[6.] Evolutionary Cosmology.

 

Recall Peirce’s desire for a “scientific metaphysics,” conducted with the scientific attitude and containing claims that can pass the pragmatic maxim’s test of meaning.

 

We have already looked in detail at one doctrine of his scientific metaphysics: scholastic realism.

 

But there are other doctrines as well, and together some of them comprise Peirce’s cosmology:

 

cosmology (df.): 1 a : a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe b : a theory or doctrine describing the natural order of the universe. 2 : a branch of astronomy that deals with the origin, structure, and space-time relationships of the universe; also : a theory dealing with these matters.[1]

 

So cosmology is the study of the structure and nature of the universe. It can be pursued as a sort of metaphysical, and therefore philosophical, inquiry or as a sort of astronomical, and therefore scientific, inquiry.

 

Peirce’s cosmology includes the following doctrines:

 

·         evolutionism: the universe and the laws that govern it are evolving.

 

·         objective idealism: “matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws” (EP 1:293; CP 6.25)[2]

 

·         tychism: there is real chance in the universe; not all events are causally determined to happen the way they do by preceding events; some events happen without being caused to happen.

 

·         synechism: there is real continuity in the universe.

 

·         agapism: “the law of love ... is operative in the cosmos” (EP 1:362, CP 6.302)

 

 

Peirce’s most elaborate discussion of these ideas occurred in a series of articles published in the philosophy journal The Monist from 1891 to 1893:

 

“The Architecture of Theories” (Jan. 1891; EP 1:285-97)

“The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (Apr. 1892; EP 1:298-311)

“The Law of Mind” (July 1892; EP 1:312-33)

“Man’s Glassy Essence” (Oct. 1892; EP 1:334-51)

“Evolutionary Love” (Jan. 1893; EP 1:352-71)

 

We will be reading the first of these articles. Tychism, evolutionism, and objective idealism are discussed at length in this article; synechism is mentioned (although not by name); and agapism is not mentioned at all (it shows up in “Evolutionary Love”).

 

 

[6.1.] Peirce’s Architectonic Approach.

 

At the beginning of the article, Peirce commits to taking an architectonic approach to philosophy. He writes: “That systems ought to be constructed architectonically has been preached since Kant...” (EP 1:286). Kant had written:

 

By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system. Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will be an aggregate, and not a system. (Critique of Pure Reason II ch.III)

 

So in these papers, Peirce is building a cosmological (and therefore a metaphysical) system. The doctrines enumerated above are not meant to function independently. Instead, they are supposed to hang together in a coherent way

 

His strategy is to examine a number of “sciences” looking for fundamental concepts that he can incorporate into the philosophical system he intends to build:

 

What I would recommend is that every person who wishes to form an opinion concerning fundamental problems should first of all make a complete survey of human knowledge, should take note of all the valuable ideas in each branch of science, should observe in just what respect each has been successful and where it has failed, in order that, in the light of the thorough acquaintance so attained of the available materials for a philosophical theory and of the nature and strength of each, he may proceed to the study of what the problem of philosophy consists in, and of the proper way of solving it. (EP 1:286, CP 6.9)

 

This table shows the various sciences that Peirce examines in this article and the claims that he adopts from each, claims that he will attempt to integrate into his cosmology.

 

science	ideas to be incorporated into philosophy
dynamics (the study of the relationship between motion and the forces affecting it)	·      The fact that there are laws needs explaining, and there is only one way to explain it: to suppose that the universe evolved from a state of lawlessness to a state of relative lawfulness (evolutionism) and that even now, the universe is not completely lawful (tychism).
psychology	·      Mental laws are primordial, and physical laws derive from them (objective idealism).
mathematics	·      a consideration of the shape and size of space (he considers three different views but does not advocate any of them) ·      a rejection of previously held metaphysical “axioms” ·      the importance of continuity (synechism)
logic	·      The universal categories (the most basic, fundamental classifications into which reals can be divided) are: Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness.

 

 

 

[6.2.] Our Propensity to “Guess” Correctly.

 

In beginning his examination of “dynamics,” Peirce considers Galileo, and comments that

 

[a] modern physicist on examining Galileo's works is surprised to find how little experiment had to do with the establishment of the foundations of mechanics. His principal appeal is to common sense and il lume naturale [the light of nature]. He always assumes that the true theory will be found to be a simple and natural one. (EP 1:287, CP 6.10)

 

On Peirce’s view, it is no accident that Galileo was about to arrive at true principles about the physical universe without much in the way of experimentation:

 

... our minds having been formed under the influence of phenomena governed by the laws of mechanics, certain conceptions entering into those laws become implanted in our minds, so that we readily guess at what the laws are.[3] Without such a natural prompting, having to search blindfold for a law which would suit the phenomena, our chance of finding it would be as one to infinity. The further physical studies depart from phenomena which have directly influenced the growth of the mind, the less we can expect to find the laws which govern them “simple,” that is, composed of a few conceptions natural to our minds. (EP 1:287, CP 6.10)

 

So Peirce’s view is that human beings have a propensity to “guess” correctly, at least when it comes to inquiry involving the physical universe. In other words, humans are naturally good (although fallible, of course) at abductive reasoning (hypothesis, retroduction, inference to the best explanation) in the physical sciences.

 

 

[6.3.] Evolutionism.

 

According to Peirce, the universe is becoming more law-governed. Peirce’s cosmology is evolutionary because he believed that the universe is evolving from a more chaotic state (in which chance plays a greater role) to a more law-governed, rule-based state (in which chance plays a smaller role).

 

This happens because the universe takes on habits. For Peirce, habit is primarily “the tendency to repeat any action which has been performed before.” (EP 1:223) Peirce attributes such a tendency to the universe itself—the more law-like it becomes, the even yet more law-like it becomes:

 

If the universe is thus progressing from a state of all but pure chance to a state of all but complete determination by law, we must suppose that there is an original, elemental, tendency of things to acquire determinate properties, to take habits. (EP1:243, “One, Two, Three”, 1886)

 

Not only is the universe becoming more law-governed; it is becoming less homogeneous, more heterogeneous. In other words, the degree of variety in the universe is increasing as the universe evolves.

 

Peirce agued as follows in “The Architecture of Theories”:

 

1. There must be an explanation of the fact that there are natural laws and regularity.

2. “[T]he only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution.” (EP 1:288)

3. So, natural law and regularity have evolved from an earlier state of unlawfulness and irregularity.[4]

 

Notice that this is an abductive argument, an inference to the best explanation. This is an example of the use of abductive reasoning in the context of Peirce’s “scientific metaphysics.”

 

 

Stopping point for Wednesday October 3. For next time, finish reading “The Architecture of Theories” (EP 1:290-97).