[4.3.1.] Illustrations of the Pragmatic Maxim.

 

EXAMPLE 1: gold

 

Consider the claim “This chain is pure gold.” What does this claim mean? Its pragmatic meaning is given by a list of conditionals (if-then statements), e.g.,

·         If you raise the temperature of the chain to 100° F, it will not melt.

·         If you raise the temperature of the chain to 1948° F, it will melt.

·         If you hammer it, it will flatten out.

·         If you wear the chain around your neck, it will not turn your skin green.

etc.

 

This is how the PM ties the meaning of concepts to both actions and sensible effects: the PM gives the meaning of a concept in terms of the experiential consequences of engaging in certain actions: “If you do so-and-so, then you will experience such-and-such.”

 

EXAMPLE 2: hard

 

As an example of the application of the PM, Peirce gives the concept hard (EP 1:132, CP 5.403).[1] [Peirce is considering the word “hard” in its strict, mineralogical sense.]

 

The pragmatic meaning of the claim that an object (say, a diamond) is hard is given by a list of conditionals, such as:

·         If you attempt to scratch it with a knife, then the diamond will not be scratched.

·         If you attempt to use it to scratch a piece of glass, then the glass will be scratched.

etc.

 

On Peirce’s view, this list of conditionals is all that is (pragmatically) meant by the word “hard.” There is no hidden quality of hardness inside the diamond. To say that it is hard is to say simply that if you do certain things with it, then certain practical consequences will follow.

 

And if an object never had pressure applied to it, then pragmatically, it makes no difference whether we describe it as hard or as soft. The only difference it makes is in how we use the words “hard” and “soft.”

 

There is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test. Suppose, then, that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion of soft cotton, and should remain there until it was finally burned up. Would it be false to say that that diamond was soft? ... what prevents us from saying that all hard bodies remain perfectly soft until they are touched, when their hardness increases with the pressure until they are scratched. Reflection will show that the reply is this: there would be no falsity in such modes of speech. They would involve a modification of our present usage of speech with regard to the words hard and soft, but not of their meanings. For they represent no fact to be different from what it is; only they involve arrangements of facts which would be exceedingly maladroit. This leads us to remark that the question of what would occur under circumstances which do not actually arise is not a question of fact, but only of the most perspicuous arrangement of them. (EP 1:132, CP 5.403)[2]

 

Peirce himself illustrated the PM by applying it to the following concepts of physical science:

 

·         hard (p.138)

·         weight / heavy (p.140)

·         force (pp.140-42; requires an understanding of the Parallelogram of Forces)

·         lithium:

 

If you look into a textbook of chemistry for a definition of lithium, you may be told that it is that element whose atomic weight is 7 very nearly. But if the author has a more logical mind he will tell you that if you search among minerals that are vitreous, translucent, grey or white, very hard, brittle, and insoluble, for one which imparts a crimson tinge to an unluminous flame, this mineral being triturated with lime or witherite rats-bane, and then fused, can be partly dissolved in muriatic acid; and if this solution be evaporated, and the residue be extracted with sulphuric acid, and duly purified, it can be converted by ordinary methods into a chloride, which being obtained in the solid state, fused, and electrolyzed with half a dozen powerful cells, will yield a globule of a pinkish silvery metal that will float on gasolene; and the material of that is a specimen of lithium. The peculiarity of this definition—or rather this precept that is more serviceable than a definition—is that it tells you what the word lithium denotes by prescribing what you are to do in order to gain a perceptual acquaintance with the object of the word.[3]

 

 

[4.3.2.] Pragmatic Account of Belief.

 

Remember that in “The Fixation of Belief,” Peirce defined belief in terms of habits or dispositions to behave. Although Peirce is not explicit about this, his account of belief seems to be the result of applying the PM to the concept belief.

 

Consider the claim that Bill believes that the liquid in this container is water. If we apply the PM to this claim, what we get is a list of conditionals stating what Bill will do in certain situations:

·         “If you offer Bill a drink from the container, then he will accept.”

·         “If you pore it on Bill’s houseplants or give it to his dog to drink, then he will not yell at you.”

·         “If Bill needs to brush his teeth, he will use the liquid to rinse his mouth.”

etc.

 

On Peirce’s view, applying the PM to the concept belief reveals that Bill’s belief consists, at least in part, of a group of habits or dispositions to perform certain actions in certain situations.

 

 

[4.3.3.] An Argument for the Pragmatism.

 

Peirce does not simply put forward the PM… he provides an argument for it (although it is not obvious from the text of “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” that this is what he intends to do).

 

Years after the 1878 publication of “How to Make…”, in a series of lectures on pragmatism he gave in 1903, Peirce stated the PM in the following way:

 

“[T]he possible practical consequences of a concept constitute the sum total of the concept” (EP 2:139, CP 5.27)

 

And he describes the “proof” he had given for this claim in “How to Make…”:

 

 What is the proof that the possible practical consequences of a concept constitute the sum total of the concept? The argument upon which I rested the maxim in my original paper was that belief consists mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula believed in as the guide to action.

If this be in truth the nature of belief, then undoubtedly the proposition believed in can itself be nothing but a maxim of conduct. That I believe is quite evident. (EP 2:139, CP 5.27)[4]

 

The argument that Peirce in 1903 attributes to “How to Make...” is something like this:

 

1. The concept of truth “developed out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention.” (EP 2:140, CP 5.28)
2. Therefore, “belief is nothing but the deliberate preparedness to act according to the formula believed.” (EP 2:140, CP 5.28)
3. Therefore, “the proposition believed in can be nothing but a maxim of conduct.” (EP 2:139, CP 5.27)
4. Therefore, “the possible practical consequences of a concept constitute the sum total of the concept.” (EP 2:139, CP 5.27)

 

 

[4.4.] The “First and Second Grades” of Clarity Regarding the Real.

 

Having used the PM to clarify a number of scientific concepts, he now turns toward a more philosophical concept: reality.

 

He begins by considering the concept real in its “first grade” of clarity:

 

Taking clearness in the sense of familiarity, no idea could be clearer than this. Every child uses it with perfect confidence, never dreaming that he does not understand it. (EP 1:136, CP 5.405)

 

He then considers the concept real in its “second grade” of clarity. This is the dictionary definition of “reality.” Here he reiterates the definition we’ve seen him use before:

 

Thus we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be. (EP 1:137, CP 5.405) [5]

 

[At this point he also defines the external (that which does not depend on what anyone thinks) and the fictional (that which depends on what someone thinks about it—this is the opposite of the real).]

 

But Peirce wanted to go beyond this “second grade” of clarity to a higher grade, one that ties the concept of reality directly to action and its sensible effects.

 

In other words, he wanted to apply the PM to the concept real, in order to answer the question: What conceivable sensible effect does something’s being real have on our experience?

 

Here, then, let us apply our rules. According to them, reality, like every other quality, consists in the peculiar sensible effects which things partaking of it produce. The only effect which real things have is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs. The question therefore is, how is true belief (or belief in the real) distinguished from false belief (or belief in fiction). (EP 1:137, 5.406)[6]

 

So the pragmatic account of reality will need to be put in terms of true belief. The objects of a true belief are real, and the only difference that the real makes in our experience is that it causes our true beliefs. So in order to have a pragmatic understanding of reality, we must understand what it is to have a true belief.

 

 

[4.5.] Science’s Conception of Truth.

 

At this point, he refers back to the account of the four methods of fixing belief he gave in “The Fixation of Belief.” [And it’s at this point that it becomes explicit what he was doing in describing those four methods: he was describing the history of the development of the concept of truth.]

 

It was in the advent of the fourth and final method, the method of science, that the concepts of truth and falsehood were fully developed:

 

Now, as we have seen in the former paper, the ideas of truth and falsehood, in their full development, appertain exclusively to the scientific method of settling opinion. (EP 1:137, CP 5.406)

 

He reprises the first three methods of fixing belief, and describes the concept of truth that accompanied each:

 

Tenacity	“A person who arbitrarily chooses the propositions which he will adopt can use the word truth only to emphasize the expression of his determination to hold on to his choice. ... For him, the truth is simply his particular stronghold.” (EP 1:137, CP 5.406)
Authority	“When the method of authority prevailed, the truth meant little more than the Catholic faith. ... the idea of loyalty replaced that of truth-seeking.” (EP 1:138, CP 5.406)
a priori	“...philosophers have been less intent on finding out what the facts are than on inquiring what belief is most in harmony with their system. It is hard to convince a follower of the a priori method by adducing facts; but show him that an opinion that he is defending is inconsistent with what he has laid down elsewhere and he will be very apt to retract it.” (EP 1:137, CP 5.406)

 

Unlike the followers of the other methods,

 

all the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied. ... Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth…

 

This is the fully developed concept of truth—it is also the concept of truth clarified to the third grade of clearness—the result of applying the Pragmatic Maxim to the concept of truth…

 

… and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. (EP 1:138-39, CP 5.407 emphasis added)[7]

 

…and this is the fully developed concept of reality—as it is clarified to the third grade of clearness, the result of applying the Pragmatic Maxim to the concept of reality.

 

 

[4.6.] The Pragmatic Accounts of Truth and Reality.

 

According to Peirce, if we apply the PM to the claim “it is true that p,” we get something like this:

·         “If you push inquiry into the claim that p as far as it can go, then it will still be believed that p.”

 

So on Peirce’s view, to say that the belief that p is true is to say that that belief will be a part of the collective opinion of a community of inquirers at the hypothetical end of inquiry.

 

Truth, understood in the third grade of clearness, is that which will be agreed upon by all inquirers after inquiry has been pushed as far as it can go (an “ultimate community of inquirers”).

 

[This analysis of truth is one of Peirce’s most famous doctrines. Different versions of this pragmatic account of truth appear in the works of other philosophers, including William James and John Dewey. But the “pragmatic theory of truth” has changed so much since Peirce first articulated it, e.g. in the work of contemporary pragmatist Richard Rorty, that it is no longer recognizable as the same theory that Peirce articulated.]

 

That which is real is the object represented by the opinion that will collectively be agreed upon if inquiry is pushed as far as it can go; in other words, the real is what is represented by a true belief.  Consider the claim: “x is real.” According to Peirce, applying the PM to this claim yields something like this:

·         “If you push inquiry as far as it can go, then some beliefs held at the end of inquiry will be about x.”

 

In other words, if x is real, then x is the object of a true belief. It will be the object of a belief that belongs to the collective beliefs of that hypothetical group of inquirers.

 

 

Stopping point for Friday September 14. For next time, finish reading “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (EP 1:139-41).