[5.6.] Peirce’s Argument for Scholastic Realism.

     

To recap: on Peirce’s view, generals

·         are real (independent of what anyone thinks about them)

·         do not exist (do not react against or interact with like things)

·         are not individuals, entities, or particulars... not even abstract ones.

 

So far, the only positive point we have seen Peirce make about  generals is that they are real.

 

To get a more complete understanding of Peirce’s scholastic realism, we need to draw connections between his belief in the reality of generals and his understanding of reality and truth that derives from the Pragmatic Maxim.

 

Recall that, when applied to the notions of reality and truth, the Pragmatic Maxim yields the following:

 

·         Truth. Truth is that which will (would) be agreed upon, i.e., collectively believed, by all inquirers if inquiry is (were) pushed as far as it can go.

 

·         Reality. The real is the object of a true belief—in other words, it is the object of a belief that will (would) belong to the collective beliefs of the ultimate community of inquirers.

 

With these pragmatic understandings of truth and reality, Peirce argues for SR as follows:

 

...a proposition whose falsity can never be discovered, and the error of which therefore is absolutely incognizable, contains, upon our principle, absolutely no error. Consequently, that which is thought in these cognitions is the real, as it really is. There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, and it is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any special case.

                But it follows that since no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate, generals must have a real existence. (EP 1:52-3; CP 5.311-2; “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” 1868)

 

This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I, or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else. …

            It is plain that this view of reality is inevitably realistic; because general conceptions enter into all judgments, and therefore into true opinions. Consequently a thing in general is as real as in the concrete. It is perfectly true that all white things have whiteness in them, for that is only saying, in another form of words, that all white things are white; but since it is true that real things possess whiteness, whiteness is real. It is a real which only exists by virtue of an act of thought knowing it, but that thought is not an arbitrary or accidental one dependent on any idiosyncrasies, but one which will hold in the final opinion. (EP1:89-90, CP 8.12-14, W2:469-70; review of Fraser’s Berkeley, 1871)[1]

 

 

Peirce’s argument for scholastic realism seems to be as follows:

 

1.       All beliefs involve general conceptions.

2.       So, beliefs that will be (would be) part of the final opinion (i.e., true beliefs) will (would) involve general conceptions.

3.       That which is  (would be) thought to be real in the final opinion IS real. [Peirce’s pragmatism about reality]

4.       So, generals are real.

 

 

[5.7.] Two Views of Reality.

 

Before he sets forth his scholastic realism in his review of Fraser’s Berkeley, he explains two different ways of understanding reality; one of them leads to scholastic realism, the other to nominalism...

 

Says Peirce, the definition of “real” as that which is independent of what anyone thinks about it is one on which nominalists and realists agree.

 

But they disagree about what sorts of thing are real, i.e., what sorts of thing are independent of what people think about them. On Peirce’s view, it is with exactly this difference of opinion that the disagreement between nominalism and realism begins.

 

 

[5.7.1.] The Nominalist View of Reality.

 

Nominalists hold that the real includes only that which is outside of individual minds and which causes sensation, and thus thought, in those minds. It is “the incognizable cause” of cognition (8.15, EP 1:91, and W 2:471).[2]

 

What does this imply about the reality of generality?

 

Nominalists can grant that there is generality in thought. For example, nominalists can say that “man” is a “mental term or thought-sign” that “stands indifferently for either of the sensible objects caused by the two external realities” (EP 1:88, 8.12, W 2:468).[3]

 

But since they take that which is incognizable to be non-general, they are nonetheless led to accept

 

Anti-Realism about Generals (ARG): generals (a.k.a. universals, including natural kinds, types, laws, etc.) are not real, i.e., they are not independent of what anyone thinks about them.

 

So nominalists begin by assuming that the only realities are those incognizable things outside the mind that cause sensation, and this leads them to deny the reality of generals.[4]

 

 

[5.7.2.] The Pragmatist View of Reality.

 

We have already seen that Peirce had a very different way of thinking about reality: the understanding of reality that results from Peirce’s clarification of the concept of reality by way of the pragmatic maxim.

 

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. (5.407, EP 1:139 and W 3:273, 1878)

 

On this pragmatic conception of reality, generals are real:

 

...there is nothing to prevent universal propositions from being absolutely true, and therefore universals may be as real as singulars. (W 2:175, 1868; not in EP)[5]

 

...a realist is simply one who knows no more recondite reality than that which is represented in a true representation. Since, therefore, the word “man” is true of something, that which “man” means is real. (EP 1:53, 5.312, and W 2:239, 1868)

 

...general conceptions enter into all judgments, and therefore into true opinions. Consequently a thing in the general is as real as in the concrete. It is perfectly true that all white things have whiteness in them, for that is only saying, in another form of words, that all white things are white; but since it is true that real things possess whiteness, whiteness is real. (EP 1:90, 8.14, W 2:470, 1871)

 

Unlike the nominalist’s notion of reality, on which only uncognizable causes of cognition are real, Peirce’s pragmatic notion, far from simply being compatible with realism about generals, implies that there are real generals.

 

 

[5.7.3.] Summary of the Two Views.

 

nominalistic view of reality the real is that which is external to the mind and which causes sensations and thereby causes cognition   [and thus is independent, not only of what anyone thinks about it, but also of thought in general]   when paired with the assumption that generals are not external to the mind     implies that   there are no real generals.

pragmatic view of reality: the real is that which is the object of a true belief, i.e., a belief which would belong to the final opinion   [and thus is independent of what anyone thinks about it, but not of thought in general]     when paired with the assumption that all beliefs, and therefore true beliefs, involve general conceptions   implies that   there are real generals.

 

 

So on Peirce’s view, the disagreement between nominalists and realists has its roots in the different conceptions of reality assumed by each camp. They all agree that the real is that which is independent of what anyone in particular thinks about it (i.e., they all accept the verbal definition of real, the clarification of the concept of real to the 2^nd degree). But they disagree about what it is that is real.

 

 

Stopping point for Friday September 28. Next time we will continue examining Peirce’s scholastic realism, drawing in part on the same reading you had for today.