
Annual Meeting
July, 2004
Cullowhee, North Carolina
6:30
Welcome and
Opening Remarks (Joe Jones)
9-10:30
Brian Thomas, “Oppression and Autonomy”
Farrell Graves, “Rethinking Freedom, Power, and
the State”
10:45-12:15
Andrea Sullivan-Clarke, “Cultural Diversity: It’s
in Everyone’s Best Interest”
Chris Gandy, “Virtue Capitalism: A Reply to
Deirdre McCloskey”
LUNCH
2.00-2:45
Trudy Conway, “From Tolerance to Hospitality”
3-5
“Teaching
Philosophy: Methods and Suggestions”
Panelists:
Andrew Fiala, Lani Roberts, Barbara La Bossiere, Trudy Conway, Ed Grippe,
9-10:30
Ed Grippe, “Plato the Democrat”
Norman Fischer, “Fathers and Sons: On Piety and
Humanity”
10:45-12:15
Rob Metcalf, “Aristotelian Doubts about the
Reach of Moral Argument”
LUNCH
2.00-4:30
Hye-Kyung Kim, “Aristotle, Potential
Personhood, and the Abortion Debate”
Laura Duhan Kaplan, “Heschel’s Hassidic
Critique of Phenomenology and Critical Theory”
6:30
Business Meeting
9-10:30
Aaron Lercher, “The Problems of Environmental
Rights”
Jack Weir, “Moral Failure and the Environmental
Crisis”
10:45-12:15
“Bringing Philosophy Down to Earth: Practical
Reasoning, the ‘Great New Wilderness Debate,’ and Environmental Policy”
Panelists: Dane Scott, Josh Haddock, and Seth
Nivens
Afternoon Trip
9-10.30
Paul Eddy Wilson, “Regulative Control and the
Subjectivist’s View of Moral Responsibility”
Joseph Orosoco, “César Chavez on the Use of
Violence for Global Justice”
Tuesday (continued)
10:45-12:15
Janet Donohoe, “The Place(s) of Monuments”
Patricia Trentacoste, “The Aesthetic Gestalt
and the Moral Gaze”
LUNCH
2:00-3:30
Ralph Ellis, “Love, Religion, and the
Psychology of Inspiration”
Keya Maitra, “Comparing the Bhagavad-Gita and
Kant: A Lesson in Comparative Philosophy”
9-11:30
Stephen R. Brown, “Naturalized Virtue Ethics
and Same-Sex Love”
Jeremy Wisnewski, “Murder, Cannibalism, and
Indirect Suicide”
James McLachlan, “Religious Pluralism: Whoring,
Polygamy, or Friendship?”
Abstracts
and Biographical information (in order of presentation)
Joe Jones is one of the founders
and current Director of the Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary
World. He is Professor of Philosophy and
Religion at Barton College in Wilson, North Carolina. His publications include: A Modest Realism
and several articles on topics metaphysics, ethics, and religion. He served for serveral years as Editor of the
Society’s journal, Philosophy in the Contemporary World.
Brian Thomas, “Oppression and Autonomy”
In her paper “Towards A Theory of Oppression,” T.L Zutlevics,
claims to be doing what is usually said to be impossible, namely, giving a
unitary theory of oppression. She says
her theory is general enough to capture the essential ingredients of
oppression, and, as proof of the explanatory power of her theory, that it
captures the five faces of oppression offered by Iris Marion Young in her book Justice and the Politics of Difference. I argue that her theory does not adequately
describe a range of cases of oppressed peoples and where the theory is accurate,
it covers fairly trivial cases. This
suggests that her theory, where it applies, has very little explanatory
power. The upshot of my comments is a
general skepticism about the usefulness in explicating the concept of
oppression with the concept of autonomy.
Brian Thomas is a Doctoral
Candidate at UNC-Chapel Hill. His areas
of specialization include: Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law,
Race/Racism, Feminism
Farrell Graves concentrates on
Japanese Intellectual History, Critical
Theory, Ethics. He teaches at the
What appeal can be made to
the dominant society in favor of preserving minority culture? In Multicultural Citizenship, Will
Kymlicka believes that the Cultural Diversity Argument, which imposes costs to
some segments of the dominant society, is unable to justify group-differentiated
rights without the support of other arguments.
This paper seeks to demonstrate that cultural diversity is a public good
by drawing an analogy between cultural diversity and biological diversity. I contend that by preserving the knowledge
inherent within diverse cultures, the survivability of the species is improved
or, to be succinct, it’s in everyone’s best interest.
Andrea Sullivan-Clarke is Master’s Candidate at the
Economist Dierdre McCloskey
argues that with the demise of the old aristocratic and agrarian social
classes, and the failure of an inevitable proletarian revolution, the virtues
associated with said social classes are both antiquated and ineffective.
McCloskey argues that as society becomes more bourgeois our virtues must
reflect this economic and social status. This essay suggests that McCloskey falls
victim to both the naturalistic fallacy and a misinterpretation of the notion
of virtue. If we have in fact become
bourgeois, it is the result of adopting means disguised as virtues, which
although serving us well in the marketplace, achieve an end closer to the
bovine existence of gratification. The
notion of virtue as excellence (arete) in aid of a fine existence (eudaimonia)
necessitates that one focus not on economic status, particularly when that
status is the result of a capitalistic economy which necessitates that many
suffer to elevate the few. One would do
well to adopt virtues in aid of a higher good, rather than adopting
"virtues" which are means to an economic status quo merely.
Chris Gandy is Lead Philosophy
Instructor at
This
paper analyses the problematic aspects of the negative virtue of tolerance and
explores a more positive virtue, much needed in contemporary American society
and current global context. The first
section broadly discusses the responses of tolerance and intolerance to
diversity and presents an overview of the emergence of tolerance as a
distinctly modern, Western virtue. After exploring the minimalistic and
problematic aspects of the virtue, it considers Walzer’s call for something
better and beyond tolerance. Drawing on a number of traditions that affirm
hospitality as either the most esteemed virtue or the most fundamental moral
response to the other, it articulates an understanding of hospitality that
moves beyond tolerance as benign indifference or principled non-interference.
Drawing on a current case study, it argues that our age and in particular its
increasingly pluralistic societies need to recognize the problematic limits of
tolerance and to begin to cultivate the more demanding virtue of hospitality.
Trudy Conway is Kline
Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy Department at
Mount Saint Mary's University (
Teaching Panel
Andrew Fiala is Associate
Professor of Philosophy at the
Lani Roberts is a philosophy
professor at
Barbara La Bossiere is a philosophy
professor at
Ed Grippe, “Plato the Democrat”
My aim in this paper is to
take Wallach’s thesis—that Platonic justice, indeed, stands in opposition to
democracy; the opposition, however, is neither direct nor wholly antagonistic;
rather, it is critical, indicative of Plato’s effort in his dialogues to construct
a decisive ethics of politics and politics of ethics that would genuinely
conciliate justice and power—one step further. I propose to show that Plato not
only wished to reconcile power and justice, but that he desired, and was aware
of the need, to do so within a moderate cosmopolitanism in the democratic
Athens of his time. I will accomplish this aim by uncovering the implicit
egalitarian elements in the Apology and the Crito and how, through a method of Zen reading, the Republic may
support them.
Ed Grippe teaches philosophy
at
Norman Fischer, “Fathers and Sons: On Piety and
Humanity”
Modern political philosophy, and modern philosophy generally, have
not had much room for the discussion of piety or reverence as a virtue. It is almost needless to mention that
contemporary European, and especially American, society, has difficulties, reflected
in social policy and moral habit, with reverence for the old. We are urged to look at our parents as
“merely human”, “just like us,” perhaps disregarding that such is the tragic
assumption of Oedipus. Of course, our
awareness, vague as it may be, that we do not do justice to the old is perhaps
the inchoate beginnings of a reconsideration of the value of ancestral
piety. What I wish to claim here is that
perhaps now we are ready for a reconsideration of piety. I wish to turn to the ancient world in which
piety and reverence were a simple matter of course. To this end, I wish to
consider an aspect of Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro, which introduces the
question of piety within the context of a dispute between a son and his
father. I hope to shed some light upon
the value of piety in the quest for self-knowledge. Perhaps in this we can see something that
will correct inadequacies within the self-image of our age.
Norman Fischer is Assistant
Professor of Philosophy at
Rob Metcalf, “Aristotelian Doubts about the Reach of
Moral Argument”
Beginning with Aristotle’s various remarks on the
limited reach of moral argument, this paper explores the moral psychology that
gives rise to such doubts, including those expressed recently by John
McDowell. The diagnosis offered is that these doubts are caused by a
rather anemic conception of argument, and for a prescription I turn to the
various forms of ad hominem argumentation. Ad hominem arguments are shown
to do justice to Aristotelian moral psychology while allowing for the sort of logos
that Aristotle thought was unavailable.
Robert Metcalf shucked aside his early childhood
training as a Southern Baptist and joined the Mormon church as an adolescent
for its promise of black-magical powers.
Yet, disappointed in this, his new religion, he dropped it altogether
while an undergraduate at
Hye-Kyung Kim, “Aristotle, Potential Personhood, and
the Abortion Debate”
This paper is an exploration of
the moral significance of Aristotle's theory of potentiality and actuality for
the contemporary debate on the morality of abortion. The concepts of
potentiality and actuality are frequently invoked in debates on abortion. The
fetus is commonly said to be potentially but not actually a person. For some,
the mere potential personhood of the fetus means that the fetus has no
moral standing, and abortion is permissible. For others, the potential
personhood of the fetus is of great significance, and means that the
fetus has a right to life, or at least that abortion is seriously prima facie
wrong. But what exactly is potential personhood? Does the notion have its roots
in Aristotle's metaphysics? More fundamentally, what is Aristotle's notion of
potentiality, and in what sense, if any, would the fetus be considered a
potential person by Aristotle? What exactly are Aristotle's views on the
morality of abortion, and how do they fit in with his views on the
potentiality/actuality distinction? In this paper I examine in what sense a
fetus is a potential person in Aristotle's metaphysics, and whether its
(supposed) potential personhood can be used in arguments for abortion the way
that it is in the contemporary debates on abortion.
Hye-Kyung Kim is Assistant Professor
of Philosophy at the
Laura Duhan Kaplan, “Heschel’s Hassidic Critique of
Phenomenology and Critical Theory”
This paper brings together a
wide variety of sources in order to situate Abraham Joshua Heschel's thought in
relation to some of the influences on his work.
Herbert Marcuse argues that capitalism has rendered social and
intellectual life, including philosophy, one-dimensional. In response, philosophers should articulate
social, political, and intellectual models that transcend capitalism. Heschel implicitly critiques Marcuse's view,
arguing that philosophers can only address the alienation of contemporary life
by transcending the focus on material needs and intellectual models. Heschel argues that the only solution lies in
the realm of the spirit, and recommends that philosophers practice wonder. Heschel also criticizes phenomenology for
being spiritually bankrupt. In so doing,
he seems to draw his inspiration from several Hassidic sources about the evolution
of consciousness. The paper concludes
with an evaluation of Heschel's solution.
Laura Duhan Kaplan is Chair of
the Philosophy Department at the
Aaron Lercher, “The Problems of Environmental Rights”
The view that people have rights to a non-polluted environment
raises theoretical problems.
Environmental harms often arise from compound or incremental sources
which spread responsibility among many agents.
Environmental harms are probabilistic rather than direct results of
pollution, which complicates our understanding of the stringency of such
claims. This paper defends the view that
there are environmental rights and discusses these problems. I argue that the problems are problems of democratic
process, rather of the validity of rights.
I argue that resolving these problems requires a theory of environmental
rights to explain which acts we have valid claims against, and also to explain
that we have valid claims that acts not be performed in certain defective ways.
Aaron Lercher has been an adjunct professor of
philosophy and environmental studies at several Buffalo-area institutions since
1998. For three years he led an effort to organize an adjunct union at
one of these institutions, but this ultimately was unsuccessful. His
research is in philosophy of mathematics and environmental ethics.
Jack Weir, “Moral Failure and the Environmental
Crisis”
Common in environmental literature, both popular and philosophical,
is the view that the environmental crisis is the result of a failure of Western
morality. From that failure, many
environmentalists conclude that a radically new morality is needed if the world
is to avoid imminent environmental apocalypse.
Many people hope—and apparently believe—that only by discovering and
proclaiming a radically new non-traditional and Postmodern morality will
Western civilization and the rest of the world be able to ameliorate the
crisis. This paper argues that these hopes
and beliefs are misguided. Since this
widespread view is so negatively critical of Western morality, it is labelled
the “Negative View.” Among environmental
philosophers, the most prominent and influential advocate of the Negative View
is J. Baird Callicott. A brief section
summarizes Callicott’s theory of environmental ethics and outlines in
propositional form his critique of traditional Western morality. Four sub-arguments make up his critique and
are representative of the Negative View.
The heart of the paper is a critical evaluation of the four
sub-arguments. The paper defends
traditional Western morality against Callicott.
Callicott’s central criticisms of traditional Western morality are
seriously mistaken. The Negative View
makes assumptions and imposes demands impossible for any morality to fulfill.
Jack Weir is Professor of
Philosophy at
Dane Scott, Josh Haddock, and
Seth Nivens, “Bringing Philosophy Down to Earth: Practical Reasoning, the
‘Great New Wilderness Debate,’ and Environmental Policy”
Environmental philosophers such as Byron Norton have
often been criticized for drifting into theoretical debates that do not readily
connect with policy debates. One important example of this tendency for
philosophical debates to lose touch with concrete policy decisions is the
debate over the “wilderness idea.” The debate begins with concerns about the
tradition of the “wilderness idea”, commonly held to be handed down from
Emerson, Thoreau and Muir, that focuses on restricting human activities in
set-aside areas. The debate evolves into a metaphysical dispute about dualism
versus monism. Nonetheless, this is clearly an important debate with real
consequences for determining the social goal of 21st century
environmental policy. Moreover, the philosophers involved in the debate are
offering powerful philosophical insights and weighty arguments. The problem
then is how to connect this vital theoretical dispute with policy
deliberations. The hypothesis defended by this panel is that recent work on
practical reasoning/deliberation by the Canadian philosopher Douglas Walton
offers interesting possibilities for connecting the abstract philosophical
debates with concrete policy deliberations. These three papers will us Walton’s
practical inference schemata. In “Practical Reasoning, the Wilderness Ideal,
and
Dane Scott is Assistant
Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at
JoshHaddock is an
Undergraduate Student in Philosophy at
Seth Nivens is an
Undergraduate Student in Philosophy at
Paul Eddy Wilson, “Regulative Control and the
Subjectivist’s View of Moral Responsibility”
In this essay I focus upon
John Martin Fischer’s notion of taking on responsibility. In his view moral actors must acquire a
proper self-understanding to take on moral responsibility. I question whether Fischer steps out of his
role as a subjectivist, when he maintains that having only guidance control is
a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
I suggest that subjectivists are committed to the notion that taking on
responsibility includes the acquisition of a proper phenomenology of
freedom. I compare actors who have not
acquired a sense of regulative control to actors whom Fischer identifies as
nonresponsible actors.
P. Eddy Wilson is Assistant
Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Religion and Philosophy at
Joseph Orosoco, “César Chavez on the Use of Violence for
Global Justice”
In this paper, I examine several arguments that
justify property destruction as a form of civil disobedience. These arguments stress that the question
about the use of violence in social protest is not a moral one, but a strategic
one; that is, about the most efficient means to achieve political goals. I then rely on César Chavez’s conception of
nonviolent civil disobedience to demonstrate why these arguments fundamentally
misunderstand the dynamics of power and violence. Chavez argues that advocates of property
destruction threaten to reduce struggles for social justice to power politics
by ignoring moral guidelines for strategy, fail to consider how state
repression against violent protests harms the most poor and vulnerable members of
society, and confuse a violent shift in the balance of power with the creation
of a more just, democratic, and equitable society.
Jose-Antonio Orosco is an assistant professor
in the philosophy department at
Janet Donohoe, “The Place(s) of Monuments”
Just two years after the September 11 attack on the
Janet Donohoe is an associate professor of philosophy
at the State University of West Georgia.
She is the author of Husserl
on Ethics and Intersubjectivity: From Static to Genetic Phenomenology
due out July 2004 from Prometheus Books.
Patricia Trentacoste, “The Aesthetic Gestalt and the
Moral Gaze”
Even ethically minded people who fail to adequately
perceive the contextual details of their circumstances are likely to misapply
moral principles to actual cases.
Unfortunately, the inability to detect ground/figure shifts or to accept
the presence of ambiguity, reinforces black and white thinking and the harms
that attend conceptual rigidity and moral dim-sightedness. Artists, on the other hand, due to their
aesthetic sensitivity and metaphoric modes of expression, experience gestalt perception as a natural function of their craft. I argue that both practical ethics and moral
epistemology will profit from looking carefully through the “eye of the poet.”
Patricia
Trentacoste is a Special Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at
Ralph Ellis, “Love, Religion, and the Psychology of
Inspiration”
While much of psychology preserves the legacy of
behaviorism and consummatory drive-reductionism, attempting to explain all
human behavior as in the service of chemical micro-constituents, this paper
begins by summarizing the self-organizational approach to emotion and
motivation. Emotions are not responses
to stimuli, but expressions of an active system seeking congenial environmental
affordances, motivated by fundamental playful, exploratory, and other
non-consummatory aims that can be understood as the tendency of complex systems
to prefer higher-energy basins of attraction rather than settle into satiation
and dull comfort. Given this understanding of the emotions in complex animals,
there is a fundamental need for inspiration to fuel the self-initiated
activation of the system; lack of this basic inspiration leads to depression.
This newly developing emotion theory, now gaining support from neurophysiology
(e.g., Panksepp’s “play” and “seeking” systems in mammals), leads to a richer
psychology of religion than the old wish-fulfillment school. In sophisticated
conscious beings, the need for inspiration is exacerbated by awareness of the
problems of finitude; love, the arts and religion are meant to address this
heightened need for inspiration. Some
approaches to religion, however - “fundamentalist” approaches - contend with
the problems of finitude in an inauthentic way: rather than enhance the feeling
of inspiration so as to create a positive experience of the value of being
capable of counterbalancing the problems of death, evil, and the relative
powerlessness and insignificance of the individual, they contend with those
problems simply by denying them. This
fundamentalist approach leads to corresponding distortions of ethical and
political attitudes.
Ralph Ellis teaches philosophy at
Keya
Maitra, “Comparing the Bhagavad-Gita and Kant: A Lesson in Comparative
Philosophy”
This
paper examines the often-mentioned similarity in comparative moral philosophy
between the Hindu Text Bhagavad-Gita’s notion of duty and Kant’s notion
of duty. It is commonly argued that they are similar in their deontological
nature where one is asked to perform one’s duty for the sake of duty only. I
consider three related questions from Gita’s and Kant’s perspectives,
namely, what is the Source of our Duties: Self or Nature, How do we know that
an act x is our duty and an acceptable example of a duty in these two moral
frameworks. In all these three cases I show that their respective answers
diverge quite clearly and conclude by arguing that the reason for this
divergence is due to the fact that while the ideal of Kantian morality is to
become a member of the ‘kingdom of ends’, the aims of the Gita’s system of duties are the sustenance of the social order and
the realization of one’s identity with the Supreme Self.
Dr.
Keya Maitra is an Assistant Professor of philosophy at the
Stephen R. Brown, “Naturalized Virtue Ethics and Same-Sex
Love”
There are certain traits that make us good human
beings by enabling us to realize our natural ends. From the perspective of such
a naturalized virtue ethics, there is nothing obviously unethical or imprudent
about the capacity for same-sex love. Moreover, given the resources of this
theory, such questions are empirical ones. If it should turn out that the
capacity for same-sex love is a trait the possession of which makes one a good
human being, then the just political state will promote and encourage it. One
way it can do so is by allowing same-sex marriage.
Stephen R. Brown is Assistant
Professor of Philosophy at
Jeremy Wisnewski, “Murder, Cannibalism, and Indirect
Suicide”
Recently, a man in
J. Jeremy Wisnewski is
currently a Visiting Assistant Professor at
James McLachlan, “Religious Pluralism: Whoring,
Polygamy, or Friendship?”
Over the last twenty years
discussions of the plurality of religions have centered around three possible
stances toward another’s religion (Race 1982).
The exclusivist claims that his/her tradition is the only true one and
that all others are wrong. An
exclusivist would investigate other traditions only to show how they are wrong
or through mere intellectual curiosity.
Any sincere religious interest would constitute whoring after false gods.
An inclusivist claims that all religions are really versions of one’s own,
which is the true faith. Here we have a
type of religious polygamy in which all the traditions become one’s own. Finally, a pluralist claims that all
religions are somehow true and thus equally valid ways to salvation. Hence, religions should enter into a
dialogue of equals.
James McLachlan is a
Professor of Philosophy at the
SPCW 2004 Conference Organizers
Siegfried Van Duffell
Andrew Fiala
Joe Jones
Special thanks to those who read papers