[9.] Pragmaticism.

 

Nine years after the modal shift, Peirce wrote the following:

In the Monist of Jan. 1897 [i.e., in “The Logic of Relatives”], quite assertorically, ... and this same journal during 1892 [i.e., in “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined”] more tentatively, the author of the present article repudiated the nominalistic view of possibility, and explicitly returns to the Aristotelian doctrine of a real possibility. This was the great step that was needed to render pragmaticism an intelligible doctrine. The paper of Jan. 1878 [i.e., “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”] wavers palpably at this point, sensible of the advantages of a real possibility, yet wishing to save pragmaticism in case that doctrine should prove untenable. (R 288, 129, 1905, emphasis added)

 

In another manuscript from the same period, Peirce wrote:

 

In [“The Logic of Relatives”] the objectivity of possibility was asserted; and the hypothesis defended in [“The Architecture of Theories” (1891) and “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,” viz. the doctrine of tychism] supposes possibility to be real. …  But [“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”] evidently endeavors to avoid asking the reader to admit a real possibility. The theory of modality is far too great a question to be treated incidentally to any other. But the distinct recognition of real possibility is certainly indispensable to pragmaticism. (5.527, c.1905)

 

So in hindsight, Peirce saw his criticism of the IR account of substantial modality, as well as his earlier defense of tychism, as “repudiations” of a nominalistic approach to the question of modality, and to see that move as having resulted in an improvement over his original treatment of pragmatism in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.”

 

In this section of notes, we will see what Peirce’s pragmatism looks like after the modal shift, and after his scholastic realism (his realism about generals) has expanded to be a realism about generals and vagues.

 

Early on, Peirce defended pragmatism and scholastic realism separately. As we have seen, he defended scholastic realism in the 1868-9 “cognition series” (see EP 1:52-53, CP 5.311-12), several years before he first enunciated in print the Pragmatic Maxim (in 1878’s “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”).

 

By 1905, he has come to think of the two doctrines as closely related. In particular, he has come to believe that pragmatism implies extreme scholastic realism.

 

In other words, he has come to think that the legitimacy of the Pragmatic Maxim as a method for clarifying concepts requires that there be both real generals (including real necessity) and real vagues (including real possibility).

 

In what follows, we will see why Peirce comes to believe that the PM requires both real generals and real vagues.

 

Our reading for this section is “What Pragmatism Is,” the first of a three-part series published in The Monist in 1905-06 (this is the same philosophy journal that had published the cosmological series a decade earlier):

1.       “What Pragmatism Is,” The Monist 15 (April 1905); CP 5.411-37, EP 2:331-45.

2.       “Issues of Pragmaticism,” The Monist 15 (October 1905); CP 5.438-63; EP 2:346-59.

3.       “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,” The Monist (1906); CP 4.530-72.[1]

 

 

[9.1.] The Pragmatic Maxim as Experimental and Experiential.

 

At the beginning of the article, Peirce reiterates his view that the PM reflects a scientific, experimental way of understanding the meaning of concepts.

 

He writes that the disposition of the typical experimental scientist (e.g., a physicist, chemist, etc.)

 

is to think of everything just as everything is thought of in the laboratory, that is, as a question of experimentation. ... whatever assertion you may make to him, he will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result, or else he will see no sense at all in what you say. (EP 2:332, CP 5.411)

 

This “typical experimentalist” will reject the idea that scientists seek to access some reality that cannot be revealed in any possible experience. Peirce still understands the PM as ruling out any sort of transcendent reality, a Kantian Welt an sich that lies behind all possible experience.

 

He goes on to state the PM this way

 

...a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. (EP 2:332, CP 5.412; “What Pragmatism Is,” 1905)[2]

 

As we saw at the very beginning of the semester, Peirce derived the word “pragmatism” from Kant’s use of “pragmatisch,” to mean “experiential.”[3]

 

Kant distinguished between two types of “law” (a principle or rule for behavior):

 

As Kant put it...	As Peirce puts it...	e.g.
practical (“praktisch”) laws: which are known a priori (independently of sense experience) “and which are prescribed to us not in an empirically conditioned but in an absolute manner ... such are moral laws...”[4]	these “belong[] in a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet” (EP 2:333, CP 5.412)	“you should always be honest” (this does not depend on any desire we have as the result of sense experience; it stems entirely from our reasoning)
pragmatic (“pragmatisch”) laws: “for the attainment of those ends which are commended to us by the senses”	these “express[] relation to some definite human purpose.” (ibid.)	“if you want to improve your racquetball game, then you should practice”

 

According to Peirce (EP 2:333, CP 5.412, 1905)

·         “pragmatisch” expresses a “relation to some definite human purpose,” the intention to bring about some specific state of affairs (e.g. the state of affairs in which your racquetball game is much improved). He intended the name “pragmatism” to reflect the theory’s “recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose”.

·         “praktisch” “belong[s] in a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet.” Kant’s categorical imperatives are supposed to result from pure reason, totally divorced from both experience and purposeful behavior.

 

In contrast to Peirce, James claimed to have derived “pragmatism” from the Greek word “praxis” (i.e., practice or action).  In James’ version of pragmatism, rationality and purpose are de-emphasized and there is more focus on specific individual behaviors themselves.

 

 

 

[9.2.] The Ethics of Terminology.

 

Peirce goes on to complain about the tendency of philosophers to appropriate existing terms for their own original theories and concepts, and maintains that philosophy will not progress in the way the physical sciences have unless it follows an ethics of terminology:

 

... he who introduces a new conception into philosophy is under an obligation to invent acceptable terms to express it, and ... when he has done so, the duty of his fellow-students is to accept those terms, and to resent any wresting of them from their original meanings, as not only a gross discourtesy to him to whom philosophy was indebted for each conception, but also as an injury to philosophy itself; and furthermore, that once a conception has been supplied with suitable and sufficient words for its expression, no other technical terms denoting the same things, considered in the same relations, should be countenanced. (EP 1:333-34, CP 5.413)

 

He recommends that, just as in chemistry, philosophy specify prefixes and suffixes with set meanings, e.g., “prope” to indicate a broader sense of a term and “icism” (instead of “ism) to indicate a narrower sense of the name of an existing theory.

 

He then follows his own advice in order to distance himself from other so-called pragmatists. He seems to approve of the use put to his word “pragmatism” by his fellow philosophers William James and F. C. S. Schiller. But there are others who have begun using the word in ways to which Peirce objects:

 

... at present, the word begins to be met with occasionally in the literary journals, where it gets abused in the merciless way that words have to expect when they fall into literary clutches. Sometimes the manners of the British have effloresced in scolding at the word as ill-chosen—ill-chosen, that is, to express some meaning that it was rather designed to exclude. So then, the writer, finding his bantling “pragmatism” so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word “pragmaticism,” which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers. (EP 2:334-35, CP 5.414)

 

 

[9.3.] “Dismiss Make-Believes.”

 

Peirce notes that a mere statement of definition of pragmaticism “could convey no satisfactory comprehension of it to the most apprehensive of minds” and that it “takes no notice of one or two doctrines without the previous acceptance (or virtual acceptance) of which pragmaticism itself would be a nullity.” (EP 2:335, CP 5.416)[5]

 

But setting forth these “one or two doctrines” will be difficult, since “no formal list of them has ever been made.” (EP 2:335, CP 5.416)

 

Peirce offers the following “vague maxim” as a blanket for these doctrines: “Dismiss make-believes.”(EP 2:335, CP 5.416)

 

One of the specific make-believes Peirce has in mind is: Philosophy should “begin by doubting everything,” and “there is only one thing that you cannot doubt.” (EP 2:336)[6]

 

In rejecting this “make-believe,” Peirce is reiterating his 1868 rejection of the Cartesian method of doubt, which he here states as follows:

 

...there is but one state of mind from which you can “set out,” namely, the very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do “set out”—a state in which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would; and who knows whether, if you could, you would not have made all knowledge impossible to yourself? Do you call it doubting to write down on a piece of paper that you doubt? If so, doubt has nothing to do with any serious business. But do not make believe; if pedantry has not eaten all the reality out of you, recognize, as you must, that there is much that you do not doubt, in the least. Now that which you do not at all doubt, you must and do regard as infallible, absolute truth. (EP 2:336, CP 5.416)

 

Peirce imagines two objections:

 

Objection 1: Doesn’t this imply either that we should have beliefs that are not true or that anything someone actually does believe is by that very fact true? These are both unacceptable consequences.

 

His reply: it implies neither of those things; what it implies is only that if a person really does believe that p, then he himself must regard it as being absolutely true that p.(We can imagine Peirce continuing, echoing his earlier articulation of this point: “...and it is mere tautology to say so!”)

 

Objection 2: “But you tell me there are scores of things I do not doubt. I really cannot persuade myself that there is not some one of them about which I am mistaken.”(EP 2:336) In other words, the objector simply cannot accept Peirce’s claim that there are many things he does not doubt, for the reason that he believes that he is fallible, i.e., that at least some of his beliefs are false.

 

Peirce’s response to this objection is somewhat cryptic: “You are adducing [i.e., bringing forth as evidence] one of your make-believe facts, which, even if it were established, would only go to show that doubt has a limen [i.e., a threshold], that is, is only called into being by a certain finite stimulus.” (EP 2:336)

·         It is not clear to me what make-believe the objector is supposed to be using in his argument... Peirce definitely agrees that each person is fallible.

·         But it is clear why this objection cannot gain traction against Peirce’s view: Peirce’s insistence that a philosophical inquirer must begin with the beliefs she actually has does not imply that she is infallible. It is consistent to maintain that philosophical inquiry must begin with the beliefs that you already have, but also to maintain that you are fallible, i.e., that some of your genuine beliefs are very likely to be false (although, of course, you don’t know exactly which beliefs those are).

 

 

[9.4.] Self-Control.

 

Peirce describes what he takes to be “the fundamental characteristics which distinguish a rational being”: not only having habits (including “habits of mind,” or beliefs), but also having a degree of self-control over one’s own future actions. By this Peirce means

 

a process of self-preparation will tend to impart to action (when the occasion for it shall arise), one fixed character, which is indicated and perhaps roughly measured by the absence (or slightness) of the feeling of self-reproach [i.e., self-criticism, finding fault with oneself], which subsequent reflection will induce. Now, this subsequent reflection is part of the self-preparation for action on the next occasion. Consequently, there is a tendency, as action is repeated again and again, for the action to approximate indefinitely toward the perfection of that fixed character, which would be marked by entire absence of self-reproach. The more closely this is approached, the less room for self-control there will be; and where no self-control is possible there will be no self-reproach. (EP 2:337, CP 5.418, emphasis added)

 

This self-reproach is appropriate only with regard to actions that are under one’s own control; it would be inappropriate to criticize or find fault with oneself for an involuntary behavior.

 

When we blame someone for doing something, we are transferring or “projecting” the feeling of self-reproach onto that person; and analogously, “we never blame anybody for what had been beyond his power of previous self-control.” (EP 2:337, CP 5.419)

 

What does all this have to do with belief and truth?

 

On Peirce’s view, “thinking is a species of conduct which is largely subject to self-control”(EP 2:337, CP 5.419), so all of the points just laid out about self-control, reproach and blame apply to it, as well.[7]

 

So we should assess our beliefs (the results of our thinking) in a way analogous to that in which we assess our actions, with the following upshot:

 

... what you cannot in the least help believing is not, justly speaking, wrong belief. In other words, for you it is the absolute truth. True, it is conceivable that what you cannot help believing today, you might find you thoroughly disbelieve tomorrow. But then there is a certain distinction between things you “cannot” do, merely in the sense that nothing stimulates you to the great effort and endeavors that would be required, and things you cannot do because in their own nature they are insusceptible of being put into practice. In every stage of your excogitations, there is something of which you can only say, “I cannot think otherwise,” and your experientially based hypothesis is that the impossibility is of the second kind. (EP 2:337, CP 5.419, emphasis added)

 

The strong suggestion is that this hypothesis is at least sometimes mistaken: what feels to you as a belief that you could literally never give up is merely a belief that has not in fact been dislodged by experience and reasoning.

 

But at any rate, when it comes to fixed belief, self-control is no longer possible: we cannot help believing what we actually do believe: with regard to fixed belief, “no room is left for further self-control.”(EP 2:337, CP 5.420)

 

 

[9.5.] Truth, Reality and Personhood.

 

Earlier in the article, in continuing his response to his imaginary interlocutor who is objecting to Peirce’s rejection of Cartesian make-believes, Peirce had reiterated his pragmatic (pragmatistic?) conceptions of truth and reality:

 

You only puzzle yourself by talking of this metaphysical “truth” and metaphysical “falsity,” that you know nothing about. All you have any dealings with are your doubts and beliefs, with the course of life that forces new beliefs upon you and gives you power to doubt old beliefs. If your terms “truth” and “falsity” are taken in such senses as to be definable in terms of doubt and belief and the course of experience (as for example they would be, if you were to define the “truth” as that to a belief in which belief would tend if it were to tend indefinitely toward absolute fixity), well and good: in that case, you are only talking about doubt and belief. But if by truth and falsity you mean something not definable in terms of doubt and belief in any way, then you are talking of entities of whose existence you can know nothing, and which Ockham’s razor would clean shave off. Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want to know the “Truth,” you were simply to say that you want to attain a state of belief unassailable by doubt. (EP 2:336, CP 5.416)

 

Peirce is here harshly criticizing the person who insists upon a distinction between

·         what he himself genuinely believes and does not doubt; and

·         “absolute truth”

 

Later on Peirce returns to this point and states that such a person can make this distinction, but that “two things alone ... render it possible for you—but only in the abstract, and in a Pickwickian sense[8]—to distinguish between absolute truth and what you do not doubt.” (EP 2:338, CP 5.421)

 

1. “...a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language.” (EP 2:338, CP 5.421) In other words, a person (or self) that is engaged in thinking is engaged in a dialogue with itself. By denying the “absolute” individuality of a person, Peirce is emphasizing the dialogical nature of thought. My thinking is the conversation between myself at one time and myself at later times (and those selves with selves at still later times). “I” am something like a collection of those conversing selves.

 

2. “...the man’s circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism.” (EP 2:338, CP 5.421, emphases added) [This to me is a very odd claim indeed!]

 

Perhaps Peirce means that a person can maintain the distinction between what she actually does believe and what is “absolutely true” because (a) she herself is (or is like) a series of persons engaged in a critical dialogue, with each later “self” able critically to reflect upon what the earlier “selves” believed; and (b) society itself is (or is like) a person, and so we can conceive of “absolute truth” as that which that collective person will believe if inquiry is pushed into the indefinite future.

 

But nonetheless, this distinction is Pickwickian: it has no effect on the actual practices of the person who makes it, since she is bound to continue to hold the beliefs she actually does hold until forced into actual (not make-believe) doubt by real experiences and reasoning.

 

 

Stopping point for Friday October 26. For next time, finish reading “What Pragmatism Is” (pp.338-45).