Campus Public Safety Preparedness for Catastrophic Events: Lessons Learned from Hurricanes and Explosives

This report was sponsored by The U. S. Department of Homeland Security, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, and The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators.
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There are 4,000 Title IV Institutions of Post-Secondary Education in the United States serving about 15 million students and several million faculty, staff, and visitors each year. Our colleges and universities are responsible for $80 billion in federal research and provide support functions such as super-conducting for multi-national companies.

Gulf Coast colleges and universities suffered massive infrastructure and economic damages from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Physical and economic losses to colleges and universities from Hurricane Katrina alone total an estimated $2.5 billion. Gulf Coast institutions of higher education are major contributors to the economies and employers for the regions which they serve.

Campus public safety agencies are charged with protecting the buildings and other facilities of colleges and universities in the Gulf Coast region. More importantly, these campus public safety agencies are responsible for protecting the lives of the many students, faculty, staff, and visitors to these institutions of higher learning.

In early September of 2005, shortly after Hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans, Jeff Allison, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Special Advisor to the FBI Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, was attending a focus group meeting sponsored by the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, Inc., (IACLEA) in Washington D.C. The purpose of the focus group meeting was to identify current and future training needs to help campus public safety departments prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism on college campuses. During this meeting, Allison initiated preliminary discussions with IACLEA staff and Domestic Preparedness Committee leaders to explore whether DHS grant funds could be reprogrammed to support a Lessons Learned Listening Session specifically for the Gulf Coast Schools. The concept was that a catastrophic event such as Hurricane Katrina presents many of the same challenges as a WMD/terrorist event: the need to evacuate and protect large numbers of students and others; the need to protect property and maintain order; and the need for mutual aid and cooperation among law enforcement, first responder, and other groups. One of the campus public safety leaders who happened to be attending the focus group meeting in Washington, D.C., Police Chief David Benada of McNeese State University, responded to the call and graciously agreed to have his institution serve as host for this session. Two weeks later, Chief Benada’s campus would be hit by Hurricane Rita.

The scope of this meeting was expanded after the suicide bomber incident at the University of Oklahoma and an incident involving home-made explosives at Georgia Tech to include debriefings and Lessons Learned presentations for those two events.

Once the authorization was received by DHS to proceed with the meeting, IACLEA and its grant sponsors at DHS reached out to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Listening Session became a jointly sponsored event.

We thank Jeff Allison for his foresight and vision; J. Scott Whitney, DHS program manager, for his support; Chief David Benada for his invaluable assistance; and the IACLEA Board of Directors and its Domestic Preparedness Committee for working together to ensure a successful session.
We also wish to thank the campus public safety executives (see the List of Participants, p. 1-11) who participated in the event and completed surveys in advance to document actions taken before, during and after the hurricanes.

It is our hope and desire that this Lessons Learned report will serve as a guide to help campus public safety agencies take the necessary steps to protect the lives and property of the college and university communities they are committed to serve in the face of future catastrophic events, whether natural or man-made.

It is also important for policymakers other than campus public safety executives to understand that colleges and universities are communities within the larger geographic community in which they are located. To the extent that we are able to protect the campus community, they may provide valuable incident response and recovery assets that add a protective layer to the larger community.

In other words, if campus communities have the wherewithal to withstand the storm, they become a huge asset to the larger community during response and recovery. If they do not withstand the storm, they become another entity in need of rescue.
Listening Session

On March 21, 2006, IACLEA, the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) convened a two-day listening session for campus public safety leaders from higher education institutions affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Hosted by McNeese State University in Lake Charles, LA, the purpose of this two-day session was to identify and share lessons learned that might be applied to planning for future catastrophes, whether natural or man-made.

In addition to attendees from the sponsoring agencies, representatives from numerous institutions were invited to participate in the conference, including:

- Centenary College,
- Delgado Community College,
- Dillard University,
- Georgia Tech,
- Jackson State University,
- Louisiana State University,
- McNeese State University,
- Nicholls State University,
- University of Oklahoma,
- Tulane University,
- University of New Orleans,
- University of South Alabama,
- University of Southern Mississippi, and
- Xavier University.

Participants were asked to present a summary of the most important issues they encountered leading up to and in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, they were asked to provide written responses addressing their planning, command and coordination, communications, equipment and logistics, and staffing issues. The representative from Dillard University was unable to attend but submitted information in advance.

A selection of their challenges and lessons learned are compiled in the following chapters of the report. Additionally, the report concludes with lessons learned from incidents involving explosives at Georgia Tech and the University of Oklahoma in 2005.
The participant schools had a wide range of experiences during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The following summary highlights the central lessons they cited as most important and most generally applicable across a range of hazards.

**Planning**

It is imperative to have up-to-date emergency operation plans that address all hazards and are exercised on a regular basis. During the hurricanes, many schools found themselves without adequate plans and were forced to adopt hastily-planned responses. Several particularly important planning points were noted.

- Consider extending provisions for self-sufficiency in Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) to 7-10 days. Many campuses have emergency plans that call for 3 days of self-sufficiency. During the hurricanes, this proved to be an unrealistic expectation.
- Obtain the help of engineers when selecting shelter sites on campus; many seemingly “obvious” sites (such as sporting arenas) are not best for withstanding weather.
- Consider determining the Global Positioning System (GPS) locations of campus buildings, which may be helpful in the event local signs are destroyed. The State of Florida, for example, requires that trucks bringing in relief supplies be equipped with GPS, so that the trucks can be located in real time and drivers can receive directions in places without signs.
- Coordinate the campus EOP with those of surrounding agencies and entities and clarify in advance the criteria and protocols for use of campus facilities as shelter points. Several participants were surprised to discover that facilities on their campuses were considered sheltering points by other members of their community and thus found themselves taking on unexpected evacuees.
- Resolve issues regarding legal authority over campus resources and operations before a critical incident occurs. This process should involve the college or university administration and legal counsel.
- Make agreements with other entities in your area. Campuses with pre-existing arrangements for buses, food, fuel, water, and IT functions had a generally faster response time and smoother recovery operations.
- Planners should also form relationships with federal entities in the area, including the
  - FBI SAC,
  - Homeland Security Advisor, and
  - Emergency Management Assistance Coordinator (EMAC).
- Representatives from colleges and universities should participate on their Local Emergency Planning Committees.
TRAINING

Having an all-hazards plan is necessary, but not sufficient preparation for a major incident; responders must be trained adequately to carry out the plan, and this training should include periodic exercises.

- Some level of Incident Command System (ICS) training is vitally important not only for Public Safety personnel, but also for campus administrators or other individuals (such as physical plant personnel) who may be part of the command or decision-making structure during response efforts. IACLEA offers an Incident Command program for command and supervisory level emergency responders from both campus and non-campus emergency response entities.

- Training is not just for senior officers; beat officers should have some level of Command Post and Incident Command/Emergency Management training. Such courses are available from FEMA and other agencies at no cost to participants.

- Campus officers encountered many situations for which they were not adequately trained; in the worst cases, officers were unable to communicate with the decision-makers in their command structure. Additional training in shelter management, critical incident management, and crowd control would have been useful.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION

- College and university administrators must be prepared to fulfill their roles and responsibilities in the coordination of response and recovery efforts. Campus executives with the authority to make decisions sometimes involving the modification of existing policies must be accessible throughout an emergency.
In any large-scale event that involves multiple government officials at the municipal, county, state and federal level, command structures can be confusing. It is essential to have written agreements in place that clarify command structure and coordination before an event occurs. IACLEA has sample memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and mutual aid agreements (MAAs) that can be used to establish these kinds of command structures; these will be available to campus public safety departments on its web site.

COMMUNICATION

During the hurricanes, maintaining situational awareness was one of the greatest problems encountered; communication, both internally to the campus and externally to other agencies and the surrounding area, was an issue for almost every school. The media was not a reliable source of information, and many campuses were acting in an informational vacuum.

- Many participants noted that otherwise-operational radio systems were hampered by a lack of power generators that could be used to re-charge the equipment.
- Satellite phones and UHF/VHF radios (military surplus) were effective in situations where radios and cell phones were unreliable.
- Internet web sites were a critical means of communication with campus communities after the hurricanes.
SUPPLIES

- Many campuses did not have an adequate supply of fuel on hand for post-event needs.
- Campuses with national or regional food services contractors fared better during recovery; they were able to obtain supplies that were not available locally.
- During such a large event, it was difficult for responding agencies to get water and ice distributed to where it was needed. Campuses should consider making agreements with outside entities to provide water and ice.

EQUIPMENT

- In many cases, backup generators (such as those found in dormitories) are designed to be run for short periods, rather than continuously. Such generators are inadequate for extended periods without power.
- Generators should be located well above ground level. Many perfectly functional generators had to be shut off when water reached the level of the lowest power outlets.
- Transfer switches for backup generators should also be above likely flood conditions.
- Key generators should also be armored against wind-borne projectiles.
- During weather incidents, patrol vehicles should be staged out of flood-prone areas, and should be dispersed in separate locations so that catastrophic damage in one location does not affect all vehicles.

PEOPLE

- Key personnel should be identified in advance, and provisions to take care of those people and their families should be made. At the very least, make sure that officers and other key campus personnel have their own emergency plans for family members before an incident occurs. It is also wise to have a timeline for enacting those plans (which may be earlier than the rest of the campus population).
- Backup records of employee contact information (telephone and e-mail) should be kept current, should be kept in a safe location that will remain accessible during an emergency, and should not rely on a single mode of contact (such as the campus e-mail system), which may not be functioning during an emergency.
- When housing/hosting emergency responders as part of the recovery effort, it is important to make certain they are self-sufficient for their supply needs. It is also important to have a timeline for their departure from campus in order to resume academic operations.
- Many campuses found that they did not have adequate plans to deal with the counseling needs that personnel and their families and evacuees required.

CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

Several conference participants noted that their campus administrators pushed to re-open before public safety personnel were confident that they could sustain operations at a pre-event level. At the same time, it should be recognized that for a college or university to lose an entire semester may mean the campus is out of business completely.
Careful consideration should be given to preserving IT functions. Moving servers away from campus can help preserve payroll operations, databases and other vital information records, and web pages that can serve as a vital link to students and staff evacuated hundreds of miles from campus. If these systems are not functioning, the business of the school will come to a halt.

Resuming campus operations was problematic in situations where campus administrators or other key personnel were scattered around the country as a result of evacuation. Plans must account for tracking the whereabouts of decision-makers and having a means to reach them to direct or manage incident or post-incident operations.

When conducting damage assessments, team officers with facilities personnel to ensure that structures are safe to enter and/or downed power lines will not endanger the officers.

Several campuses housed student evacuees from other institutions; in cases where the evacuees were not well integrated into the existing student community, there were much higher rates of crime and domestic violence.

During recovery efforts, getting supplies from FEMA and other agencies was hampered by poor communication. Contact personnel were constantly changing, making it difficult to track the progress of requests. Many campuses found that their own pre-existing agreements with outside companies and other colleges and universities were a faster route to getting the supplies and equipment that were needed.

Financial reimbursement has proven to be a problem for many of the participant schools. Reimbursement from federal sources has been slow in coming, and in many cases may not be provided because the schools are unable to document certain expenditures. It is important to have a plan in place to track and document financial expenditures during an emergency.

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CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY PREPAREDNESS FOR CATASTROPHIC EVENTS

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Demographic Information

Campus Demographics

- Students: 975
- Faculty: 80
- Staff: 160

Campus Public Safety Department Demographics

- Officers: 8
- Other Staff: 1
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

Chronology of Priorities

Centenary College was not affected by Hurricane Katrina other than being the evacuation location for Dillard University, which is located in New Orleans. Centenary College used our emergency plans to prepare for the evacuees (approximately 300 students) from Dillard University.

72 Hours

During Hurricane Rita:

- The police department transitions from an 8-hour shift schedule and into a 12-hour shift schedule.
- A supervisory officer is assigned to each of the shifts. All leave for police personnel is cancelled.
- Recommendations/discussions with the Centenary College Executive Staff begin regarding the potential for the evacuation of students.
- The Sodexho food services manager is alerted to make preparations and to have at least seven days of food, beverage, and paper products on hand for students and emergency personnel and their immediate families. Sodexho is also responsible for notifying and reserving a "cold storage" truck per agreement with a local company.
- An estimate of family members is provided.
- The Director of Facility Services is notified and all loose objects are secured and all drains are cleaned. The Director of Facility Services is charged with contacting the local generator company per agreement and reserving two large generators for the Fitness Center and campus telephone switch. The Fitness Center is the campus evacuation site and our telephone switch has a battery backup life of approximately 12 hours.
48 HOURS

- The decision is made to close the campus and send students home where possible to reduce the number that will need to be fed and housed. No students were sent to areas within the storm’s predicted path.
- The local news media was alerted about the decision to close the campus.
- All non-essential personnel are alerted via global e-mail that they need not report for work the following day.
- Facility Services checks all generator hook-ups and functionality.

24 HOURS

- All contracted generators are on hand and ready to be connected/powered on if power is lost.
- The Office of Residence Life distributes emergency lighting supplies to students who will not be leaving campus.
- Students are also informed to have an adequate supply of all prescription medicines that they are currently taking.
- Updated weather information is broadcast via campus radio station, TV station, and global e-mail regularly.
- Sodexho verifies they have on hand supplies for 7-day period.
- All computerized backup tapes of college financial records, grades, etc. are taken to safety deposit boxes at an off campus location. Another copy is stored in the Evidence vault at Police department.
- Emergency bedding, towels, toiletries, emergency lighting, etc. is moved to the Fitness Center and placed.

12 HOURS

- Fitness Center is opened to family members of emergency staff personnel required to be on duty.
- All vehicles, generators, and additional gasoline containers are filled.
- Any/all remaining non-essential personnel are sent home.
- All campus facilities are locked.
- A global e-mail is sent indicating that entry into campus facilities other than by essential personnel is prohibited.

DURING EVENT

- Police make limited patrols looking for damages and responding to emergency calls as necessary.
- Police officers report obvious damages to Facility Services on-site emergency crews to try
to limit damages to campus buildings.

- Facility Services also clears known problem drainage areas if it can be done safely.

### Recovery Priorities

- Respond to any "life" emergencies.
- Reduce or eliminate the business interruption of the college.
- Obtain damage estimate to the facilities and structures on the campus.

### Plans

The Centenary College Emergency Operation Plan worked well for the limited storm damage that was sustained.

The EOPs were based on a formal threat and risk assessment and were used during the hurricane incidents. They were previously exercised; Dillard University has evacuated to the Centenary campus several times as a result of the threat of a hurricane hitting New Orleans. This has allowed the school to utilize the plan.

The previous Dillard evacuations have aided the college's President and Executive Staff in understanding their roles during emergency situations. Centenary College's plan is designed so that the President is the ultimate decision maker. However, his decision is based on the input from the Director of Public Safety, Dean of Student Life, and the Vice President for Finance and Administration. These exercises validated planning assumptions; however, each incident has been a little different so adjustments were made as necessary.

Other training proved useful during these incidents, including IACLEA WMD training and a limited weather related table top exercise.

### Command and Coordination

The college did have a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis. The Chief and Captain were responsible for coordination with the local Emergency Management officials, but this contact was minimal.

The command structure did work together to establish priorities, and an Incident Action Plan was developed.

Mutual Aid Agreements existed prior to the event, but they were not used. The college was able to handle all problems that were encountered.

The Director of Facility Services, a representative from the insurance company, and Director of Public Safety conducted the damage assessments for Centenary College.
Centenary College experienced minimal problems with logistics. The primary issues involved needing additional generators, cots, pillows, blankets, cosmetics, and first aid supplies.

Officials allowed the Dillard students to attend classes and participate in other student activities to give them something to do. The Dillard administration was scattered around the country, and students were not prepared for lengthy evacuation. The students had no means to get home; Centenary contracted a bus company to make trips around the country to drop students off.

Information was communicated to students and parents by way of local radio, television, and e-mail. The Centenary College website was also used. An alternate off-campus website was also available should it have been needed.

Officials communicated with the media, providing information briefings to students at various points. However, most students were watching the events occur on CNN or FOX.

Internal communications were never lost; communication was possible via radio. Also, Centenary College is a NEXTEL campus and personnel were able to communicate via phone and/or push-to-talk.

Emergency personnel’s immediate family members were provided with housing and meals on campus. Counseling services were not needed by Centenary College employees, but were provided to Dillard students.

Centenary College employees were notified through the local news media. Operations were not affected by any staff shortages.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

• While en route to Shreveport, one of the buses carrying evacuees from Dillard University
caught on fire, and approximately 50 students lost everything. Centenary sought out and received many donations from the local churches, hospitals, and Wal-Mart. These places and people donated enough items and/or money to sustain the immediate needs of the evacuees for the short term and ultimately get them all home by either plane or bus. No government funds or assistance was received; the school did ask for assistance but was denied after being informed that the majority of the resources had been sent south and that Centenary was not an official evacuation shelter open to the general public. That is an accurate statement, but the college did provide housing to 300 Dillard students and 150 Electric Company employees from Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana.

- There were not enough cots, soap, shampoo, and other supplies on hand at the evacuation location. These items were located on campus but not readily available in the building in which they were needed.

**What went right?**

- The vast majority of planning/preparations went extremely well. The community support for Dillard evacuees was incredible.

**Unmet Needs**

**Immediate (first 30 days)**

Centenary lacked assistance from any outside agencies, i.e. Red Cross, Local, State, Federal, governments.
**Demographic Information**

**Campus Demographics**
- Students: 16,787 pre-Katrina, 10,002 post-Katrina
- Faculty: 466 pre-Katrina, 366 post-Katrina
- Staff: 417 pre-Katrina, 259 post-Katrina

**Campus Public Safety Department Demographics**
- Officers: 26 pre-Katrina, 17 post-Katrina
- Other Staff: 15 pre-Katrina, 7 post-Katrina
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

**Chronology of Priorities**

**72 Hours**
The college administration monitored news and weather reports of the storm’s projected path.

**48 Hours**
On Saturday, August 27, 2005, as Hurricane Katrina approached New Orleans, the Delgado Community College Campus Police Department initiated its emergency operations order, which outlines its tactical plans. The operations order assigned officers to two twelve-hour shifts that would commence when the college and city declared a state of emergency.

**24 Hours**
The operations order was activated at 0600 hours on Sunday, August 28, 2005, with all personnel assigned to the City Park Campus. Initially, police personnel were divided into two twelve-hour shifts and assigned to patrol the City Park Campus. The officers were tasked with securing campus buildings and any objects that could cause property damage or present a danger in high winds.

**12 Hours**
Officers had been allowed to bring their immediate family members who had not evacuated the city. Their families were quartered in the zones to which the officers were assigned.
**DURING EVENT**

The officers were instructed to seek shelter in buildings 1, 2, 23, and 37 during the height of the hurricane to ensure a police presence in each campus zone. The severity of the storm forced campus officials to change the shifts assignments to two overlapping sixteen-hour shifts and eventually forced everyone into buildings 1 and 38. The officers were responsible for securing college facilities during the storm. Immediately following the passage of the hurricane, they were responsible for determining the extent of damage.

**RECOVERY PRIORITIES**

The operations plan called for pre-designated police personnel not on the City Park Campus to check the satellite campuses as soon as the storm passed; however, without communications officials could not determine if this was still possible after the storm passed because of the extent of flooding.

It was the plan that once the hurricane had passed, officers would be dispatched from the City Park Campus to the other campuses to establish site security and assess damage to the facilities. However, the severity of the hurricane prevented execution of this segment of the operations order. Unfortunately, this segment of the operations order was not accomplished because the storm flooded the city and surrounded the City Park Campus.

**PLANS**

The college has a written emergency preparedness plan, but it was not based on a formal threat or risk assessment. The plans have not been exercised, but they have been used as an operational guideline.

The staff also has Hazmat response training.

**COMMAND AND COORDINATION**

The college did have a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis, but it was not practical or effective. Once electrical power was lost at the campus, there was no effective means of communicating with the college administration. The effectiveness of cell phones immediately preceding the arrival of the storm was sporadic at best. After the storm they were completely unreliable.

The chief of police is responsible for communicating with all public safety agencies. However, communication with the outside was not possible, and there was no known effort by local or regional emergency management personnel to reach out to the college.

There was no contact with the city’s emergency operations center or the local police department.
Command and control response to this event resembled or followed the design model of a police incident command response. The college’s written policy outlines a management command structure similar to the design of a ICS model, but it did not function as designed for many reasons; the most significant problem was that none of the members designated in the emergency plan was on site during the event.

The college’s designated EOC location eventually flooded and was never used as the EOC.

Several attempts have been initiated to establish Mutual Aid Agreements with the local police department, but the attempts have been unsuccessful.

The initial damage assessment was the responsibility of the Campus Police Department.

**Equipment and Logistics**

**Equipment**

Once electrical power was lost, public safety personnel could not communicate with other public service agencies. Communication with anyone outside of the radio talk group was not possible.

**Logistics**

Initially, there were provisions (food and water) for several days. However, the responders did not expect to receive dozens of civilians from the neighborhood seeking refuge on the campus. It would have been helpful to have had access to additional basic first aid materials available.

The school did not have sufficient generators or gasoline to provide a minimum level of comfort to the many infirm and elderly civilians quartered in campus buildings for an extended period of time.

**Site Safety and Security**

The school did not experience any personnel issues during or immediately following the storm. The officers on site worked sixteen hours a day.

**Other Operational Issues**

The most critical issue was the inability to communicate. Other significant concerns were the lack of information available on the extent of flooding, confusing messages from local officials on television, and the delay in receiving help from the responding agencies.
**COMMUNICATIONS**

Internally, campus responders were able to communicate using the radio-to-radio talk feature.

The police department was the only department on the campus site; once cell phones failed, it was not possible to convey status reports to the college administration.

There was no communication at all with external agencies.

It was not possible or necessary to communicate with the media. The police department used its gasoline powered portable generator to monitor the one local television news station broadcasting.

It was not possible to communicate with anyone and there is no Mutual Aid Agreement between the local police and the school’s police department despite the school’s efforts to acquire one.

**RECALL AND STAFFING**

Prior to evacuation, personal cell phone numbers were exchanged so personnel could stay in contact with each other.

Operations continue to be affected by personnel and equipment shortages. The police department has experienced a one-third reduction in personnel, resulting in a need to eliminate shifts and change the work schedules to twelve hour shifts.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

**WHAT WENT WRONG?**

Just about everything went wrong. The emergency plans were ineffective and shortsighted at best; they did not account for devastation that was possible or the innumerable problems associated with such an occurrence. The campus did not have the resources necessary to survive for an extended period of time isolated from any outside assistance.

**WHAT WENT RIGHT?**

The human spirit overcame all challenges.
**UNMET NEEDS**

**IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)**

Personnel had to abandon the campus and evacuated three days after the storm.

**MID-TERM (30-180 DAYS)**

It was not possible to return and resume security for the campuses until October 2005.

**LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)**

All damaged and loss equipment, vehicles, bicycles and uniforms have not been replaced.
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CAMPUS DEMOGRAPHICS

- Students: 2300
- Faculty: 303
- Staff: 150

CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- Officers: 5
- Other Staff: 1
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Non-sworn

CHRONOLOGY OF PRIORITIES

72 HOURS

- Identify evacuation location and transportation.
- Secure materials for protecting property.
- Contact insurance company.

48 HOURS

- Notify students, faculty, staff of closure of school.

24 HOURS

- Close campus.
- Secure all buildings.

12 HOURS

- Campus closed.

DURING EVENT

- Contact parents and school administrators.
Recovery Priorities

- Safely evacuate students and employees.

Plans

The university did not have an Emergency Operation Plan prior to the event.

Command and Coordination

The university did have a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis. However, the plan was ineffective because of the lack of communication from the City of New Orleans as to whether or not a mandatory evacuation would take place.

Coordination with the local Emergency Management Office and other public safety agencies was the responsibility of the Communications Office and Security.

An informational meeting two weeks prior to Katrina with the City of New Orleans Emergency Management Office took place. The meeting concentrated on preparing homes for a hurricane and alternative routes to evacuate the city.

The management structure for this event did not use a formal ICS structure. The President led the team in preparing to evacuate our boarding students from campus.

The command structure worked together to establish priorities; however, several major areas were omitted, such as securing records, computer server, etc.

The Risk Manager did the damage assessment.

Equipment and Logistics

Complete inventory of all equipment, furniture and supplies was not available.

Communications

Campus public safety was involved with the evacuation process and securing the campus.

All department heads were involved in discussion pertaining to the emergency.
The City of New Orleans Emergency Planning Office provided maps and essential information for distribution to employees and students. There was a lack of clear communication from the City of New Orleans.

The Communications Department informed local media of the closure 48 hours before evacuating the campus.

**STAFF AND CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT (CISM)**

None planned or implemented.

**RECALL AND STAFFING**

Employees were notified by e-mail.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

**WHAT WENT WRONG?**

Continuation of academic programs.

**WHAT WENT RIGHT?**

Safe evacuation of all students and employees.

**UNMET NEEDS**

**IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)**

Housing shortage.
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CAMPUS DEMOGRAPHICS

- Students: 7,800
- Faculty: 500
- Staff: 600

CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- Officers: 50
- Other Staff: 4
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

CHRONOLOGY OF PRIORITIES

72 HOURS

- Student safety was a major concern. Students were encouraged to go home instead of staying on campus. Local students went home, but most out-of-state students elected to stay on campus.
- The university was also host to evacuating Tulane University students. The Tulane students were housed in the Athletic Assembly Center on campus. Phone lines and Internet service was provided for them. Preparations were made with the Food Service Department to provide meals for the visiting students.
- Officers were assigned to work with the accompanying Tulane officials. Housing was also provided for these officials inside university dormitories.

48 HOURS

- Plans were being formulated for providing a safe location for remaining students. Students were still encouraged to go home or home with a friend if they could arrange transportation.
- An assessment was made of campus buildings big enough and safe enough to house the remaining students. Food Service was notified that a large number of students would be remaining on campus and meals would be needed to be delivered to the locations where students would be housed during the storm.
- Faculty and Staff were warned to stay away from campus unless absolutely necessary.
24 Hours

- Facilities Management began to remove all unsecured items about campus that could cause damage or injury if airborne by winds.
- Faculty and Staff were told to stay away from campus unless their position required them to be at work.
- Locations were identified where students would be housed during the storm. Students were advised to pack their needed items and be ready for the move to the alternate locations.
- Officers and security officers were put on alert that all days off were cancelled and to be prepared to work twelve-hour shifts to increase manpower on campus.

12 Hours

- Students were moved to their specified storm locations. Males were housed in the interior of the library while females were housed in the interior of the campus union building. Officers were assigned to accompany the students and assist where needed with the Housing department personnel.
- All unauthorized personnel were asked to leave the campus.
- Twelve-hours shifts were commenced for the department.
- The command center for the Department of Public Safety was moved to the interior area of the Charles F. Moore building. The building is equipped with a generator to maintain charging of batteries for communications.

During Event

- Officers maintained posts throughout the campus and limited patrols continued.
- Officers maintained watch over the students relocated from the dormitories.
- It was discovered that the generator system in the Charles F. Moore building was not capable of maintaining enough electrical current to keep batteries charged as needed and maintain light in the relocated command center.
- Food Service delivered meals to all staff and students remaining on campus.

Recovery Priorities

- Because of damages on campus and lack of public utilities, it was decided that the start of school would be delayed for two weeks.
- Students were allowed to re-enter the dormitories to pack belongings and were advised they had to return to their homes until power and water were restored on campus.
- Areas on campus with electricity were identified so battery charges could be maintained for the department personnel.
- Facilities Management began to clear downed trees and other debris from campus so patrols could be maintained.
- Buildings were inspected for damage and reports made regarding condition.
PLANS

An Emergency Operation Plan based on formal threat assessments was in place prior to the event and was used during the hurricane.

This plan had been exercised only in tabletop exercises, discussions and planning; it was also put into action during previous hurricane threats that required housing of Tulane students.

These previous incidents assisted responders and administrators in understanding their respective roles and also helped to validate the plans and show needed adjustments and changes, along with practicality of accomplishing the intended results.

The staff had not received any other emergency training that proved applicable during the incident, but they did have proven experience from working in public safety related jobs.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION

The university had a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis; the Director of Public Safety was responsible for coordination with the outside Emergency Management Office and other public safety agencies.

Local agencies were advised there would be students housed on campus during the storm, and staff would be present. The Jackson Police Department was asked to assist with exterior patrols during and after the storm. The Hinds County Emergency Operations Center also maintained contact, providing weather updates and offers of any needed assistance.

The planned incident structure included the Department of Public Safety, Facilities Management, Risk Management, the President of the University, Student Life, Student Housing, Food Service, Public Relations and Academic Affairs. The involved units maintained communications and worked together to ensure the safety of all persons on campus and to maintain services as needed.

The university does have a space for an Emergency Operations Center, but it was not available at that time to deal with the weather experienced. The location would usually be in the Department of Public Safety, but at that time the department was located in a mobile home building.

The Department of Public Safety has agreements with the Jackson Police Department and the Hinds County Emergency Operations Center. The Jackson Police Department was instrumental with assistance for providing gasoline for the patrol vehicles and assisting with exterior patrols around the university property.

Lessons learned in the actual event are being incorporated into the existing emergency action response plan.
Facilities Management and the Risk Management Office did the damage assessment post-event.

**Equipment and Logistics**

**Equipment**

There were problems maintaining charged batteries for radios and cellular phones during the power outage.

**Logistics**

- A secure and safe location had to be located for the Public Safety Command Center.
- The attainment of gasoline for patrol vehicles and maintenance vehicles on campus was a problem. Mississippi Valley State University assisted by providing gasoline for Facilities Maintenance vehicles.
- All campus dorms had electronic locks (which would not lock when there was no power, leaving dorms unsecure).

**Communications**

The only problem with communications among the public safety department members was maintaining a supply of charged batteries for handheld units.

Cellular phones were utilized for direct communications with other departments at the university.

No problems encountered communicating with students, faculty, and staff. Announcements were made through e-mail, public service announcements, and meetings.

Public Information handled all media communications.

Backup of communication systems was provided through the use of cellular phones.

**Staff and Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)**

Officers were advised ahead of time to plan for safety of family members and communications plans for them.

The Psychology Department and the Counseling Center on campus were available for any seeking counseling.
RECALL AND STAFFING

The local television stations and newspapers announced all closures and openings of local schools and universities.

No staff shortages were encountered.

LESSONS LEARNED

WHAT WENT WRONG?

- It was discovered the generators used to maintain the command center were not adequate and a rotation system had to be put into place to maintain batteries until another location was identified to maintain charges on batteries.
- The lack of generators for key buildings on campus was also recognized.

WHAT WENT RIGHT?

- All units of the emergency response teams knew their responsibilities and worked together to provide the expected services.
- IT center was located off campus and had its own generators; the university web site remained available during the entire incident for contact with people off campus.

UNMET NEEDS

IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)

Relocate the Department of Public Safety headquarters to a permanent location.

MID-TERM (30-180 DAYS)

Same as above.

LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)

Public Safety personnel were relocated into a new building but the need for generator-provided power in case of power outages has not been met at this time.
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CAMPUS DEMOGRAPHICS

- Students: 5,500 before Katrina, 4,094 after
- Faculty: 469 before Katrina, 344 after
- Staff: 498 before Katrina, undetermined after

CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- Officers: 25 before Katrina, 13 after
- Other Staff: 8 before Katrina, 5 after
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn before Katrina, both after

CHRONOLOGY OF PRIORITIES

72 HOURS

- Hurricane Emergency Preparedness Team meetings and plan were activated.
- Decision pending to cancel classes and prepare for evacuation (on-campus or off-campus).
- Hurricane plans were reviewed.
- Emergency equipment and supplies were checked.
- Portable radios were distributed to designated non-police personnel.
- Shuttle vans were gassed up and moved with other university vehicles to top floor of parking garage. Garages were closed to non-permit access.
- Media was monitored for information.

48 HOURS

- The University Police activated the department’s hurricane emergency plan.
- Personnel were placed on 12 hour shifts.
- Patrols watched for unsecured items.
- Non-resident buildings were secured and the University closed.
- Most students, faculty, and staff evacuated.
- Media was monitored for information.
24 HOURS
- 140 students were left on campus. Vans and other vehicles were lined up to evacuate students and staff to Baton Rouge Red Cross shelter.
- Maps and food were distributed to evacuees.
- All campus buildings were searched for occupants and all buildings locked down.
- Immediate families of U.P. personnel as well as off duty personnel were moved into recreational complex.
- Media monitoring was continued.

12 HOURS
- Everyone took shelter in headquarters or recreational complex.
- Monitoring media continued.

DURING EVENT
- All people on campus took shelter in headquarters or recreational complex.

RECOVERY PRIORITIES
- Taking care of personnel first and then the university.
- Accounting for all people left on campus, and assessing for injuries.
- Assessing supplies and feasibility of staying on campus.
- Assessing safety of campus and area surrounding campus.
- Communicating with the outside world.
- Damage assessment.

PLANS
The university has a written and specific Hurricane Emergency [Preparedness] Plan, which was tested in 2004 for Hurricane Ivan.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION
The President of Loyola University has designated the Vice President for Student Affairs as the Plan Coordinator. The Plan Coordinator has supervisory responsibility over departments and personnel who comprise the Hurricane Emergency Preparedness Team (HEPT) and Designated Emergency Personnel Team (DEPT). All decisions of the HEPT and DEPT are recommendations to the University President as relayed by the Plan Coordinator. After mass
evacuation, the President stayed on campus during the storm and left the day after. He then
designated the Assistant Vice President for Administration, who remained on campus with
the Director of University Police and 8 physical plant employees, as the on-campus CEO.

Communication with the local Emergency Management Office (EMO) was the responsibility
of the Vice President, Associate Vice President for Student Affairs, and Loyola’s Public Affairs
office for the EMO and Red Cross. The Director of University Police made contact with
other public safety agencies when needed.

University police had no direct contact with the EMO before or during the storm. After the
storm there was direct contact made with the military (11 days after) who were the designated
emergency response team and who established bases on Loyola’s two campuses 14 days after
the storm until December 2005.

The university had a command structure that did work very well to establish priorities.
However, after the mass evacuation which included the HEP Coordinator, the University
President and the Assistant V.P. for Administration were the remaining command staff along
with the Director of U.P. and 8 physical plant employees for this emergency. There were two
satellite administrative offices set up in Alexandria, LA and Houston, TX. Mass
communication was limited for several days to a satellite telephone and later to an off-site web
site and server.

Loyola had space for an Emergency Operations Center originally in a building that was shut
down immediately after the storm. A back-up EOC was utilized in the only remaining
emergency powered building on campus (Mercy Hall), which also housed physical plant
offices and work stations.

There were no formal written Mutual Aid Agreements in place before the hurricane; all
attempts to establish them with local entities have been unsuccessful.

Assistant V.P. for Administration along with physical plant, U.P. employee, contractors and
Risk Manager did the damage assessments.

**Equipment and Logistics**

**Equipment Issues**

- With emergency generators and fuel limited, all alarms and CCTV were disabled for
  approximately 2 months.
- No phone service or internet web site (e-mail) communication was available for several
  weeks.
- When officers returned many had lost uniforms, badges, some firearms and other per-
  sonal safety equipment.
LOGISTICS ISSUES

- University police personnel and their families were staying in the recreational complex on the 6th floor during the storm. In the middle of the storm, the sky lights blew off the roof exposing personnel to massive amounts of rain and flying materials. Those people had to be evacuated to a nearby residence hall during high winds and rain.
- Some officers had many family members, including infants, staying with them, which presented unique problems.
- A number of returning resident students reported thefts from their rooms.
- In addition, on the day after the storm, radio reports indicated that the levees had breached and the city was rapidly flooding. U.P. personnel were given the opportunity to evacuate using a predetermined one-way-out route from the city. Everyone left except the Director of U.P.
- Employees were spread out over the country with many in emergency shelters out-of-state. With lack of communication, it was several weeks before contact was made with some personnel to resume security services.

OTHER ISSUES

- Security was provided by the Director of U.P., the Assistant V.P. for Administration (retired NOPD officer) and 8 armed physical plant employees. Approximately 1 month after the storm 3 officers returned and provided security.
- There was no communication to the outside world including all other local public safety agencies.

COMMUNICATIONS

University police UHF radios and repeater (on emergency power) worked through and after the storm.

Communication with other departments on campus was done intermittently by satellite phone and then through a temporary web site and call center set up in our two off-campus administrative offices (Alexandria, LA and Houston, Tx.). This was done for faculty, staff, students and parents.

Just prior to the storm, during the storm (before the phones went dead) and after the storm (when the land-lines were activated), all university community members, especially parents, continuously called university police lines. There was an emergency phone number to call that had a pre-recorded message with information. Community members wanted to speak to a live person.

The university’s public affairs staff handled all communication with the media.
Many of the staff who rode out the storm had their families with them. Those who remained were allowed to make phone calls as needed from department cell phones or land lines. If families were nearby some limited time off was granted.

A formal CISM organization was not used. Two months after the storm when public safety employees were required to come back to work, professional counselors, selected clergy, and a member of the Emergency Response Massage International (ERMI), who were all university employees, provided services on duty and without cost to university police personnel.

RECALL AND STAFFING

The university set up an off-campus web site requiring employees to check in. Employees were required to give phone numbers and their locations. University police employee information was relayed to the Director of U.P via the on-campus satellite phone and contact was made. A few officers made direct contact with the Director via cell phones as they came up sporadically.

The President of the University declared immediately after the storm that all university employees would continue to be paid until the end of the year (12/31/05). This did not help in getting employees to return. Some officers gained additional employment in other locations (e.g. Houston). The few that had returned in late September were overworked and had personal problems regarding their own losses. A mandate was sent out that all university police staff (essential personnel) had to return to work by 11/15/06 or their employment would be terminated.

There were no immediate places to stay and those that were available were not affordable. The university provided FEMA trailers with free utilities on a tract of land they own 16 miles from the university (Kenner, LA.). This was and is provided from February through December 2006.

LESSONS LEARNED

WHAT WENT WRONG?

- Evacuation of remaining students occurred 24 hours before the storm hit. Although it was successful it should have occurred a day or so earlier.
- There were no designated drivers for university vans used for the evacuations, nor a point person in charge of those vehicles and keys once they reached the evacuation site. It took a lot of effort to track down these vehicles and have them returned.
- There was no planning for business continuity on a long-term basis without local
resources.

- Families on campus were sheltering in what turned out to be unsafe locations.
- There was no planned reliable communication with the outside world and employees.
- Decision-makers had to decide whether it was possible or desirable to mandate that some personnel must stay no matter what the conditions were in an emergency such as Katrina with massive destruction and flooding.
- Some professors and staff entered unsafe buildings with keys after returning to campus.
- There were no immediate affordable safe places to stay for returning employees.
- There was no safe water from faucets, no flushing toilets, no showers, for 36 days.

**WHAT WENT RIGHT?**

- All faculty, staff and students were able to safely evacuate before the storm hit.
- The 10 remaining essential employees worked very well together in spite of obvious hardships.
- Radios worked for in-house communication.
- Portable generators and fuel were available.
- Ample food, bottled water and gas stove supply was available.
- Employees who remained had an adequate supply of medicine.
- The military established 2 bases on campus 14 days after the storm bringing fuel, medical aid, and other supplies as needed.
- Personnel were able to provide security patrols shortly after the storm.
- Personnel were able to secure all buildings.
- Times were set up for returning faculty and/or staff to retrieve office possessions with one check-in/egress point and inventory logs required.
- One person was in charge on campus after the storm.

**Unmet Needs**

**Immediate (First 30 Days)**

- There was no communication with the outside world.
- Administrators were unable to contact employees.
- There was no safe water to wash or toilet facilities.

**Mid-Term (30-180 Days)**

- There was a lack of housing for returning staff. 98% of university police personnel lost
their entire homes and all possessions.
- There was a shortage of uniforms, badges, and local suppliers. No mail, UPS or Federal Express was available.

LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)
- The permanent loss of personnel who have moved away with their families.
- Financial constraints including administrative staff layoff, some job openings “frozen,” and budget cuts.
- The U.P remains unable to fill vacancies that are authorized for officers due to low salary offered and higher salaries elsewhere as a result of labor shortage.
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CAMPUS DEMOGRAPHICS

- Students: 33,000
- Faculty: 1,736
- Staff: 3,774

CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- Officers: 76
- Other Staff: 2
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

CHRONOLOGY OF PRIORITIES

72 HOURS

- Preparation.
- Scheduling of personnel.
- Coordination with other campus and local organizations.
- Checking inventory of emergency supplies.
- Encouraging staff to secure their homes and family in order to be available for duty.
- Attending campus administrators meetings to review preparedness.

48 HOURS

- Continued planning.
- Monitoring weather advisories.
- Stocking up on last minute supplies.
- Filling vehicle fuel tanks.
24 Hours

- Staffing Special Needs shelters.
- Assisting with increased traffic flow caused by evacuation of New Orleans.
- Attending campus administrators meetings to close campus to non-essential personnel.
- Moving essential personnel to campus.
- Increasing numbers of on-duty police personnel.
- Making provisions to feed personnel.

12 Hours

- Adding staffing to shelters.
- Working with influx of evacuees.
- Increasing patrols.
- Attending meetings.

During Event

- Answering calls for emergency services.
- Checking staff at shelters.
- Stationing police personnel in different parts of the campus in the event of flooded roadways and downed trees.

Recovery Priorities

- Ensuring the safety of personnel and evacuees.
- Asking for additional help from EOC and military.
- Working with the demands placed on resources by the increased population at LSU and in the City of Baton Rouge.
- Accessing emergency fuel supplies.
- Keeping roads open.
- Answering calls for service.

Plans

As part of the massive evacuation from the New Orleans area and the efforts of responders to move medical cases from the area, LSU set up the largest triage facility in the country: 25,000 to 30,000 people were moved through the field hospital and toward triage sites. The number of helicopters delivering and removing people was completely unexpected, and in some cases 25-year-old police officers with no UHF/VHF equipment and no training were directing air traffic by hand.
Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) did exist prior to the hurricane, and they were based on a formal threat and risk assessment; however, they required adjustments because of the scale of the storm and number of injured, dying, and evacuated.

The plans had been exercised in previous hurricane seasons and were designed to assist incident commanders in understanding their respective roles. The exercises validated planning assumptions.

LSU staff has received other emergency training that proved applicable during the incident, including Emergency Medical training and Incident Command. Most of all common sense prevailed and police officers relied on their natural instincts to make up where training may have lacked. For example:

- Landing helicopters in the mass numbers that were required.
- Managing a major field trauma where officers had no prior expertise.
- Making special arrangements for the dead when supplies such as body bags and refrigerated trucks had not yet been delivered.

**COMMAND AND COORDINATION**

There was a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis, and the person in the command structure responsible for coordination with outside offices and agencies was the Executive Director of Public Safety.

LSU maintained telephone and periodic personal contact with both the local and state EOC. Through no fault of either, both the State and Local EOC were overwhelmed with activity and requests due to the magnitude of the storm.

The Incident Command System structure was used, but responders essentially rewrote the book as it related to the command structure. In theory it was applied, but adaptation was required.

The command structure did work together to establish priorities, and the university did have its own EOC.

No Mutual Aid Agreements were established prior to the incident.

Damage assessments were conducted by the Executive Director of Public Safety, who also handles Risk Management.
EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS

EQUIPMENT ISSUES

LSU experienced a lack of equipment to adequately provide services. The university needed additional modes of transportation for the volume of escorts of medical evacuees requested and travel in and out of New Orleans with medical staff. Initially there were not enough body bags or refrigerated trucks to store the deceased and not enough generators or emergency lighting. There was no true mobile command post for use of coordinating emergency personnel, and not enough crowd control equipment.

LOGISTICS ISSUES

LSU experienced an immediate lack of an established system to coordinate the large volume of patients, medical staff, volunteers, and public safety personnel. It was very difficult to determine who belonged and who did not. Controlling the media was an issue.

OTHER ISSUES

LSU did not have an ID card system or equipment to produce ID’s for personnel in and out of the shelters and the medical facility and a lack of containment equipment, such as barricades or fencing to secure the facilities. Needs were subsequently met.

Establishing a true chain of command between the various agencies, civilian group, and university officials was problematic.

COMMUNICATIONS

Fortunately, LSU transitioned to the State Police statewide radio system a month prior to the hurricane, and it offered communications with State Police and other agencies’ systems. Another very reliable backup for communications was NEXTEL radio to radio. This system worked effectively.

Communications were generally not a problem during the incident. Communication with the media was handled through a Public Information Office. Communications with campus public safety, external agencies, and students/faculty/staff were good. Radio systems were not compatible with those used by other departments at the university, but this did not hamper communications drastically.
In order to address staff concerns for their own families, LSU allowed personnel to leave as needed on a case-by-case basis. They would assist their families and return as quickly as possible. Supervisors exercised flexibility and common sense in these situations.

To address Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM), rest was encouraged when possible, debriefing when time allowed, and frequent visits by the Departmental Psychologist.

Recall and Staffing

Staff recall was initiated through the department’s chain of command.

Staff shortages created challenges, but they were overcome by supplementing military and out-of-state law enforcement.

Lessons Learned

What Went Wrong?

- Not enough housing for emergency personnel.
- Help was slow to arrive.
- Poor coordination of or lack of transportation of evacuees out of the medical zone to out-of-state shelters.
- Lack of coordination of emergency personnel as it relates to assignments of military and out-of-state personnel.

What Went Right?

- Personnel rose to the occasion.
- Training paid off.
- The public volunteered to help in massive numbers.
- Coordination improved over time.
- Incident Command worked after adjustments.
IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)

- Staffing to relieve overworked and stressed personnel,
- too few vehicles,
- rest, and
- adequate storage space for medical supplies.

MID-TERM (30-180 DAYS)

- Staffing,
- transportation, and
- storage of supplies.

LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)

- Financial reimbursement,
- resupply (efforts are slow mainly due to a lack of funds), and
- new training as a result of lessons learned from the storm.
Demographic Information

Campus Demographics
- Students: 8,992
- Faculty: 305
- Staff: 495

Campus Public Safety Department Demographics
- Officers: 12
- Other Staff: 7
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

Chronology of Priorities

72 Hours
The President and the MSU crisis committee begin tracking the storm in order to implement the university’s response plan if the situation requires.

48 Hours
- Continue meetings as above, and attend briefings at the local OEP (Office of Emergency Preparedness) with local public safety and government officials.
- Begin to make preparations at the university to secure the facility, and activate the remote EOC (Emergency Operations Center) at the university if necessary.
- Stage supplies (water, MREs, food, medical, etc.) at the EOC.
- Ensure that all diesel generators are fueled and tested. Move portable generators to the EOC in case they are needed. Stage a generator at Facilities and Planning Office to power fuel pumps. Stage a generator at the PBX office to power the telephone switch. Stage a generator at the infirmary to provide power for personnel quarters in the aftermath of the storm.

24 Hours
- Continue meetings as above with increasing frequency.
- Secure buildings with facilities personnel, and make preparations to secure the campus.
after the storm passes.

- Move emergency supplies to the EOC, and prepare the EOC for activation.
- Move VHF emergency radios to the police station to stage for use after the storm.

**12 Hours**

- Activate the EOC in addition to the main EOC at the police station.
- Prepare any equipment that may have to be moved from the police station to the EOC in the event the police department must be abandoned.

**During Event**

Survival, maintaining generators.

**Recovery Priorities**

Obtain generators and maintain facility security.

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**Plans**

An Emergency Operation Plan existed prior to the storm and was used as part of the response.

The hurricanes also highlighted an important side issue of threat assessment for McNeese University’s EOP. In the surrounding area, there are petrochemical companies, the 8th largest port in the country, and an Air Force base. The university needs to be prepared for WMD incidents and able to do business during, through, and after such events.

**Command and Coordination**

The Chief of Police was the person in the university’s command structure responsible for managing the crisis and communicating with the local OEP and other public safety agencies.

Formal ICS structure was not used during the crisis; the university used a unified command among university department directors.

Damage assessments were performed by the Director of Facilities and Plant.
EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS

EQUIPMENT

The main equipment issue was the lack of reliable, adequate generators staged at critical buildings at the university. Currently the only building with a generator is the police station. It was several days after the hurricane before generators were acquired to power the infirmary that is used for quarters, the fuel pumps and the PBX switch. Adequate power was never available at Farrar Hall, which is the shelter and was occupied by approximately fifty people for over a week.

LOGISTICS

Had it not been for supplies acquired for the Katrina shelter, McNeese would have not been as well supplied.

OTHER OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Personnel secured the facility both before and after landfall of the hurricane. This should be in the plan to complete no later than 24 hours prior to landfall.

Adequate shelter for first responders was not available immediately after the storm passed.

COMMUNICATIONS

Internally communication was done through normal channels on 800 MHz radios. The university also bought VHF radios to use as a backup in the event the main trunked radio system failed. The main system had very few problems. The VHF radios were used to communicate with other university department that are not on the public safety channels.

Communication with external agencies was done by telephone (the Bellsouth phone system did not fail) using emergency phones in the PD EOC that are independent of the PBX switch, which did fail as a result of a power outage. Communication was also possible via the 800 MHz radio system.

Information was made available through the university’s media services director to local media and also before and after the storm on the university’s web page. The server and information technology staff had been moved to a secure location in north Louisiana.
Some staff brought their families to the shelter, while others families left the area. Staff concern was understandably high for all personnel. The university plans in the future to split the staff and send part of them to a remote location. In this plan staff will be allowed to check on their house and family if the situation permits.

Formal CISD sessions have not taken place as a group, mostly because the presence of a counselor during the duration of the crisis addressed problems as they arose. Personnel have also utilized the counseling center, which is available to all employees and their families. Personnel are participating in a Volunteers of America PTSD program.

RECALL AND STAFFING

The police department had no staffing or recall issues. The university has initially looked at the staffing plan and intends to keep fewer personnel on site during future storms.

LESSONS LEARNED

WHAT WENT WRONG?

The university needs to implement a formal ICS to smooth daily operations before, during, and after an event and needs better allocation of personnel. Reliable, adequate power at key buildings is a must. Also, this will allow personnel to take care of daily tasks such as washing clothes, etc. The university also needs to address the absence of access to local and national media. The isolation created a problem.

WHAT WENT RIGHT?

Because the university was involved in the aftercare of Katrina victims, there were a lot of supplies available that otherwise would not have been. The arrival of FEMA personnel to set up a base camp on the university resulted in the acquisition of a FEMA generator, and resources provided by the base camp contractor, GFP Enterprises of Sisters, Oregon. This support included meals, shower facilities, laundry facilities, water, ice and other basic needs to support the recovery efforts. The university was also loaned two generators, one by Sprint telephone and one by GFP; these critical items need to be pre-staged prior to a hurricane’s projected landfall.
UNMET NEEDS

IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)

- Reliable power for facilities.
- Adequate temporary space for recovery operations.
- Basic needs: food, shelter, clean clothing, latrine facilities, etc.

MID-TERM (30-180 DAYS)

Lack of usable buildings to facilitate reopening of the university; this created a stressful environment.

LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)

- A comprehensive plan to provide logistics to better prepare for another emergency.
- The acquisition of temporary structures (tents, mobile command vehicles) and trailers to facilitate the storage and transportation of emergency supplies and equipment.
- A minimum 125Kwh generator to provide power to the mobile emergency facilities.
**Demographic Information**

**Campus Demographics**

- Students: 6,400
- Faculty: 600
- Staff: 600

**Campus Public Safety Department Demographics**

- Officers: 16
- Other Staff: 8
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

**Chronology of Priorities**

**72 Hours**

Officers prepare their homes and families prior to preparing to secure the campus.

**48 Hours**

Place emergency staff at critical locations, moving all students and citizens to secure area for the storm.

**24 Hours**

Lock down the university, make sure staff is in place, move everyone not needed inside buildings and maintain communications.

**12 Hours**

Ensure food, water and other arrangements are met, movement on university is at a minimum and that all parties are accounted for.

**During Event**

Stay under shelter and provide security to the building where citizens and students are kept.
RECOVERY PRIORITIES

Assessment of property damages to buildings, computer system and communications.

PLANS

An Emergency Operation Plan did exist prior to the event and had been put into action during previous storm seasons. The plans were partially used during this event.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION

There was no predetermined chain-of-command for crisis management; the Emergency Preparedness Committee chairperson was the default person in charge and was responsible for coordination with the local EMO and other public safety agencies.

The ICS was not used during this event.

Damage assessment was performed by Facilities and Planning and the University Police.

EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS

- The local repeater was damaged in the storms, and cell phones were down.
- Legal authority issues were encountered among the university, the City, and the Parish; local authorities closed down all shelters and directed resources to the university in order to provide a central sheltering facility. While this allowed other public facilities to return to daily business, it caused extensive problems for the university.
- The university had to set up a special needs shelter; 800 evacuees were shipped from New Orleans to be processed and sent to other facilities. There were also about 60 animals that had to be housed on short notice. There were also problems with crimes committed in the shelter -- mental health patients, sex offenders, and alcohol and chronic drug abusers all presented community crime problems for which not all university police were trained to address.

COMMUNICATIONS

The university had no communications other than with the local police department. Communications with parents and the public were conducted via PIO and the university web page after they returned to operation after the storm.
Staff and Critical Incident Stress Management

Staff stress issues were addressed by affording counseling services to all staff members at the Counseling Center on campus.

Lessons Learned

What went wrong?
There was no plan to address the situations encountered after the storm with shelter operations and a formal command structure with clarifications of authority and responsibility.

What went right?
Police department response and community support to New Orleans evacuees.

Unmet Needs

Immediate (First 30 Days)
Support staff and EMAC number to get support

Mid-term (30-180 Days)
Support staff.

Long-term (180 Days and Beyond)
Support staff.
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CAMPUS DEMOGRAPHICS

- Students: 11,307
- Faculty: 1,166 full time/143 part time
- Staff: 2,166 full time/311 part time

CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- Officers: 37
- Other Staff: 15
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

CHRONOLOGY OF PRIORITIES

72 HOURS

Wait & watch - hurricane projected to hit Florida.

48 HOURS

- Recommended to execute personal evacuation plans.
- Began evacuation of students to Jackson State University; students unable to execute a personal evacuation plan.
- Began securing Public Safety Office and designated Emergency Commander Center.

24 HOURS

- Minimum Public Safety staff began checking all campus buildings and grounds for loose objects.
- All buildings locked down.

12 HOURS

Hunkered down in the Public Safety Office.

DURING EVENT

Hunkered down in the Public Safety Office.
TULANE UNIVERSITY
PLANS

RECOVERY PRIORITIES

A physical check of the campus to assess damage.

PLANS

An Emergency Operation Plan based on a formal threat and risk assessment did exist prior to the event, but the plan did not account for the actual flooding that took place. Supplies for personnel remaining on campus were sufficient for three days, not five weeks.

The plan was implemented during the previous year for Hurricane Ivan.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION

The university did have a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis. The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness was responsible for coordination with the local Emergency Management Office and other public safety agencies.

Ongoing communication with the EM office was maintained up until the loss of communications.

The university did not use Incident Command. The plan called for a command post manned by the President, Senior Vice President for Operations, Vice President for University Communications, the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and a Public Safety dispatcher. The Director of Public Safety managed field operations until the weather conditions deteriorated. At that time field personnel were ordered to the safety of the Public Safety Office.

An outside restoration company under the direction of Facilities Services personnel did the damage assessment.

EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS

EQUIPMENT

Because of the length of time of standing water, as deep as four feet, most electronic equipment was damaged. Paper files lower than the height of the water were a loss.

LOGISTICS

The plan called for putting the key in the door and locking the place down. Employees were spread all over the country; contacting them and resuming operations was difficult.
**SITE SAFETY AND SECURITY**

Impossible to provide site security because of the flood waters.

**OTHER OPERATIONAL ISSUES**

Biggest problem was communications. Cell phones were just about useless, land lines were down, satellite phone worked intermittently and Public Safety radios were not on the same frequency as the New Orleans Police Department, not by choice.

**COMMUNICATIONS**

All telephone calls to the university were routed to Public Safety, and the university was shut down.

As noted, the biggest problem was communications with outside agencies and organizations. Cell phones were just about useless, land lines were down, satellite phone worked intermittently and Public Safety radios were not on the same frequency as the New Orleans Police Department, not by choice.

Once a temporary office was established in Houston, about one week after the hurricane, a temporary web site and a call center was established for students, faculty, and staff.

Existing communication systems were inadequate in regards to communicating with local governmental entities.

Backup systems were in place: an emergency generator at the Public Safety office until the water started to rise, and an emergency generator at the command center until the fuel ran out.

**STAFF AND CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT (CISM)**

Staff is briefed at the time of hire that they need to make arrangements for their families.

No CISM resources used.

**RECALL AND STAFFING**

Staff was spread all over the country. Fortunately there was a list of contact numbers.

Staff shortages were the result of a housing shortage. Once students’ belongings were packaged and stored, a limited amount of housing was available for essential employees.
LESSONS LEARNED

WHAT WENT WRONG?

- The school needs to rethink the location of the command center.
- The school needs to make provisions for a longer stay.
- The school needs to build a retaining wall around the power plant to keep the co-gen unit operating. The co-gen unit will power half the campus.

WHAT WENT RIGHT?

Student evacuations.

UNMET NEEDS

IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)

Lack of housing to accommodate returning staff.

MID-TERM (30-180 DAYS)

Lack of uniforms, food stuffs, functional radio equipment.

LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)

Loss of personnel who relocated and have decided not to return.
Demographic Information

**Campus Demographics**
- Students: 16,000-18,000
- Faculty: 1,000
- Staff: 1,000

**Campus Public Safety Department Demographics**
- Officers: 25
- Other Staff: 5
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

Chronology of Priorities

**72 Hours**
Monitoring the storm.

**48 Hours**
Monitoring the storm, considering evacuation.

**24 Hours**
Closing the university and evacuating students.

**12 Hours**
Monitoring media for information.

**During Event**
Monitoring media for information.

**Recovery Priorities**
Securing and opening the campus.
The latest draft of the Emergency Operation Plan was due to be approved right before the storm occurred. This plan was not based on a formal threat and risk assessment.

**Command and Coordination**

The university’s administration managed this event; the ICS was not used. Contact was maintained via phone and e-mail with the local Office of Emergency Planning.

Mutual Aid Agreements existed but were not used.

**Equipment and Logistics**

The university experienced extensive problems during the storm. Vehicles were flooded, and radios had no power to recharge. There was no food or water for the people who were on campus and inadequate security to cover the site. Very limited assistance from other agencies was available.

There was also a large influx of unexpected evacuees from the surrounding community; somewhere between 3,000 and 6,000 people were on campus before helicopters began moving them to other locations.

**Communications**

Communication was primarily maintained with cell phones and e-mail (non-UNO accounts, since the UNO computer systems were not available). Communication with external agencies, students/faculty/staff and others outside the university was accomplished via website.

The radio system was knocked out and unavailable during the storm, and no backups were in place.

**Lessons Learned**

**What went wrong?**

It took too long to close the university and evacuate.
There was no backup communication plan.

Campus was used as a drop-off location for rescue operations and was not prepared to accommodate these unexpected people.

**WHAT WENT RIGHT?**

The university was able to set up a command center at Louisiana State University’s Baton Rouge campus in order to get information to staff.

**UNMET NEEDS**

**IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)**

Housing, food, water and generators for people on campus.

**MID-TERM (30-180 DAYS)**

Poor/No communication with outside agencies, lack of supplies and vehicles.

**LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)**

Lack of supplies, computers.
UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS
Unmet Needs
**Demographic Information**

**Campus Demographics**

- Students: 13,500
- Faculty: 725
- Staff: 4,016

**Campus Public Safety Department Demographics**

- Officers: 30 Sworn, 5 Non-sworn
- Other Staff: 15

**Chronology of Priorities**

**72 Hours**

- Placed essential Departmental employees on official standby.
- Determined employee scheduling based on available information.
- Coordinated with Administration on shelter buildings for employees/students/families.
- Reviewed/inventoried essential items (water, food, batteries, number and condition of departmental vehicles available, gear, cots, gasoline, generators).

**48 Hours**

- Continued/reviewed as needed of above.
- Assisted Mobile County Sheriff’s Dept. with setup of their command post on campus per prior agreement.
- Preparing dispatch operations to move from present location (building is glass and not storm approved) to operations center in Administration Building.
- Encouraged staff to complete necessary personal/family preparations.

**24 Hours**

- Continued above preparations as needed.
- Moved dispatch operations
- Continued to refine emergency schedule based on perceived needs and changing information.
12 HOURS

- Implemented emergency scheduling and assigned officers to man designated shelters on campus and branch campuses.
- Assisted campus housing with relocating remaining dorm students to shelters as required.

DURING EVENT

- Patrolled properties as much as possible, answering student and staff concerns.
- Responded to numerous fire and burglar alarms until no longer safe.
- Manned designated shelters on campus.
- Kept maintenance and administration officials aware of known damage as needed.

RECOVERY PRIORITIES

- Ensured no human casualties.
- Assessed damage to property.
- Assisted with reopening of roadways.
- Restricted routine patrols and worked to secure supply of gasoline for patrol cars because campus fuel tanks were depleted after excessive pre-storm refueling of other non-essential university vehicles.

PLANS

An Emergency Operation Plan based on a formal threat and risk assessment did exist prior to the event.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION

The university did have a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis. EMA coordination was handled by our Director of Environmental Safety. Other Public Safety was coordinated by two corporals assigned to the federal task force.

The Administration Bldg. was used to house the dispatch operations only, and it had a generator. However, the rest of departmental staff operated out of the department’s administrative offices located in a faculty office building without a generator. Therefore, once power failed, they were in the dark and running in a limited capacity on a portable generator and extension cords. The cost of a generator to run the whole location is estimated to be about $25,000. A search for funds is underway.

Facilities and Maintenance/Construction director did the damage assessment.
EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS

EQUIPMENT

Cots, sleeping areas, batteries, and generators were in short supply.

OTHER OPERATIONAL ISSUES

- Lack of gasoline for public safety vehicles because of an inadequate supply and/or lack of management of existing supplies.
- Some personnel did not come in when called.

COMMUNICATIONS

For the most part, communication was good both on campus and with external agencies.

Communication with students, faculty, and staff was a little laborious because no single method of communication was very effective.

PIO was used to communicate with the media, and all available methods of disseminating information was used.

STAFF AND CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT (CISM)

Families, by university policy, are allowed to shelter on campus. When they chose that option, campus administrators attempted to locate them in an area that was most convenient to the officers assigned location. Also, administrators gave them as much time as possible to address their personal needs before they reported for duty and allowed them to stay in as much contact as they needed with their families to reduce their own anxiety.

RECALL AND STAFFING

Staff recall was initiated by phone and followed up with regular e-mails and phone calls.

If the campus had taken a direct hit, response efforts would very possibly have been overwhelmed or left shorthanded because people that were not physically on the campus may have been unable to come in.
LESSONS LEARNED

WHAT WENT WRONG?

Lack of adequate food supplies/preparation, proper bedding conditions for extended stay, and fuel.

Approximately 200 students relocated from other schools; they were not integrated well into the student community, resulting in high crime rates, as well as increased domestic violence and larceny rates.

WHAT WENT RIGHT?

No one was injured, and the campus was able to reopen in two days, although it was subsequently closed and the department was able to fulfill its mission.

UNMET NEEDS

IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)

Housing shortage.
DEMGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CAMPUS DEMOGRAPHICS

- Students: 16,000+
- Faculty: 700
- Staff: 1,600

CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- Officers: 25
- Other Staff: 17
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn

CHRONOLOGY OF PRIORITIES

72 HOURS

- Meet with the President and his Cabinet along with the Direction and Control Team to give a real-time update of current track of storm and probabilities.
- Review and assess the readiness status of the university in accordance with Emergency Response Manual.
- Discuss most recent information available in regards to mandatory and volunteer evacuation orders. Determine the impact on transportation routes and designated shelter capabilities in the event the university makes decision to close and encourage students to seek safer distance from potential impacted area.
- Begin release of information from PR in regards to status of the university, numbers to call for information, etc.
- Meet with the Emergency Administration Team, and determine their location and contact information.
- Begin correspondence with outside agencies that maybe called upon for assistance
48 HOURS

- Begin meeting with local EOC officials, President and Cabinet, and Direction and Control Team as needed for continuous updates and projections on storm, evacuation notices, and readiness of the university.
- Monitor on-campus housing for current occupancy and discuss with Direction and Control Team.
- Follow up on all responsibilities and compliance to Emergency Response Manual.
- Start identifying spaces/facilities available for housing of outside emergency responders if requested.
- Prepare Declaration of State of Emergency for President’s signature if needed.

24 HOURS

- Final meeting with President and Cabinet and the Emergency Administration Team.
- Decision on closing university is made and distribute to available media outlets and campus resources.
- State of Emergency is declared. Students are asked to evacuate, but the request is not mandatory.
- Final review of Emergency Response Manual and preparations with Direction and Control Team.

12 HOURS

- Discontinue voluntary evacuations.
- Conduct final head-count on remaining residences and halls that are occupied.
- Finalize and identify other critical personnel who will remain on campus and other key locations and distribute to the Direction and Control Team.
- Lock down all buildings and facilities.
- Make ready three days of supplies for Residence Halls and staff personnel to remain on duty.

DURING EVENT

- Continue answering calls for service until conditions become such that first responders are in harm’s way.
- Ensure personnel go to pre-assigned locations and stand down until conditions allow for continuing of response to calls for service.
RECOVERY PRIORITIES

- Ascertain status of all persons who remained on campus during the event and any need for assistance, and render needed aid.
- Identify utility issues such as gas leaks and down power lines, blocked or impeded travel-ways or entrances and exits to buildings.
- Review status of EOC for campus, including functionality and communication status, and address as needed.
- Start needs assessment, and begin damage assessment of facilities.

PLANS

The university did have an Emergency Operation Plan prior to the event; this plan was not based on a formal threat and risk assessment.

The plan is designed to address both natural disasters and issues that have been known to occur in an academic environment, and it has also been updated to give guidance in certain WMD scenarios. There have been no formal exercises or table-tops, but the plan is reviewed yearly and changes made as needs are identified. Portions of the plan are exercised several times a year in many ways because there are actual occurrences that put the plan into action. The plan for preparation and action in the event of a Hurricane is used at least once yearly because of the university's proximity to storms and the number of threats during a season.

Previous reviews and implementations of the plan have assisted administrators and responders in understanding their respective roles; also, it usually falls within the responsibility of the Emergency Coordinator to review with the command staff in order to remind them of their area of responsibility.

Most of the training in reference to these types of incidents are addressed to those who are responsible for the management and implementation of the plan. Specific areas are addressed at times with personnel other than management in regards to HAZMAT, 1st Responder Training, WMD, etc.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION

The university did have a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis. There are actually two levels. The Emergency Administration Team consists of all Administrators and is designed for specific direction and to provide for needs during these times. The other level is called the Direction and Control Team. These are the actual Directors, Managers and employees of the various divisions that remain on campus and manage the day-to-day operations during the time of a declared emergency and through the recovery period.
The Emergency Coordinator (who is identified as the Director of the University Police Department) was responsible for coordination with the local Emergency Management Office and other public safety agencies. The university is a member of the local Emergency Management Committee and sits on the Board of Directors. The university also has personnel assigned to the local EOC pre-event, during, and post-event.

The ICS was used and functioned well. However, because of the magnitude of the storm and the damage done, there were times that it was pushed to the limit as a result of a lack in some communication abilities.

An Incident Action Plan was developed for the incident. The Police Department policy and procedure dictate that a Pre-action Plan be done as well as a Post-action plan after the emergency declaration is lifted.

The university did have a location for an Emergency Operations Center, as well as a fully-equipped backup site if needed.

Although the university did have Mutual Aid Agreements, it did not have to call on any of them.

The initial damage assessment was done by pre-determined teams designated through the Emergency Response Manual. Later, assistance came from the state in the form of inspectors from the Bureau of Buildings and insurance adjusters.

**Equipment and Logistics**

**Equipment**

No problems encountered.

**Logistics**

- There were problems in regards to the Residence Halls. Because there was no mandated evacuation, there were approximately 1,500 staff and students on campus during and post event. Because all of the Halls were occupied to some extent, it became apparent that certain health related and hygiene issues would arise because of an extended power outage and no water.
- Extended use of backup generators caused rapid failure of some of the units, making emergency lighting at night a serious issue.

**Other Personnel Issues**

Accommodating the needs of emergency personnel assigned to work who had their own concerns for family and property.
COMMUNICATIONS

The entire university is on the same communications system, which is managed by the police department, and approximately 200 radios are assigned to the various departments. Communications functioned excellently.

All emergency operations services in the local area, including fire, police, sheriff, EOC, VFD, HAZMAT, medical, and others, are on the same communications system managed by the local EOC.

Communication with students and parents, faculty, and staff was sufficient, but areas of concern were identified post storm in regards to updates.

The PR department is a part of the Emergency Administration Team and Direction and Control Team and handled communication with the media.

The public safety communications system remained operational during and post-event and was, at times, the only communication available.

The radio system had backup systems that, at times, had to be put into effect, but the system never failed entirely. The university phone switch generator was not operational post event, and battery backup eventually failed.

STAFF AND CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT (CISM)

Scheduling was done in accordance with normal schedules with the only change being shifts were 12 hours and overlapping for additional manpower during critical need times. Families were allowed to stay at the police department for the event if they needed. Personnel who could not get home after shift were given quarters, and contact was made to families utilizing other law enforcement agencies or first responders in the area. If families wanted to stay with employees, arrangements were made to facilitate transportation at the earliest available time.

The University Counseling Center was available if needed.

RECALL AND STAFFING

Staffing needs were worked out pre-event. Staff who were scheduled to work but did not show up would communicate through department radio if delayed. Some staff were given rooms to stay in along with their families pre-event and post-event.

No staffing issues were identified because of any storm-related issue. All staffing needs were met or surpassed.
WHAT WENT WRONG?

- Preparations and supplies for three days were insufficient for a storm of this magnitude and its resulting infrastructure destruction.
- Post-event recovery was delayed at times because of decisions that were made or not made in regards to relief agencies assigned to recovery.
- No clear line of communications to any decision makers and no one willing to make a decision when one was needed at the State or Federal level.
- Communications to inform of status of recovery, anticipated opening, general information sharing with staff and faculty not assigned to recovery was insufficient.
- Sheer strain on availability of resources was overwhelming at times.
- The number of refugees and evacuees who came to the area pre- and post-event was overwhelming and a management nightmare.
- Extended outages of water and power made for difficult times on campus.
- Extended use of backup generators for buildings caused many failures. Most generators were not designed for extended use.
- No plan in place to allow for request of personnel help from other state institutions, in regards to recovery efforts.

WHAT WENT RIGHT?

Overall the Emergency Response Plan worked well except for the sometimes unforeseen issues. Having the entire university on common radio system compatible to the local area was a real plus and kept communications possible throughout campus and local area during the entire recovery.
UNMET NEEDS

IMMEDIATE (FIRST 30 DAYS)

- IHL support post event and during recovery was non-existent.
- Fuel and related supplies post-event.
- Poor communications between those affected and MEMA/FEMA personnel. Very poor follow up on their behalf in regards to request that were made to them.
- A positive plan in place for request of supplies such as generators and fuel. When external agencies were provided with requests that they had solicited, they did not deliver the supplies that were promised.
- An adequate fuel plan. Nearly a full week passed before a fuel plan was put into place and that was after many failed attempts at various other alternatives.
- Contact with decision-makers at the State or Federal level for verification of information. Chain of command was very poorly organized.

MID-TERM (30-180 DAYS)

Continuing issues with MEMA/FEMA. This period of time involved what could be recovered in regards to expenses. Constant turnover of personnel at that level. Representatives handling requests were replaced frequently with other individuals, who basically had little or no knowledge of previous discussions.

LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)

- Unresolved issues with FEMA in regards to recoverable cost such as equipment purchased for preparation pre-storm and post-storm. No monies received in regards to over-time spent and equipment needs. The university has been told to send rough numbers as request for the known monies available for future law enforcement needs, but it has not received official notification of how to request monies. This shortfall is causing some budget issues.
- Very difficult to get qualified contractors for needed repairs in a timely manner.
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CAMPUS DEMOGRAPHICS

- Students: 4,000
- Faculty: 250
- Staff: 300

CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- Officers: 20
- Other Staff: 8
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn and commissioned with arrest powers

CHRONOLOGY OF PRIORITIES

72 HOURS
Attempt to evacuate students.

48 HOURS
Continue attempts to evacuate students and prepare campus for the approaching storm.

24 HOURS
Secure all campus buildings, property and residents.

12 HOURS
Monitor storm path.

DURING EVENT
Ensure safety of all remaining students and residents.

RECOVERY PRIORITIES
Food, water, protecting the campus from desperate citizens.
PLANS

There was no existing Emergency Operation Plan.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION

The university did have a predetermined chain-of-command for management of the crisis, and the Senior Vice President was responsible for coordination with the outside Emergency Management Office and other public safety agencies.

Management of operations on campus did not involve extensive contact with the local Emergency Management Office.

The existing command structure on campus worked together to establish priorities; they did not use a formal ICS structure and did not develop a formal Incident Action Plan.

Coordination for recovery efforts was difficult; administrators stayed on campus. It would have been more efficient if they had left before the storm and set up recovery efforts elsewhere.

The Senior Vice President did the damage assessment.

EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS

EQUIPMENT

Vehicles and other equipment were inoperable because of flood waters. Campus personnel were able to procure a boat, but it did not have a functional engine.

LOGISTICS

There was extreme difficulty in traveling across campus to deliver food, water, medicine, etc. The students taking shelter in campus buildings were scattered at several locations, and it took six hours to deliver food to them by boat (pushed by swimming). These deliveries were made twice per day.

SITE SAFETY AND SECURITY

Desperate citizens attempted to steal items and storm the campus.

OTHER OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Lack of communication capability internally and externally.
COMMUNICATIONS

Communication with campus police/public safety and other departments at the university was good.

Contact with students, faculty, and staff was also maintained. Contact with parents was poor.

Communication with external agencies was maintained, but it has to be in person because the radio systems are not compatible.

Contact with the media was maintained through a Public Information Office.

The primary communication problems were the lack of compatibility among local radio system, and the lack of a backup system in place.

STAFF AND CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT (CISM)

Many staff members brought family to the campus. Others had no contact with family until 5 days later.

RECALL AND STAFFING

Staff recall was initiated via telephone and e-mail.

We are now working 12-hour shifts; not enough manpower to staff 8-hour shifts.

LESSONS LEARNED

WHAT WENT WRONG?

A lack of a plan that anticipated the worst.

WHAT WENT RIGHT?

The entire university community worked together.
MID-TERM (30-180 DAYS)

Vehicles for XUPD.

LONG-TERM (180 DAYS AND BEYOND)

New officers need training; with the New Orleans Harbor Police Academy no longer functioning, there is currently no place to send them.
On October 10, 2005, the Georgia Tech Police Department (GTPD) received a telephone call stating that a facilities worker had been injured by an explosion in the Glenn courtyard, an area located on east campus and surrounded by several residence halls. When officers arrived, they spoke with the facilities worker, who stated that he picked up a small clear plastic bottle with a pair of metal tongs and the bottle exploded. The explosion broke the metal tongs. The facilities worker refused medical treatment, but complained of ringing in the ears.

Officers secured the area, notified a GTPD K-9 unit and established an incident command post near the incident site. The facilities worker showed the responding officers a "Pringles" potato chip can with duct tape around the ends of the can, which was lying next to an open black trash bag containing three more possible devices. Two of the residence halls were evacuated and a perimeter was set up. The Atlanta Police Department (APD) and Atlanta Fire Department (AFD) were notified and, upon arrival, they called for their specialized units. Explosive Ordinance Disposal personnel used a robot to render all suspected devices safe.

Immediately afterward, both GTPD and APD responded to questions from the media and a joint investigation began. Within hours, it was determined that the explosive device was a water bottle bomb that had been thrown in the courtyard from a window in Glenn residence hall. Theodore Hollot, a freshman student turned himself in to the Georgia Tech Police. Following interviews with Mr. Hollot, he was charged with one count of Possession, Manufacture of a Destructive Device and one count of Reckless Conduct.

**DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

**CAMPUS DEMOGRAPHICS**

- Students: 17,500
- Faculty: 950
- Staff: 5,500

**CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT DEMOGRAPHICS**

- Officers: 68
- Other Staff: 40
- Sworn/Non-sworn: Sworn
CHRONOLOGY OF PRIORITIES

DURING EVENT

- Render medical assistance,
- Ensure public safety of students,
- Search and secure crime scene,
- Activate K-9 units,
- Identify device and call appropriate agency assistance,
- Set up perimeter,
- Maintain crowd control and traffic control, and
- Render the area safe.

RECOVERY PRIORITIES

- Collect evidence.

PLANS

The school does have an Emergency Operation Plan based on a formal threat assessment. The plan was exercised during the NCAA Final Four and Championship Game in April 2004.

The staff has received other emergency training that proved applicable during the incident: IACLEA - WMD, Incident Command, Hazmat, In-service training.

COMMAND AND COORDINATION

ICS was used at this incident. Police responded to the incident, assisted an injured worker, secured the area, notified Atlanta Fire who called for the bomb unit, notified and campus units who acted as support: Housing; Institute Communications and Public Affairs (ICPA), which acts as the spokesperson for the Institute; Facilities; and buildings surrounding the affected area.

The EOC was set up at the site with the other agencies involved.

COMMUNICATIONS

ICPA needed more personnel on the scene and in the office assisting with the media and phone calls.
LESSONS LEARNED

WHAT WENT WRONG?

After the incident, the university received a lot of calls, letters and e-mails stating that the student should not have been charged with a crime because it was a prank and students make these type of bottle bombs all the time.

ICPA needed more staff at the scene and in their office to handle the media and phone calls.

WHAT WENT RIGHT?

Protocols and procedures that the GTPD had in place worked extremely well for this particular incident.

All media goes through ICPA and they work with each media outlet to provide all critical information.
EVENT SUMMARY

On October 1, 2005, an OU student set off a homemade bomb only 200 yards from the OU vs. Kansas State University football game taking place in Oklahoma Memorial Stadium.

Subsequent investigation did not determine whether the bomb exploded prematurely, or, if so, what the bomber’s target may have been. There is no indication he attempted or intended to enter the football stadium, and the route from his home to the explosion site took him past numerous high-population sites.

Though this “suicide bombing” caused no casualties other than the bomber himself, it illustrates the difficulties of tracking potential threats to the campus population, the difficulties in developing security plans to cover major events, and the challenges of integrating campus public safety response with the numerous other agencies that may be involved during an incident.

PRE-GAME SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The football stadium received a number of security upgrades in 2005, including:

- Stadium camera system.
- Over 120 cameras planned for installation prior to first home football game.
- As of 10-01-2005 (3rd home game) 81 cameras in place and recording.
- Vehicle Barricades.
- Three ordered and delivered prior to the first home football game on 9-03-2005.
- A fourth barricade delivered later during the season.

Additionally, on game day there were 64 armed officers on duty around the stadium:

- 21 OUPD – Norman,
- 5 OU Health Sciences Center (OU “HSC” PD - OKC),
- 13 Cleveland County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO),
- 11 Garvin County Sheriff’s Office (GVSO),
- 5 McClain County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), and
- 2 Norman Public Schools Police (NPS).

There were also 10 Unarmed OUPD Community Services Officers.
At the time of the explosion, there were a number of additional considerations for the response efforts.

- Approximately eight (8) minutes game time were remaining in the second quarter (about 20 twenty minutes real time).
- At halftime at least five thousand (5,000) spectators would normally exit the stadium on the west side.
- Approximately 10,000 spectators would normally exit the stadium on the east side.
- The west side of the stadium was two hundred (200) yards from the blast site.
- There was a direct line of sight from the stadium to the blast danger area.
- The crime scene/blast area was not cleared prior to half time.

Prior to halftime the west side stadium gates were ordered closed by the OU Athletic Department, at our request. The Athletic Department also suspended halftime passouts for this game.

Managing the Response

A quick response was possible because the bomb squad, police chief, FBI personnel, and medical personnel were all immediately on hand. The PIO was nearby and on the scene within five minutes.

However, the bombing response still caused a heavy strain on available manpower. Public safety and police personnel had to perform a variety of tasks:

- crime scene perimeter,
- OU football game (maintain calm with football fans – police/medical calls at the game),
- police calls (OU and City of Norman),
- fire and medical calls (OU and City of Norman),
- rendering crime scene safe (HDU),
- crime scene investigation,
- witness interviews,
- identifying the deceased, and
- identifying other possible explosives storage and/or preparation areas (deceased’s residence, vehicle, workshop – others involved).

Multiple command posts were set up, which proved problematic; the football game command post had to be moved to accommodate the bombing incident. Also, the command post had
to house multiple agencies -- the DHS, FBI, ATF, U.S. Attorney, District Attorney, City of Norman, county sheriff, and highway patrol were all represented.

The Norman and OU Police Departments stripped their patrol shifts to bare minimum staffing for the crime scene perimeter and crowd control.

Most OUPD officers working the OU Football game were assigned duties on the crime scene perimeter – leaving only a few OU officers with a number of outside agency officers on the game detail. At the end of the football game, all available football detail officers were assigned to the crime scene and the patrol officers were released to patrol.

Secondary investigation needs began to arise.

**POST EVENT REVIEW**

**PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED**

- Incident Command Post moved three times.
- No additional units available for patrol or the bombing incident.
- Local on-duty manpower completely exhausted on perimeters and game detail.
- Identify Command Agency and Incident Commander (Federal vs. Local).
- Federal Search Warrant for the bomber’s apartment took approximately twenty (20) hours.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

- Separate Public Safety from Non-Public Safety Functions in the Command Post.
- Establish a liaison at the federal level – to ensure information / intelligence flows both ways “up and down”.
- Follow Incident Command Protocols.
- Issue formal announcement when Incident Commander changes and/or Command Agency changes.
- Pre-plan incident communications.
- Communicate and train on the plan.
- Do not rely on cell phones for communications (84,500 football fans – most had a cell phone).
- Issue Public Safety Announcements for all controlled detonations.
HURRICANE RITA: LESSONS LEARNED

WRITTEN BY DONALD D. DIXON, CHIEF OF POLICE, LAKE CHARLES, LOUISIANA

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Just a few days before the 2005 annual IACP conference opened in Miami Beach, Hurricane Rita skirted the Florida Keys as it strengthened from a category 1 to category 2 storm. Law enforcement and other emergency responders in southwest Louisiana watched the progress of the storm warily as forecasts indicated landfall along the central Texas coast over the next weekend. That track meant that Lake Charles, Louisiana, would likely receive a few showers from rain bands but had little chance of severe weather.

Nonetheless, for the Lake Charles Police Department, experience and policy dictate that emergency preparations begin any time a named storm enters the Gulf of Mexico. There was added urgency in this case as Lake Charles was now temporarily home to several thousand New Orleans evacuees displaced by Hurricane Katrina a few weeks earlier. Many were staying in homes with family or friends, but as many as 3,000 were in public shelters, and most would require transportation assistance should an evacuation order be issued.

The early forecasts were wrong. The storm instead plowed into southwest Louisiana near the Texas border with 120-mile-per-hour winds and a storm surge estimated at up to 16 feet. Coastal communities in rural Cameron Parish were washed away by the winds and the wall of water.

Lake Charles, 45 miles north of the coast, was hit hard. Rita’s winds and water did extensive damage. The city of 75,000 is located on I-10 midway between Houston and New Orleans. Home to several petrochemical facilities, the nation’s 12th largest deepwater port, five casino riverboats, and some of the nation’s best hunting and fishing opportunities, the area from Lake Charles to the Gulf is mostly marshland, with the highest point being a ridge that stands 10 feet above sea level.

Downed trees and utility poles blocked nearly every thoroughfare in the city, and destroyed as many as 500 homes. It is estimated that 90-95 percent of the structures in the city were damaged to some degree. The area’s electrical grid was destroyed, leaving the city completely dark for seven days, although determined efforts by power crews had service restored to 95 percent of the city some 18 days later.

Providing police service in a dark, mostly deserted city was a tactical, physical, and emotional challenge for the men and women of the Lake Charles Police Department. Many officers had significant damage to their homes, and they were unable to attend to the repairs. All officers worked long hours to protect homes and businesses and to ensure the safety of the few who did not heed the order to evacuate. Familiar landmarks were gone or damaged, and trees, poles, and other storm debris blocked darkened streets and made navigation hazardous.

The fact that the devastation in southwest Louisiana quickly faded from the national news spotlight is a testament to the efficiency and professionalism of these men and women.

*Preparing for the Storm*

After passing Florida, Hurricane Rita entered the Gulf of Mexico and intensified rapidly to category 5 intensity, maintaining that status until just 36 hours before landfall. The central pressure of the storm was the third lowest ever recorded, placing Rita in the record books.
behind only Hurricane Gilbert, which hit Cozumel, Mexico, in 1988 and the 1935 Labor Day hurricane in the Florida Keys.

Coming less than a month after Hurricane Katrina had devastated southeast Louisiana and the Mississippi coast, Rita also marked the first time since records have been kept that two hurricanes had reached category 5 strength in the Gulf of Mexico in the same season.

On Monday, September 19, 2005, as the storm passed near Florida and continued its track into the Gulf of Mexico, final review and revisions were completed on the Lake Charles Police Department (LCPD) Emergency Operations Plan, which would be initiated should the projected path of the storm change. This plan is reviewed annually and had been practiced during tabletop exercises and during a near miss by another hurricane three years earlier.

As called for in the department’s emergency procedures, a personnel deployment plan was published and distributed to all members detailing assignments to traffic control points, patrol operations, investigative details, site security, and other duties before and after the storm. Personnel were assigned to one of the two platoons that would work 12-hour shifts beginning Thursday, September 22, if needed. Each platoon consisted of approximately 65 sworn personnel. One platoon was assigned to ride out the storm in six shelter locations in the city, providing proactive patrol to prevent looting and assist with evacuation issues as long as possible before the storm hit, and rapid response for rescue and recovery as soon as conditions permitted after the hurricane. The second platoon would shelter approximately 40 miles northeast of the city to provide relief after the storm passed.

Lake Charles Mayor Randy Roach and other leaders made a crucial decision on Tuesday, one that would ultimately prove to be a lifesaver. Given the large number of evacuees already in the area, the city’s leaders decided schools would close Wednesday to allow school buses to join city and contract bus services to begin moving those evacuees north. Moving those who had no independent means of transportation had been done in previous storms, but not with the numbers of people anticipated in this evacuation.

As the storm’s projected path changed, the evacuation recommendation became a mandatory order. Owing in part to the loss of life and devastation of Hurricane Katrina on the other side of the state just a few weeks earlier, the evacuation order was heeded by the vast majority of Lake Charles residents. This undoubtedly saved many lives, but it made it more difficult for police to protect homes and businesses from looting.

As Rita began to take direct aim at southwest Louisiana on Thursday, Calcasieu Parish Sheriff Tony Mancuso and I placed calls to federal, state, and local law enforcement contacts asking that personnel and equipment be made available should it be needed after the storm passed.

Police officers were advised to prepare their homes and report for duty with the necessities to stay at work for several days. Civilian employees were released to evacuate. Patrol units were stocked with meals ready to eat, often known as MREs, and water.

In the early morning hours of Saturday, September 24, 2005, Hurricane Rita slammed into southwestern Louisiana. The magnitude of the storm had forced a halt to normal operations at 5:30 the previous evening, when sustained winds exceeded 40 miles per hour. The city of Lake Charles would be buffeted by 100-plus-mile-per-hour winds for more than six hours, with gale-force winds still being experienced in the afternoon hours Saturday.
When conditions improved enough to allow the first damage assessments after daylight Saturday morning, the scope of the disaster became clear. It was evident that the resources that had been contacted and placed on standby before landfall would be needed to help secure the peace in the devastated city and throughout the parish.

The department had anticipated at least a 72-hour wait before help arrived, and in general, that proved true. Also expected was the need for food, water, and ice for officers during those first few days. But there were also surprises, as there always are. For example, planners had never considered the ability of roofing nails and other small debris in the roadway to stop a fleet of police vehicles. The incredible flexibility of the officers of the LCPCD was shown over and over, as in this instance, where a lieutenant stepped forward and continuously plugged tires for several days until a local business was able to volunteer their tire repairman to take over.

Support from residents and the business community was essential to the successful accomplishment of the police mission. That support included providing food for officers and fuel for vehicles, staying out of town, or voluntarily complying with the curfew. Most of those who evacuated understood that essential services such as medical care, business services, electricity, water, and sewer were unavailable, and they therefore stayed wherever they were sheltered.

**Unified Command**

As directed by the department’s emergency operations plan, law enforcement in the entire parish operated under a unified command system. Operationally, Sheriff Mancuso coordinated the daytime law enforcement functions in the parish, while the chief of the Lake Charles Police Department oversaw night actions. Five other municipal police departments participated, along with McNeese State University Police. Several federal agencies and the Louisiana State Police were also present at daily planning sessions and briefings.

Primary concerns after the storm were for the safety of residents and the prevention of looting. The safety of residents proved to be a lesser concern, as few residents chose to weather the storm by staying in Lake Charles, and there were no fatalities recorded during the event.

As for the concern about looting, the law enforcement leadership understood and took seriously their responsibility to protect the homes and businesses of those residents who had evacuated the parish. Billy Loftin, the Lake Charles city attorney, drafted an ordinance that created an enforceable curfew of 7:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. for the entire parish. Hal McMillan, president of the Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, signed the ordinance into effect September 27, 2005.

This ordinance was an essential element of the law enforcement plan to protect the parish. Innumerable instances of looting were prevented because of this authority for officers to legally stop, question, cite, or detain those persons whose intent was to plunder vacant homes and businesses.

Another important component of the unified command plan was the appropriate placement of human assets. A significant portion of the available law enforcement staffing was dedicated to nighttime operations, supported by night-capable aircraft. As most of the parish was
HURRICANE RITA: LESSONS LEARNED

completely without power for several days, these aircraft supported foot patrol and vehicular-based operations in darkened neighborhoods.

Each morning, a storm recovery briefing was held at the Calcasieu Office of Emergency Preparedness. Participants included elected officials, power company representatives, public safety administrators, and others involved in the storm response.

Law enforcement operations were coordinated through a daily 9:00 a.m. briefing conducted at the Lake Charles Police Department. The meetings typically took 30 minutes to complete followed a rigid agenda:

1. Intelligence information
2. Events of the past 24 hours and expectations for the next 24 (known as 24/24)
3. Staffing needs
4. Issues by exception
5. Closing comments by the daytime and nighttime operation commanders

The first agenda item allowed discussion of any incoming intelligence known to the assembled chiefs and other law enforcement leaders. The second agenda item, the 24/24 section, required all agencies involved to identify locations of criminal activity during the preceding 24 hours to the LCPD crime analyst. This information was plotted on maps projected in the briefing room and updated daily.

The third agenda item, the deployment of personnel for the next 24-hour period, particularly night operations, was based on the hard data from the 24/24 report and on requests from the agencies represented at the briefing. By basing deployment of human assets on reported problems and anecdotal information from chiefs present, smaller communities and unincorporated areas of the parish were provided significant resources that would otherwise not have been available to respond to or prevent problems in those areas.

Issues by exception followed the staffing needs discussion, presenting an opportunity to discuss and resolve a number of concerns that faced law enforcement during the aftermath of the storm. Matters that came up during this section of the briefing included topics such as permission for those that had legitimate reasons to be on the streets after curfew, such as doctors and nurses providing emergency care and plant workers attempting to restart area industries. The solution was a numbered, brightly colored vehicle permit with review of requests and distribution managed by McNeese University police officers at their office on a cleared main traffic artery. For outlying areas, an application was developed that agencies could fax to McNeese and have the permit delivered to the requesting chief at the next morning’s briefing.

Other issues discussed and resolved during this section of the agenda included housing and registration with the FBI command post for outside agencies assisting local authorities; special security needs of pharmacies, banks, and gun stores; the development of a temporary work permit system for outside disaster-relief companies such as tree removal operations; and crowd control concerns at food stamp and Red Cross sites.
The briefings closed with a synopsis by the day and night operations commanders (sheriff and LCPD chief) of the events, needs, and plans of the group.

**Patrol Operations**

For the city of Lake Charles, the LCPD Uniformed Patrol Division continued to provide basic law enforcement service throughout the recovery period. Two shifts were on duty at all times, with officers from outside agencies augmenting the staffing available. Deployment information was maintained on electronic situation boards in the briefing room. One captain was assigned to oversee daytime operations and one captain worked nights. The two shifts on duty divided the city north and south with a lieutenant overseeing each area.

To allow officers as much patrol time in neighborhoods as possible, routine reporting requirements were lifted. A short-form offense report was created to be filled out by victims of most property crimes. Each report given to a victim was assigned a computer-assisted dispatch (CAD) call number. Police assigned a report number to the case when and if the report was actually turned into the police department. Normal reporting requirements continued in place for violent crimes.

**Night Operations**

It was determined early in the planning process that night operations would be critical to controlling looting and other criminal activity. The LCPD police chief assumed responsibility for nighttime law enforcement across the parish. In addition to providing higher staffing levels for routine patrol functions, specialized operations were undertaken in problem areas.

For the LCPD, nighttime operations consisted of three distinct components: regular patrol, with 31-50 officers assigned; a full squad of detectives, ranging from 13-16 personnel assigned specifically to looter patrol; and the search-and-rescue team’s (SRT) specialized assignment, which became known as NightOps and would eventually involve 60-80 officers each night.

Regular patrol operations at night involved two patrol shifts of approximately 20 officers each, supplemented later in the operation by 10 officers from the West Tennessee Strike Team. These officers were the primary responders to calls for service.

The LCPD Detective Division formed a looter patrol that worked from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. under the command of the detective lieutenant. This operation patrolled in their assigned unmarked units and the detectives were responsible for several looting arrests and a number of curfew violation arrests.

A few detectives were held in reserve for major crime investigations on both day and night shifts. These detectives also interviewed those arrested on looting charges in hopes of solving other crimes.

Although this was an effective use of available resources, the large number of open storm-damaged homes and businesses made it clear that additional steps would be needed to curb looting, particularly as more people returned to the city. As outside assets responded with self-sufficient teams pursuant to the chief’s request, additional trained SWAT officers became available to support routine patrol operations by undertaking specialized assignments to detect and deter potential criminal activity. To accomplish this mission, outside personnel
were divided into teams and assigned either an LCPD or CPSO officer as team leader. Typically 60-80 personnel were available to work this detail on a 12-hour shift from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. The teams were assigned specific geographic locations of responsibility based on the needs identified in the 9:00 a.m. briefing.

Team leaders were given their assignments at a meeting with the chief at the start of the shift. They had broad areas of responsibility but were also ordered to provide intense coverage at specific locations.

Some of the tactics more closely resembled military operations to search for enemy combatants than typical civilian law enforcement procedures, but the tactics were effective in locating looters and other lawbreakers. Most SRT engagements and training scenarios involve entering, clearing, and securing a single location, but officers involved in this operation were searching large areas in complete darkness. In addition to fixed-post observation and surveillance, SRT officers also used foot-and vehicle-based patrol tactics.

Air support was an important component of the looting prevention and detection work done. One officer was assigned to each aircraft flying that night to provide direction to ground units. The aircrafts were equipped with the FLIR imaging systems or other night vision equipment that was essential to detecting movement in the darkened city. On a typical night, one fixed-wing aircraft and two helicopters from outside agencies would patrol.

**Outside Agency Support**

A number of outside law enforcement agencies who responded to assist supported routine patrol operations and the specialized NightOps to prevent looting during the recovery period.

Personnel and equipment provided by other municipal police agencies and sheriff’s offices were critical to keeping the peace in Lake Charles after the storm. The LCPD chief requested and received assistance from several federal agencies including the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The assistance took the form of human assets and equipment.

In addition to the federal resources deployed to the Lake Charles area, a number of municipal police departments and sheriff’s agencies provided support. Those assigned to the Lake Charles Police Department were from the Alexandria, Louisiana, Police Department, the West Tennessee Strike Team, and a Louisiana National Guard military police company. Too many agencies answered the call to help throughout southwest Louisiana to list them all here, but we acknowledge their sacrifice and are grateful for their tireless work during our time of need.

Outside assets were arranged through personal contact by the chief, the sheriff, and others and through the Incident Command System. The Louisiana Sheriffs’ Association and the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office each made a staff member available for this function. The FBI, as provided for in the National Response Plan, provided registration and tracking for incoming agency personnel.

In all cases, outside agencies were asked to be as self-sustaining as possible. Two venues were used to house the Alexandria and Tennessee teams. Alexandria officers were housed on the parking lot of the LCPD in coaches provided by a local businessman. These officers were fed
in the chow line at the police department and showered at the nearby Lake Charles Fire Department station.

The Tennessee team was housed at the first responder base camp at McNeese State University. All necessary services were available at the camp, including large air-conditioned tents, meals, showers, and laundry service.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was already stretched thin by the demands placed on it in southeast Louisiana and along the Mississippi coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In Lake Charles, officials submitted lists of needs to the parish office of emergency preparedness on handwritten forms. If the parish office approved the requests, it sent them electronically to the state emergency management office which reviewed them there and either approved or rejected them. This system worked most of the time, but officials in Lake Charles had to find creative ways to obtain some needed commodities.

**Attending to the Officers’ Needs**

Hurricane Rita damaged or destroyed the homes of many officers working long hours to provide for the safety and security of the city. One of the most important steps taken during this emergency was the assignment of a small number of employees with building and home repair skills to a crew that provided basic repair services for the department’s employees. This team repaired or secured 72 officers’ homes within days of the storm, and that action was essential to the well-being of the officers who were being asked to sacrifice so much. One officer who was barely able to perform his duties was amazingly transformed back to his normal productivity when this crew was able to remove a tree that was across the roof of his house.

Police administrators and supervisors should be keenly alert for any changes in the health—both physical and mental—of employees during a devastating emergency situation. Contact was made early with mental health counselors should their services be needed by our staff. We ensured that all officers were up-to-date with tetanus vaccinations and made the shots available through public health. Thankfully, the department experienced only seven minor injuries to officers. More serious injuries would have presented significant problems, as the lack of water and sewer services had forced all hospitals to close.

Feeding the officers and those who came to assist was a significant operation. A few police employees and several community volunteers were able to accomplish this task admirably. During the early days of the storm, many citizens provided food for law enforcement. Businesses and schools also made available the stock that was in their freezers, which would soon be ruined if not used. Food was stored at the police department in donated refrigerated trailers.

Acquisition of other commodities was in some cases more difficult. Law enforcement leaders should become familiar with the processes that will be used to obtain the basic needs to keep a police agency functioning during and after an emergency. MREs, water, ice, and fuel are essential to maintaining police service to the community. Now is the time to learn how emergency managers expect that system to work in your area.
**Basic Needs of Citizens**

The law enforcement mission during disaster recovery is greatly affected by the well-being of the citizens served. If the basic needs of victims are not being met, civil unrest and other issues will rapidly become police problems. Two weeks after the passing of the storm, community leaders identified a need to coordinate local and national services being provided to residents. The purpose was to ensure that basic needs, such as shelter and food, were available for storm victims and to assess the provision of other services, such as medical, mental health, and child care.

The City of Lake Charles and a local not-for-profit counseling agency developed the Human Services Response Initiative. This initiative brought together government agencies and nonprofit entities to identify gaps in available services and reduce duplication of services being provided. The group met twice a week for several weeks after appointing leaders in eight impact areas:

- Sustenance
- Shelter and housing
- Child and youth care
- Recreation
- Self-sufficiency
- Medical care
- Mental health
- Personal Safety

Through involvement with this initiative, the police leadership was better able to anticipate where police resources would be needed, such as food stamp distribution sites, and deal with a host of other issues, such as ensuring that mentally ill residents were able to access needed medication and counseling services.

Law enforcement issues that came before the group early on included expired temporary protective orders in domestic violence cases. Scheduled court hearings in several cases were missed because the courts remained closed. Working with women’s advocates and family practice attorneys, police found solutions for this issue. Because of the police department’s participation in this initiative, police call takers could tell citizens where food, shelter, and other services were available in the city.

**A Sharp Contrast**

Immediately after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, we sent officers to that area to assist. Katrina posed bigger challenges for the agencies involved, including the loss of life, much higher levels of flooding, and radio communication problems.

But we learned lessons in New Orleans that helped us deal with Hurricane Rita. In particular, we learned the importance of cohesiveness between and among government and public safety leaders. Speaking with one voice and following a practiced plan helps maintain community trust and respect for law enforcement.
It is our hope that what we learned in preparation for nighttime operations across the parish after Hurricane Rita will help you prepare your department for the unexpected.
RESOURCES AND RECOMMENDED READING
RESOURCES


IACLEA WMD Awareness Training Class. Register to attend or host a class on the IACLEA web site at www.iaclea.org. http://www.iaclea.org/visitors/WMDCPT/wmd/index.cfm

RECOMMENDED READING


National Incident Management System (NIMS).
RESOURCES AND RECOMMENDED READING

RECOMMENDED READING

FEMA Introductory Course on NIMS (IS-700): http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is700.asp.
NIMS Integration Center: http://www.nimsonline.com/.


