[5.8.] Cognitionism: The “Nominalistic Element” of Peirce’s Theory.[1]

 

In a draft of the 1868-9 cognition series, Peirce described his theory of reality as “nominalistic.” (W 2:180, 1868, not in EP).

 

He did not mean that it was a form of nominalism. After all, Peirce accepted scholastic realism (the view that there are real generals).

 

He meant that his account of reality, including his version of scholastic realism, had something in common with nominalism:

^·          “it bases universals upon signs” (W 2:175, 1868; not in EP)

·          it holds that “nothing out of cognition and signification generally, has any generality”

 

Peirce went on to illustrate this view as follows:

 

... is the blackness of this, identical with the blackness of that? I cannot see how it can help being; the determinations which accompany it are different but the blackness itself is the same, by supposition. If this seems a monstrous doctrine, remember that my nominalism saves me from all absurdity. This blackness, upon my principles is purely significative purely cognitive; there is nothing I suppose to prevent signs being applied to different individuals in precisely the same sense. ... blackness in general, is shown to be real, by the testimony of the senses, and its cognitive or significative character does not stand in the way of this, at all. (W 2:181, 1868)

 

This is a view we’ve seen before, Peirce’s cognitionism, only here it is being applied specifically to generals:

 

Cognitionism about Generals (CG): generality does not occur outside “of cognition and signification generally,” i.e., outside of what is cognizable. [2]

 

CG, when paired with the nominalistic assumption that the real is limited to incognizable causes of cognition, implies ARG:

 

1. CG: generality occurs only in what is cognizable.

2. Only the incognizable is real.

3. Therefore, ARG: generality is not real.

 

As this suggests, an anti-realist about generality could accept CG, and in fact it is compatible with the nominalism that Peirce sketched in the Berkeley review while explaining the nominalistic view of reality (8.12, EP 1:88, and W 2:468, 1871).

·         The general “man,” being a thought-sign, is of the nature of thought and signification. But on the nominalist view of reality, nothing that is of the nature of thought and signification is real, since the real is limited to the incognizable causes of cognition... hence the nominalist commitment to ARG.

 

But the conjunction of CG and Peirce’s pragmatic conception of reality does not entail ARG. This is why, in 1868’s “Some Consequences...”, Peirce was able to accept CG without also denying the reality of generals.

 

He seems to have reasoned as follows:

 

1.       The real is the object of a true proposition.

2.       Some true propositions have general objects.

3.       Therefore, there are real generals.

 

And this is consistent with CG, the “nominalistic element” in his realism.

 

 

[5.9.] Are Generals Internal or External?

 

The word “generally” in Peirce’s statement of CG suggests that generality does not have being only within the cognitive activities of specific individuals, i.e., it suggests that real generals are external (independent of what anyone thinks, feels, believes, etc.) rather than internal (dependent on someone or other’s thinking, feeling, believing, etc.)

 

Were generals internal, they would not necessarily be figments, since some internals are real.

 

But they would nonetheless be dependent on the thoughts or feelings of specific individuals. A given general would be like the occurrence of some specific dream or thought, in that it would depend on how some particular individual thinks or feels.

 

This is why I interpret Peirce as having maintained, even early on, that real generals are external.[3]

 

 

Stopping point for Monday October 1. For next time, begin reading “The Architecture of Theories” (EP 1:285-90, to the end of the last full paragraph on 290).