described things whose characteristics do depend on what someone thinks about them as fictional or figments.

 

Claim (1), which is part of the “fundamental hypothesis” of the method of science, is subtly different than the following:

 

(*) There are things whose characteristics do not depend on what anyone in particular thinks.

 

Peirce described such things as external, and he described things whose characteristics do depend on what someone thinks as internal.

 

So we have two different distinctions:

·         real vs. fictional

·         external vs. internal

 

On Peirce’s view, the method of science depends on there being both external things (i.e “an external permanency...something upon which our thinking has no effect”) and real things (i.e. “things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them”).

 

But notice that Peirce did NOT say that everything that is real is external—what he said here about the method of science leaves open the possibility that part of reality is internal. And in fact, Peirce did believe that there are real things (that are independent of what people think about them) that are internal (that are not independent of what anyone thinks).

 

 

[3.1.8.2.] Why Believe Realism?

 

Why should we believe that there are realities that are independent of what we think about them?

 

Peirce’s response to this question was not a straightforward argument in support of realism. Instead, he cited the following four points: (numbered 1 through 4, EP 1:120):

 

1.       The method of science itself does not give rise to doubts about realism.

2.       [skipping this momentarily—it’s worth an extended examination, below]

3.       Everyone already uses the method of science with regard to lots of subjects. People only fail to use it when they don’t know how to apply it to a given subject. (Presumably, he means to suggest that, since everyone uses the method, everyone already believes the “fundamental hypothesis” of the method, viz. realism.)

4.       Scientific inquiry “has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion.”

 

Here is the second point Peirce makes to explain why he himself does not doubt realism:

 

2. The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is some one thing which a proposition should represent. Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind admits. So that the social impulse does not cause men to doubt it. (EP1:120 & CP 5.384, emphases added)

 

This response begins with the concept of doubting….

 

·         Peirce assumes that doubt involves a feeling of “dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions.” By “repugnant” propositions he seems to have meant incompatible propositions:

 

incompatible (df.): incompatible propositions are propositions that cannot be true at the same time, e.g. “Atlanta is the capital of Georgia” and “Georgia does not have a capital” are incompatible propositions.

 

When you have doubts about the claim that p, this involves a feeling of dissatisfaction resulting from your recognition that “p” and “not-p” cannot both be true. For example, if you are unsure where your final exam is being held, you experience a feeling of discomfort, and this stems from your recognition that “The exam is at 2pm” and “The exam is not at 2pm” cannot both be true.

 

·         But if you were not assuming that there is one and only one way things are, then this incompatibility of propositions would not bother you. So you cannot consistently maintain that there is not a single reality and at the same time be bothered by doubt.

 

·         Each of us experiences doubt and is bothered by it, so everyone does in fact believe that there is a single way that the world is. So the method of science is based on an assumption (that there is one and only one way things are) that everyone believes already, anyway.

 

·         And since everyone really does believe realism, the “social impulse” does not cause anyone to doubt it.

 

 

Peirce concludes:

 

These [four points] afford the explanation of my not doubting the method or the hypothesis which it supposes; and not having any doubt, nor believing that anybody else whom I could influence has, it would be the merest babble for me to say more about it. If there be anybody with a living doubt upon the subject, let him consider it. (EP 1:120-21, CP 5.384)

 

 

 

Stopping point for Friday September 7. For next time, read article by Susan Haack: “The First Rule of Reason” (on electronic reserve).