Mental Inversion, Modernist Aesthetics, and Disability Exceptionalism in Olive Moore’s *Spleen*

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This article argues that Olive Moore’s 1930 novel *Spleen* investigates the appropriative relationship between experimental modernism and disability. While the text takes up the disabled aesthetics of broken statues and incapacitated narratives, it also dramatizes how modernists articulate their own exceptional capacity, mobility, and able-bodiedness in ways that reinforce eugenic understandings of disability. Specifically, Moore demonstrates how feminist and emerging queer politics in the inter-war period borrowed disabled aesthetic tropes in order to recast understandings of sexuality and gender through exceptionalism, but did so by reifying disability and race as supposedly immutable categories. This reading of *Spleen*, via disability studies and a detour into suffragist art vandalism, insists that modernist studies must address the legacy of appropriating disabled modes of perception and expression.

**Keywords:** Olive Moore / *Spleen* / disability / modernism / feminism

**MISSING LIMBS**

A British cartoon postcard dated circa 1914 depicts a man and woman gazing at the iconic image of the armless *Venus de Milo*, under a caption that reads, “Now aint that a shame, I bet its them suffragettes done it!!” (Tickner 134). Referencing the outbreak of art vandalism by militant suffragists at the time, this image pokes fun at mainstream reactions to “defaced” artworks. Anti-suffragist commentators accused feminists of producing social perversion and deformity by transgressing traditionally ascribed femininity, and to them defacing art represented such degeneracy in visual terms. But because the *Venus de Milo* is appreciated not despite but in part because of its missing arms, the cartoon demonstrates the folly of assuming that aesthetic wholeness and feminine able-bodiedness are natural or desirable. In doing so, the image strikingly distills the relationship between disability, feminist politics, and aesthetics in the early twentieth century.
It points to the ways that both suffragist art vandalism and modernist aesthetics utilized bodily deformity and mental disjunction to dislocate received notions of gendered beauty and corporeal wholeness. Militant feminist activists and artists attempted to destroy taken-for-granted notions of ideal femininity and aesthetic realism by appropriating the time-inflicted disability of the Venus de Milo in their deformation of other Venuses—such as Velázquez’s painting the Rokeby Venus.¹

In this way, inter-war feminists crafted anti-patriarchal versions of social consciousness and embodiment by taking up the possibilities of disjointed—even disabled—aesthetics.

The neglected British modernist author Olive Moore intervenes into these dynamics between experimental aesthetics, feminism, and bodily fragmentation in her 1930 novel, Spleen. The novel’s protagonist Ruth takes up the disfigured aesthetics of statuary as an articulation of feminist reproductive agency, imagining herself repeatedly throughout the book as a “head without its statue” (103).² She embraces this symbol in specific opposition to the archetype of women as headless bodies: unintellectual, passive reproducers of children who are merely “the eternal oven in which to bake the eternal bun” (24). Referencing another damaged classical statue, the headless Winged Victory of Samothrace (which like the Venus de Milo is also armless though its wings are intact), Ruth inverts the figure of the headless woman and in its place claims a masculine symbol for disembodied intellectual and spiritual power—like the massive broken off head of a conqueror such as the Colossus of Constantine. Exemplifying both her mental and sexual inversion, Ruth remarks about becoming pregnant, “I think I carry my womb in my forehead” (24).

Here and throughout the novel, Ruth takes up the spiritual and imaginative powers of creation represented by the trope of male pregnancy—which Michael Davidson argues is also a figure for disability. As Davidson states, fictional narratives of male pregnancy are “disability narratives insofar as they defamiliarize the presumed normalcy of embodied life and display the nightmares of genetic futurity as the lived reality of disabled and dependent people” (“Pregnant Men” 208). Through male pregnancy, Ruth fights against the then-prevalent assumption that women were always already disabled by a reproductive function that made them therefore unfit for public life. But rather than reject her status as a woman whose rational ability is “crippled” by her maternity, she reverses these given symbols and appropriates the masculine, but still disabled, symbol of male pregnancy and disembodied intellect. In this sense, Ruth inverts gendered values through aesthetically and figuratively disabled tropes. Instead of denying her disabled status as a woman by claiming mental and bodily wholeness, she opts for the queerness of mental inversion by “cripping” able-bodied normativity. Ruth appropriates the disability of male pregnancy to challenge notions of ideal femininity and able-bodiedness in ways that parallel how suffragist art vandalism slashed aesthetic ideals of feminine wholeness.

But Moore’s text makes it apparent that although Spleen appropriates disability aesthetics and metaphors in ways that undercut able-bodiedness, its plot
nevertheless participates in the exploitation of disability. The product of Ruth’s inverted pregnancy is her son Richard, who is born with unspecified mental and physical disabilities. Through most of Spleen, Ruth recoils from and avoids her son, blaming her own transgressions for his mental and physical “deformities.” First she flees England in shame, leaving her husband and taking her baby to the remote Italian island of Foria, where she raises him for the next twenty years. At the end of this time, she finds her own liberation by denying her responsibility for her son and ultimately rejecting him as “unproductive” because of his disabilities.

While on a return trip to England after the death of her husband, Stephen, she uses his ancestral estate to create a home for disadvantaged — but explicitly not disabled — children. This ending points to how, despite her use of disability aesthetics, Ruth’s politics (and those of inter-war suffrage and feminism in general) increase women’s capacity, mobility, and able-bodiedness in ways that problematically reify disability as a biologically fixed category of human deficiency. Richard’s disabilities do not “stick” to Ruth, and therefore she is able to employ them to secure her own autonomy from biological determinism based on her exceptional capacity, which is figured against his unexceptional unproductiveness. In other words, and as I hope to show, in the text Ruth’s feminist mobility is defined against Richard’s immobility, her reproductive agency against his sterility, and her queer modernity against his arrested development.

Olive Moore’s reassessment of modernist uses of disability deserves more attention, and as a “lost” experimental modern novelist, her writing is ripe for rediscovery. Little is known of her, other than that she was casually involved in Bloomsbury literary circles, wrote four books between 1929 and 1932 (three novels and an experimental collection of essays and memoir), and disappeared from the record shortly afterwards. Newspapers and literary journals at the time reviewed her novels favorably, even while they categorized her themes as “perverse,” but her writings have slipped from memory just as she did from the public.3

Moore’s style alone — characterized by biting cynicism, blunt prose, and sexual dissidence — would seem to qualify her for attention from modernist and feminist critics. Renée Dickinson argues that Moore is a significant literary figure because she engages critically with earlier modernists and feminists like Virginia Woolf — and especially, I would add, in their treatment of disability. Like Dickinson I call for a reconsideration of Moore’s work and her place in feminist and modernist genealogies, since she is a key figure in the transitional period of the inter-war years who illuminates the “blind spots” within modernist feminism’s symbolic and formal politics of disability. Dickinson’s book Female Embodiment and Subjectivity in the Modernist Novel is the only published criticism centering on Moore’s works, with the exception of Jane Garrity’s recent article on Spleen.4

But neither the Dalkey Archive’s 1992 publication of Moore’s collected writings, their 1996 paperback edition of Spleen, nor Dickinson’s 2009 book of criticism has led to a wider readerly or scholarly discovery of Moore and her works. Perhaps Moore has been ignored precisely because literary scholars have not fully incorporated theorizations of disability into their analyses of modernism. Doing
so reveals her importance as a central figure who practices and theorizes modernist aesthetics, and also as a writer whose texts chronicle the shifts within disability biopolitics and legacies of embodiment in the early twentieth century. At the same time exceptional to and exemplary of modernism, *Spleen* critically stages the feminist exceptionalism inherent in early twentieth-century appropriations of disability aesthetics.

**DISABILITY METAPHORS AND AESTHETICS**

Disability theorists have recently taken up the relationship between disability as metaphor and as aesthetic practice that my reading of *Spleen* parses. Addressing metaphor, Robert McRuer argues that many identitarian models of liberation have used “disability as the raw material against which the imagined future world is formed” (*Crip Theory* 72). David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder identify a similar logic in literary modernism, wherein “minority commentators tend to situate disability as a social grouping from which they must escape to assert the positivity of their own culturally devalued identity” (*Narrative Prosthesis* 33). This is tied to what they theorize as “narrative prosthesis”—the hypersymbolic, metaphorical overinvestment in disability that attempts “to restore a disabled body to some semblance of an originary wholeness” (6). In so doing, this hyper-symbolism redeems certain devalued bodies while reinforcing the “false recognition . . . that disabilities extract one from a social norm of average bodies and their corresponding (social) expectations” (6). Moore’s protagonist Ruth plays into these logics of narrative prosthesis, as Garrity also points out; but I argue that she does so more specifically by asserting her own exceptional capacity. In order to secure her place above the “social norm of average bodies” she exceeds her assigned reproductive role as an “eternal oven.”

Indeed, although Ruth is portrayed as able-bodied, she is nonetheless disabled by her sex. As disability studies scholars including Lennard Davis have argued, in the early twentieth century, eugenicists took up a dominant paradigm that diminished “problematic peoples and their problematic behaviors”; and such peoples “were clearly delineated under the rubric of feeble-mindedness and degeneration as women, people of color, homosexuals, the working classes, and so on. All these were considered to be categories of disability” (*Bending Over* 14). While women of color, women who engaged in premarital sex, poor women, and other so-called undesirables were the primary targets of negative eugenic practices such as sterilization, “fit” women like Ruth were still treated as disabled through positive forms of eugenics that were directed toward productively controlling and channeling their reproductive lives in the interest of building stronger future generations. For example, Sharon Lamp argues that for women like Charlotte Perkins Gilman, “the social oppression of being trapped in the unwanted institution of marriage and motherhood” is what “caused her impairment.” The same is true for Ruth, whose queer mobility is curtailed by her entry into heterosexual eugenic motherhood. In *Spleen*, the “statue without a head” image embodies
the discourse of “sex disabilities” that characterize fit and unfit women alike as supposedly immobilized and incapacitated by their femininity and reproductive function — though clearly to vastly differing degrees and for different purposes. By inverting this symbol of intellectual incapacity and bodily productivity, Ruth conceptualizes herself as an exception to eugenics discourse that would categorize her womanhood as a disability.

In earlier feminist discourse, as Douglass Baynton argues, “Suffragists turned the rhetorical power of the disability argument to their own uses, charging that women were being erroneously and slanderously classed with disabled people who were legitimately denied suffrage” (564). Baynton traces this argument back to at least 1848 in the UK, when feminists sought to gain political representation through the abolition of “sex disabilities.” For example, The Women’s Disabilities Removal Bill, which was brought to Parliament by the Women’s Franchise League in 1889 and 1890, states, “no woman shall be subject to legal incapacity in voting . . . by reason of coverture” (qtd. in Holton 1130; emphasis added). This tactic of removing women from the categories of disability and incapacity is parallel to what Jasbir Puar calls “a recapacitation of a debilitated body” (“Getting Better” 152). Puar argues that “Those ‘folded’ into life are seen as more capacious or on the side of capacity, while those targeted for premature or slow death are figured as debility” (153).

By folding herself back into life, Ruth (like the suffragists before her) does not reject the biopolitical and eugenic systems from which she exceptionalizes herself. Rather, she reinforces the hierarchical stratification between disabled and able bodies by securing her own capacity against her son’s debility. Demonstrating this dynamic, Ruth categorizes her son as abjectly feminized. She describes Richard as having “fine thin nostrils and well-shaped mouth and the long silky eyelashes of an attractive woman” (108). These traditionally feminine characteristics that she rejects are what she uses to define him as “rootless, null, unproductive: therefore not a living being at all” (109). In this example, Ruth feminizes her son in order to dehumanize him—but she does so by assigning him the definition of femininity as “sex disabilities” that she herself leaves behind in her exceptional capacity and mobility.

Thus, on the level of plot, the novel makes use of disability as an immutable condition of inertia or decay against which Ruth defines her own progressive liberation. At the same time, however, and in keeping with other works of literary modernism, the novel deploys disability aesthetics as a mode of anti-normative critique. This latter trend has also been identified and discussed by a number of contemporary disability critics. Ato Quayson, for example, holds that the “social deformation” model of disability “is not undergirded exclusively by the binary opposition of normal/abnormal” in modernist texts because they also use disability structurally and stylistically (21). Against the symbolic model, Quayson argues that, “even when the disabled character appears to be represented programmatically, the restless dialectic of representation may unmoor her from the programmatic location and place her elsewhere as the dominant aesthetic protocols
governing the representation are short-circuited” (27). Michael Davidson and Tobin Siebers have articulated similar arguments about how disability aesthetics may actually challenge the seemingly reductive binarism of able-bodiedness/disability that characterize many modernist texts metaphorically and symbolically. Davidson, Siebers, and Quayson argue that modernist formal experimentation depends on disabled modes of perception and expression. As Siebers contends, “modern art relies with increasing frequency in its history on the semblance of disability to produce aesthetic effects” (46). Similarly, Quayson points out that literary texts that utilize “deformation” not only as a thematic element but also as formal practice undermine the distinction between disability and able-bodiedness (21). In these ways, modernist aesthetic practices seem to challenge the reading of disability as a metaphor for modernity’s disintegration and degeneracy.

These theorists provide a more complex view of disability’s hypersymbolic nature by arguing that the aesthetic practice of disability is fundamental to modernism’s experimental and oppositional politics. Alongside these disability studies approaches to aesthetics is the huge body of modernist criticism that theorizes the aesthetics of bodily and mental disfigurement in the wake of the First World War. Tim Armstrong, for example, argues that the war produced “a reconfigured modernism, shot through with contradictory forces: mourning, hysteria, paralysis and delirium; a dwelling on mutilation and abjection” (19). Ulrich Baer also argues that modernists attempted to formally capture the pervasive presence of trauma, madness, “shell shock,” and wounded bodies in the inter-war period by using disrupted and repetitive temporalities, narrative fragmentation, and other modes of formal disjunction. But Baer and Armstrong do not recognize that this kind of aesthetic trauma and fragmentation are dependent upon appropriations of various modes of physical and mental disability. By emphasizing this point, I aim to demonstrate that the kinds of disability aesthetics that Siebers and Quayson articulate have also been put in the service of exceptional, able-bodied capacity and regenerative notions of cure in ways that reify eugenic models of disability even while they might also undermine or short-circuit them. In Spleen, Ruth demonstrates this dynamic by taking up her son’s supposedly “arrested” and “debilitated” modes of perception, staging the ways that experimental modernists appropriate disability aesthetics in the interest of expanding their own visionary abilities.

Strikingly, Ruth’s appropriation of the Winged Victory of Samothrace brings the symbolic and the aesthetic together, exemplifying the tension between disability as reductive metaphor and disability as formal possibility. While Ruth takes up the aesthetic disfigurement represented by the statue’s missing head and arms, she also embodies the exceptional capacity represented by its wings. In one sense, she refuses the bodily wholeness represented by her lover’s suggestion that “her head . . . would sit well on the Victory of Samothrace” by twice insisting that she is instead “a head without a statue” (103). But in another sense, her embrace of disability aesthetics as a radical feminist rejection of able-bodied norms contradicts the fact that her liberation—or flight—at the end of the novel is predicated
on her own exceptional mobility, which she conceptualizes against the symbolic immobility of her son’s bodily disfigurement and cognitive incapacity.

Reading *Spleen* in this light produces a critical re-assessment of the relationships between modernist aesthetics, feminist politics, and disability in the early twentieth century. If modernist aesthetics are deeply rooted in appropriations of disabled modes of perception, and if feminist politics at the time are structured through logics of debility and capacity, then these relationships collapse the separation between disability aesthetics and disability symbolism.

**SLASHING THE ABLE BODY**

Before considering *Spleen* in more depth I would like to pause over another example of feminist art vandalism, which demonstrates the history of feminist uses of disability into which Moore’s novel intervenes. In 1914, militant suffragist Mary Richardson famously snuck a butcher’s knife into London’s National Gallery and used it to carve away at Diego Velasquez’s nude painting the *Rokeby Venus*. In a statement, the so-called “attacker” Richardson proclaimed that she had tried “to destroy the picture of the most beautiful woman in mythological history” in protest of the British government’s imprisonment of leading suffrage activist Emmeline Pankhurst (Tickner 134). As Lynda Nead points out, at the time journalists characterized Richardson’s act as if it were an assault on a human victim (38). *The Times* describes how she “mutilated” the painting, and “inflicted . . . six clean cuts” and “a ragged bruise” on the Venus herself (“National Gallery Outrage” 9–10). The article also reports that “the most serious blow has caused a cruel wound in the neck. . . . Further, there is a broad laceration starting near the left shoulder. . . . The other cuts are cleanly made in the region of the waist” (9). By describing the canvas as if it were a mutilated body, commentators accuse Richardson of defacing and debilitating a beautiful, unblemished, ideal woman.

Caroline Howlett also demonstrates that journalists constructed Richardson herself as “mentally deficient” and “irrational” (83). Richardson is cast as a dangerous mental invert, whose disability is evident in her effort to destroy an image of traditional feminine beauty, domesticity, and sexuality. Thus not only is the act framed as criminal vandalism, but the actor’s debilitation is framed in eugenic terms, insofar as she threatens ideal domestic femininity with her attack on bodily wholeness and female passivity. As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson argues, “the language of deficiency and abnormality is used simultaneously to devalue women who depart from the mandates of femininity by equating them with disabled bodies” (79); in this case, Richardson’s “maiming” of a female body is made to register as evidence of her own gendered unnaturalness and its connections to bodily disintegration and mental debility.

These responses to Richardson’s “attack” exemplify how modernity itself is founded upon and upheld through naturalized notions of bodily wholeness and mental capacity, which anchor categories of gender, sexuality, and race. As Snyder and Mitchell point out, this logic permits gender, sexuality, and race the flexibility
of being interpreted as socially inscribed “defects” that are falsely projected onto otherwise able bodies, while “leaving disability as the default category of ‘real’ human incapacity” (Cultural Locations 111). Emphasizing the social model of disability that is well established in disability studies, Snyder and Mitchell demonstrate that impairment is “a socially mediated category of human difference” no less than other identity categories (111). Yet social policing of differently abled bodies continues to take place through the falsely naturalized status of disability as a biological or social “defect” in contrast to other categories of embodiment.

In parallel ways, anti-suffragists used queerness to anchor deviant women to biological determinism and social degeneracy in the early twentieth century. Deborah Cohler traces how mainstream representations of suffragists depicted them as sapphists or as masculine women who rejected men completely in favor of sexual relations and attachments to other women. Portraying inversion as a disability was a widespread tactic to justify anti-suffragist fears about women turning the “natural order” of gender and sexuality upside down by insisting that “social inversion” and “sexual inversion” were not only the same, but were both evidence of social degeneration. But rather than yield to accusations of inversion and deformity or cleave to reformism, radical figures like Richardson expressed sexual perversion and bodily disfigurement in symbolic and aesthetic terms.

Because Richardson’s act and her statement refer to the violence that militant suffragettes were undergoing in prison and on hunger strikes, Howlett argues, “Where it once reassured men of woman’s place in the heterosexual economy, the Venus now spoke rather of love between women and of the suffering they were prepared to undergo for each other’s sake” (87). In her act of vandalism, Richardson manipulates the sexist aesthetic forms available to her from a male-dominated tradition of the nude Venus in order to create a new figure for queer women’s liberation: “suffragettes reinscribed femininity with new militant and lesbian meanings which severely disrupted its stability as an essential characteristic of women and thus as a signifier in the heterosexual economy” (Howlett 87). Richardson took up the multiple inversions that her act of vandalism produced on the painting and on herself as a subject, challenging the rationalities at the heart of eugenic heterosexism.

In aesthetic terms, by literally cutting the canvas, Richardson turned a realist painting of women’s beauty as object of a male gaze into an abstract, modernist artwork of bodily imperfection. Like the Venus de Milo, Richardson’s Venus testifies to the formal beauty and political significance of disfigurement. The slashes in the painting expose both femininity and able-bodiedness as only as surface-deep as the canvas itself, since they make visible its fragility and penetrability underneath the protective glass that Richardson shattered. The “cruel wound” between the figure’s shoulder blades is more like a jagged threshold, an opening into the body that moves the viewer beyond the one-dimensionality of the painting into the emptiness behind. The slashes that cut across the painting’s background and into the nude’s figure also reveal the flatness of the image, destroying the illusion of dimensionality by slicing through the surface evenly. Richardson’s vandalism
makes use of modernist aesthetics by drawing attention to and short-circuiting the artistic conventions that are intended to uphold the illusion of wholeness. By creating in its place a disfigured version of the feminine form, she exposes the fabricated and fragile nature of ideal femininity and able-bodiedness.

Printed in the *Times* the next day, the black and white reproduced photo of the slashed painting was surely intended to provoke outrage in the newspaper's readers. But the terms of degeneracy, mental illness, and disease that commentators applied to Richardson's act, person, and aesthetic creation are strikingly similar to those given to other modernist works of art. Take, for example, the way Roger Fry's first and second post-impressionist exhibitions in 1910 and 1912 were characterized as “madness,” “infection,” “sickness of the soul,” “putrescence,” and “pornography” (Harrison 47). The fragmented, disjointed bodies of modernist painting were similarly characterized as perverse and degenerate, inverted and disabled. Like experimental modernist texts, and unlike mainstream suffragist discourse, Richardson's vandalism occupies this queerly disabled position. The rent canvas bespeaks a connection between femininity and disability by signifying mental inversion and bodily disfigurement, confronting the rationalities of compulsory able-bodiedness, as well as those of ideal womanhood. Richardson's act does not reject women's “disabled” position in society, but rather yields it as a weapon: a knife to slice through the thin screen of ideal feminine embodiment.

In *Spleen*, the character of Ruth is a figure who, like Richardson, utilizes the perversity of inversion and the disfigurement of aesthetics and the female body against reformists and conservatives alike, articulating a seemingly anti-able-bodied queer feminist agency. But Ruth also reveals a mechanism of feminist exceptionalism available to radical activists like Richardson, who may appear to be queer slashers of the ideal female form, but in fact reify the division between able-bodiedness and disability by leveraging their critique on their own exceptional capacity in contrast to disabled others.

**MENTAL CAPACITY AND DISABILITY AESTHETICS IN SLEEN**

In *Spleen*, Ruth initially tries to envision her pregnancy outside of heterosexual procreation and eugenics, though she eventually fails. In the first phase of her pregnancy early in the novel, Ruth feels “like a woman possessed. She was a woman possessed and she was horrified at the possession of herself by this thing she neither understood nor desired” (19). Here she feels she has lost control of her self-determination by being chained to the maternal discourses that interpellate her as a pregnant woman, and she feels not only possessed by the growing fetus inside her, but also controlled by eugenic imperatives of generational progress. As Garrity points out, “Ruth’s observations distance her from her pregnancy and ironize the dominant view that women are ruled by the demands of their reproductive system” (294).

Initially Ruth tries to stop time altogether in order to defer her entry into reproductive femininity and eugenic futurity: she “had arrested the action of
her body; as though this thing was not to be until a satisfactory reason could be found for its being and for her willfulness in denying it life; as though gestation was suspended until she had prepared herself to accept its consequences” (27). Refusing to be “made use of against her will,” she asserts her own agency against being a “body without a head” and an “eternal oven” (27), rejecting the imperative to perpetuate gender oppression by producing future generations. She even conceptualizes her pregnancy as her own death: “A funeral dirge over the unborn. Your burial service . . . A white bubble of a coffin” (27–28). Instead of promising more life and progress, reproduction signifies for Ruth death, stagnation, and the perpetuation of women’s oppression.

When her increasing size convinces her that she is going to have a child despite her best efforts, she switches tactics, resolving instead to embrace her procreative role—but to use it as a weapon against hetero-eugenic futurity. “I will create,” she vows, “Only of course something new. Something different. Something beyond and above it all” (29). Because as a pregnant woman she is at the heart of eugenic discourse, she finds there a “terrible power” (29) and wields it against hetero-patriarchal imperatives. Anticipating the queerly feminist agency she acquires at the end of the novel through the figure of the Victory of Samothrace, her exceptional ability to reject her place within reproductive futurity and escape the binds of eugenics finds her seeming “to wing across floors and paths leaving no footprints” (29). Here she conceptualizes her feminist agency as exceptional—even superhuman—capacity and mobility, also likening herself to the male progenitor Zeus (30). Ruth’s intellectual capacity, her appropriation of male (pro)creativity, and her mobility—in her ability to “fly” beyond the limits of gendered reproduction—all allow her to refuse to be one of “these marriageable and disobedient young women borne off in absurd and smiling attitudes to be breeders of gods and heroes. No, she intended no replica of herself or Stephen. That would indeed be a shocking waste of her new-found and terrible power, laughed Ruth” (30).

But when Ruth gives birth to her disabled son, Richard, her hopes of resisting hetero-reproductive futurity seem to be dashed. Dickinson argues that Moore uses Richard as a metaphor for the “monstrosity” that was borne, so to speak, out of Ruth’s attempt to create “something new, something different.” “Unfortunately,” Dickinson argues, “Ruth’s mission fails. Richard’s deformed corporeality offers evidence to Ruth that her thunderbolt destroyed rather than created. . . . If he does figure as a product of modernism, he is a failed one, physically monstrous and mute” (87–88). Davidson points to this symbolic connection between children born with disabilities and social degeneracy in his reading of Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood, demonstrating how “The child born with a cognitive impairment becomes, in the public mind, the logical outgrowth of aristocratic inbreeding and women’s independence” (“Pregnant Men” 223). According to these readings, then, we may say that Richard represents the “monstrous” outcome of Ruth’s feminist resistance, reinscribing both of them back into abject bodily categories.
Thus, on a narrative level, *Spleen* repeats the often-used trope of disability as social degeneracy. Thematically, Ruth figures her liberatory queerness and feminist mobility against her son’s “degeneracy.” But formally, she also stages her liberation through his “debilitated” subjectivity, by appropriating differently-abled modes of perception and expression. This is most evident in a scene where Ruth forgives herself after staring at an abstract, “deformed” painting of her “son” who is a kind of composite image of Richard and one of the native children from the island where she lives with Richard (more about this below).

In a more general sense, Moore dramatizes the relationship between modernist form and disability by utilizing “deficient” and “debilitated” modes of narration in ways that seem to produce new meanings, rather than merely being signs of lack, incapacity, or degeneracy. In her analysis of Woolf and disability, and in contrast to Siebers and Quayson, Janet Lyon articulates this point by demonstrating that, “the modernist aesthetic project . . . involves the deliberate experimental creation (rather than short circuiting or collapse) of new aesthetic domains out of the encounter with non-normate bodies and affects” (561). But as my reading of *Spleen* demonstrates, this practice of experimental aesthetic creation not only blurs but also displaces the distinction between modernist capacity and eugenic debility elsewhere. Ruth creates a new aesthetic out of her encounters with disability as a way to reject her own victimization within able-bodied eugenics, but in doing so she reinforces the line between what she perceives as Richard’s “unproductive,” degeneracy and her own productive creativity.11

The style and structure of *Spleen* itself echoes its disability symbolism. As Dickinson argues, Moore’s fragmented narrative style parallels Ruth’s use of “incompleteness” as a motif: “Unfinished sentences . . . like the unfinished body of Richard, or like the headless statue, ‘The Victory of Samothrace,’ are instead linguistic bodies lacking tails rather than heads, reversing the images of headless female embodiments purported by patriarchs like Uller throughout the novel” (103). Just as Ruth reverses the image of the headless woman rather than insisting on feminine wholeness, her sentences often are headless or bodiless, rather than only “bodies lacking tails.” For example, at one point she again imagines herself as pregnant in her head, thinking,

Man woman and child and child and child. Woman and child. Wash child, wash corpse. . . . That was all there should be to it. Could be to it. Woman from the neck downward. Man from the neck downward and upward, as he chose. But for woman no choice. I think, Stephen. I think. I think I carry my womb in my forehead. And she did. And still did. (57)

The sentence fragments in this passage are subjects without predicates: “Woman and child,” “Woman from the neck downward,” “I think,” and “And she did” are all heads of sentences without bodies, mirroring Ruth’s rearticulation of herself as a head without a body and as pregnant in her mind. Her refusal to embody feminine wholeness coincides with her adoption of modernist fragmentation on a formal and stylistic level.
The novel’s style is punctuated by what is purposefully lacking, left unfinished, and in a sense even incapacitated, which is to say prevented from functioning in a syntactically “normal” way. This narrative style takes up the headless body and bodiless head imagery that recurs throughout the novel as a figure for disability, which suggests that Ruth is also appropriating disability aesthetics in order to envision her own freedom not just from ideological constructions of womanhood, but also from linguistic ones. Even formally, however, she seems unable to envision disability as anything other than lack and incompleteness, however productive for her.

The novel’s consistent use of free indirect discourse highlights the fact that Ruth is in a sense narrating her own story, or at least entering into and shaping the narrative. Her appropriation of disability in both a thematic and formal sense, then, suggests that she does indeed create a new aesthetic through disability, as Lyon argued of Woolf. Unfortunately, claiming this productive power also involves displacing an unproductive notion of disability back onto her son Richard. Not only does she block Richard from himself entering into the free-indirect narration, but she cannot even imagine him as having thoughts. His consciousness never enters into hers or into her narrative, suggesting that her use of disability aesthetics does not fundamentally unstructure the able-bodied/disabled binary, but in fact merely appropriates what she perceives as a disabled mode of writing for her own liberation. This implies that her disability aesthetic consists more of her own able-bodied perceptions and judgments about disability, rather than any sense of disability as being productive or even legible in and for itself. Her repeated insistence on Richard’s incapacity and impairment are part of her self-construction as an able-bodied woman using disability to enhance her own capacity. Furthermore, by consistently linking modernist aesthetic practices such as fragmentation and defamiliarization with defectiveness, the text exposes how such practices merely render disability knowable and concrete in ways that perpetuate able-bodied normativity. A few more examples of Ruth’s use of disability aesthetics demonstrate this clearly.

In the opening paragraph, set in the fictional island of Foria, Moore persistently repeats the words “goat,” “woman,” “child,” “udders,” and “bells,” signaling the main thematic elements of motherhood and reproduction with which Spleen will continue to grapple. Almost immediately Ruth perceives these figures in explicitly eugenic terms: “How well she knew it all. Morning and evening she had seen them pass, the same woman with angry pointed cries, the same stick, the same blows, possibly the same petticoats, the same children grown to grandchildren, the same goats perpetually renewing themselves, replaced, undulating, docile, the same purple udders . . . the same acrid smell of goats passing” (7). The women are homogeneous vessels, always reproducing sameness but never changing or progressing.

Ruth’s emphasis on sameness and the cyclical nature of the generational renewal of the women and their association with the goats suggest that her formal use of repetition constructs them as stagnant, unevolving, and therefore
eugenically suspect. This rhetoric subtly echoes eugenicists’ identification of feeble-mindedness with the lower classes, and the fear that those classes were reproducing too rapidly and would populate the nation with unproductive, parasitic children who would thwart national progress. The image of “children grown to grandchildren” reflects Ruth’s perception of the unnatural kinds of generational backwardness and “deformity” produced by this supposedly unproductive type of reproductive repetition, and also recalls the language of eugenic degeneration. Ruth envisions generational stagnation through the symbolism of disability here by raising the specter of children whose development is so arrested that they never grow up.

By beginning the novel with this incessant repetition coded as generational stagnation, Moore establishes a leitmotif of repetition as arrested development—as the proliferation of sameness over and over. Crucially, Ruth’s path throughout *Spleen* is to remove herself from this cycle by separating herself from Richard. So rather than destabilize the distinction between able-bodied and disabled subjects, or redeem disability as productive rather than stagnant, Ruth’s aesthetic practice severs disability aesthetics—which she is free to use for her own purposes—from lived disability in the form of her son, whom she reifies in eugenic terms of degeneracy and unproductiveness.

As Ruth watches a peasant woman walking away in the novel’s opening lines, she thinks how the goats would soon “be far away, small dark pellets of their own dropping, the woman dwarfed to the size of the child, the child scarcely discernible” (7; emphasis added). While the figures she watches are walking forward, away from her, she “incorrectly” perceives them as getting smaller, as if they are retreating into their own devolution. Moreover, she problematically uses dwarfism as a stand-in for degeneration, citing disabled embodiment as a sign of degeneration and eugenic unfitness. The term used by eugenicists for this type of retrogression is “atavism,” which, in that discourse, signifies “an unstable or tarnished present” being “displaced onto the past by way of the figure of the aberrant criminal, the ‘savage’ individual, the pre-evolutionary being” (Seitler 16). In the passage above, Ruth imagines the figures as shrinking and degenerating into prior and inert states, as she imagines the goats turning into their own feces and the woman regressing into childhood. As in the previous passage, here Ruth appropriates an “underdeveloped” way of seeing by way of a modernist form of perspectival relativism that registers its objects as defective. Thus, Ruth expands her own mental capaciousness by incorporating what she formulates as pre-operational, pre-evolutionary ways of perceiving, in Seitler’s terms, while at the same time projecting physical defectiveness and arrested development onto the atavistic, “dwarfed” women and goats in the novel’s opening, just as she will later distinguish her superior aestheticized mentation from her “defective” son. By seeing the peasant figures literally deteriorate before her eyes, Ruth characterizes them as degenerate, again employing the eugenic language of disability.12

Throughout the novel, Ruth’s narrative style periodically slides into non-chronological flashbacks and memories. We are taken back and forth between
Ruth’s pregnancy and her short return visit to England twenty-two years later, without any conventional markers or warnings of temporal disruptions. But however “defective” this instability might appear in a disabled narrator, like Benjy in *The Sound and the Fury*, in Ruth—an abled-bodied, intellectually capacious figure—it acquires the value of bold aesthetic experimentation. Put another way, Ruth uses disabled forms of narration that harness its aesthetic productivity while at the same time insisting on the equivalence of lived disability with deficiency. She extracts aesthetic value from an imagined experience of disability, thereby reinforcing notions of disabled people as identifiable and categorizable in ways that she herself exceeds.

**PRIMITIVIST EXCEPTIONALISM**

The narrative never describes Richard’s disabilities, but only reflects Ruth’s avoidance of them. She perceives and describes him as an amorphous composition of “two grey eyes widely spaced” with feet that “hung loose and shapeless from the ankle, soft loose pads of waxen flesh” (48–9). Ruth also uses even more generalized placeholders for his disabilities, such as “his infant stare” and “his utter soundlessness and immobility” (49). These metonymic and metaphorical ways of homogenizing different types of mental and physical debility stand in for specific accounts of Richard’s differently-abled body and subjectivity in a dynamic reminiscent of Mitchell and Snyder’s description of “the tethering together of physical and cognitive disability in the shared cultural space of the Eugenic Atlantic,” which “helped to round out a picture of human defectives as inferior in every aspect of their humanity” (“Eugenic Atlantic” 885). By grouping Richard’s physical and mental disabilities together under the homogeneous category of “defective,” Ruth uses eugenic criteria to flatten, categorize, and dehumanize her disabled son. Garrity argues that Moore’s descriptions of Richard complicate “any easy understanding of the disabled/able-bodied binary” (301). But as my analysis demonstrates, this type of flattening coincides with the biopolitical management of people with disabilities through eugenics; moreover, it is enabled by the endlessly malleable eugenic discourses bridging disability and social control.

This eugenic flattening informs other narrative techniques in the text, particularly in a racial register. For example, Ruth perceives the native Forians in purely synecdochal terms, as “rows of brown faces and foaming teeth gathering on the jetty and hemming her in, leagued against her” while she hangs on the arm of a “savage” from the village (9). Although Ruth professes to share her father’s belief that it is “unwise [and] impossible to define where races begin, end, and merge” (36), she categorizes others (here the Forians) in racial terms as primitively animalistic and lacking individuality or identity apart from their dark skin and rabid, diseased teeth. These seemingly paradoxical views about race are not contradictory, but rather exceptional. Throughout the novel, she stages her own attempts to escape from an abjected and degraded role of a maternal woman by contrasting herself with various other subjects, including Richard
and the Forians, who retain the biologically determined inferiority she rejects for herself. Ruth characterizes the Forians as “Silent indifferent dark-hearted people” (14)—evoking a Conradian heart of darkness within Europe itself. *Spleen*’s setting in a remote corner of Italy is a zone of racial indistinction, which points to the slipperiness of social markers of race. In evoking Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, Moore highlights what Ann Stoler calls the “historical variability in the making of racialized categories” (10) to demonstrate Ruth’s exceptional racial capacity, in her ability to classify the Italian islanders as non-European, primitive, and non-white (indeed, as the title *Spleen* suggests, there are other organs besides the heart that might complicate modernist Europe’s racial geography). By setting her novel on a remote Italian island, Moore demonstrates that Ruth’s position as a liberated modern woman depends on her own exceptional racial status; in order to escape her “disabled” positionality as woman, she racializes and disables those around her, saddling them with the discarded biological determinisms she leaves behind.

Moore also delineates Ruth’s primitivist exceptionalism in terms of queerness. When Ruth meets Joan Agnew, a young feminist, she thinks, “This then, was the modern girl the newspapers spoke so much about. Keen-eyed, fleshless, arrogant. She liked it. It was new to her. It had promise” (123). Doan and Garrity use the character of Joan to demonstrate that the “modern woman” is coded as queer in modernist texts—and that “To be modern is in effect to be a lesbian” (4).14 Indeed, as the “modern girl,” Joan seems to be the embodiment of what Ruth always longed for: a life independent from men, not defined by maternity, and characterized by a refusal to live up to expectations of femininity. In short, Joan represents the queer life that has been thwarted for Ruth by marriage and motherhood. When thinking back to how many times she’d been told that she was “different,” Ruth thinks “How she herself had reproached this very difference, this difficulty to take for granted, to produce appropriate emotions on their appropriate occasions, leaving her lonely as an invert” (125). Ruth’s inability to inhabit the prescribed norms of patriarchal culture makes her feel a queer identification with Joan.

But soon after this moment, Ruth disowns her feelings and turns against Joan’s modern, lesbian values, labeling them “monstrous”—which as Garrity points out is the same word she uses to describe and effeminize Richard (310). More importantly, by pathologizing lesbianism in the same terms as she denigrates physical disfigurement and feeble-mindedness, she again constructs her own exceptional capacity. Her exceptionalism must of necessity stigmatize Joan as a figure of deviance: “[Ruth] was shocked. She could not understand. Now, it seemed, the emancipated woman wanted no children. . . . How monstrous!” (126). Despite the fact that Joan’s independence from maternity and patriarchy is exactly what Ruth attempts to claim for herself throughout the novel, the logic of eugenics demands that she disavow and censure the “monstrous” degeneracy of Joan’s queerness, and in the same terms that journalists used to attack Mary Richardson’s vandalism.
Moore’s title is explicitly borrowed from Baudelaire, whose prose poem collection, *Paris Spleen*, valorizes anti-social radicalism and inversion in ways that parallel Ruth’s character. As Doan and Garrity point out, for Baudelaire the lesbian is a symbol for modernity and an “avatar of perversity and decadence, exemplifying the mobility and ambiguity of modern forms of desire” (6). The irony of Ruth’s exceptionalism is that she must condemn lesbianism even as she embraces its putative freedoms. This same irony underlies her simultaneous appropriation of Richard’s disabilities, on the one hand, and arduous self-conception as an exceptionally able-bodied individual, on the other.

**VISUAL RHETORICS OF DISABILITY**

It is telling that in *Spleen*, modernist art mirrors the eugenic emphasis on visuality as a way to hierarchize disabled bodies. Moore centralizes visual art as a mode for negotiating bodily forms; she rejects empathy in favor of spectrality. Thus Ruth (like Woolf’s queer artist Lily Briscoe) reaches her final epiphany through visual art. While on Foria, Ruth meets and has a relationship with a German abstract painter named Uller, who makes a series of paintings of Ruth that become celebrated in the art world after his death in World War I. Strikingly, Ruth absolves herself of her responsibility for her son directly after contemplating one of Uller’s abstract paintings of her in an art gallery. In the painting, Ruth holds a Forian boy, Giovanni, in her lap: “There he glowed like mother-of-pearl in the strong sunlight! He stared back at her from stark blue-black eyes set in an incredibly blue face against an incredibly blue sky” (124). Uller’s biographers later decide that the boy in the painting must be Ruth’s son, and they characterize him as a “distorted” figure. This misidentification leads Ruth to think about her “crippled, insentient” son, which suggests that for her the boy in the painting represents both Giovanni and Richard. The boy with the blue face seems to embody the eugenic homogenization of racial, bodily, sexual, gendered, and class otherness that characterizes Ruth’s definition of “monstrosity” throughout the book. He is a sort of amalgamation of the primitive islanders and her disabled son, portrayed through the disfigured aesthetics of abstract art. She forgives herself for giving birth to Richard’s disabled existence not by relating to Richard directly, but rather through the medium of this representation of her “son.” Richard is always displaced in the novel; he can never be her actual son, since he must always be a figure—a textual prosthesis, in Mitchell and Snyder’s terms—who represents the disability that she herself must escape.

Ruth’s fixation on the blue eyes, face, and sky in the painting points to Uller’s “misuse” of color in portraying the boy as blue, borrowing disabled ways of perceiving such as color-blindness and visual impairment to produce abstract aesthetic effects. But the effect of this visual impairment on the painting, for Ruth, is that the blue boy blends into the blue sky, rendering his disabled body and subjectivity invisible. In visual terms, the painting mirrors Ruth’s effacement of Richard in the novel and her narrative rendering of his disabilities as unrepresentable, even
as she appropriates his disabled modes of perception. Additionally, the painting represents the commodification of disabled aesthetics within modernist art: Ruth recalls reading “Two thousand guineas for The Modern Blue Boy, as newspapers called it” (124). But although the art object itself is “modern,” the boy/Richard recedes into the background and is not figured as modern but atavistic, not valuable or commodifiable like the painting—in Ruth’s words, “unproductive, null.” Ruth and Uller both use “defective” ways of seeing in order to produce aesthetic, monetary, and political value, but in doing so, negate the productiveness and value in disability itself.

In the aesthetic realm, however, disfigurement is a valuable commodity. Inverting the sentiment from the political cartoon of the Venus de Milo with which I opened, Uller remarks, “I never see a greek statue without being grateful to Time for knocking off its head and arms” (Spleen 103). As Tobin Siebers argues, the Venus de Milo, “is one of many works of art called beautiful by the tradition of modern aesthetic response, and yet it eschews the uniformity of perfect bodies to embrace the variety of disability” (5).

Uller’s abstract paintings in Spleen echo this sensibility, and his use of disability aesthetics leads to Ruth’s exceptionalist epiphany at the end of the novel, when she suddenly recognizes herself in Uller’s claims about Greek statuary. “That was it,” she thinks. I’m “a statue without a head. Or was she not rather a head without a statue? A head, she decided, going back many years and remembering, a head without its statue” (103). In what is by now a characteristic use of repetition in the novel, both at the level of the words in the text and the theme of the “headless woman,” Ruth envisions herself as disabled. She is at once a woman, an “eternal oven,” and its inverted counterpart, a head without a body. Both versions envision womanhood as disability: an unintellectual reproductive body, and a bodiless, immobile head. Her queerly feminist “flight” as the Winged Victory of Samothrace is dependent on both her appropriation of bodily disfigurement and her exceptional bodily capacity:

[T]o accept man not to question him and complicate a simple and necessary act. Off, off with their heads! That was what men felt in their bones; the perfect, the headless woman. And there worshipped. Like that should she come to meet one on brave wings outspread: but headless, headless. (103)

Ruth envisions her experience of oppression as a woman through the aesthetic figure of an incomplete statue, or a disabled body; her compensatory response is to endow herself with the wings of creative agency.

But in her appropriation of a disability aesthetic and disability symbolism, Ruth evades Richard and subsumes him into her own exceptional capacity. Uller’s painting of her son merely leads her to her own vision of agency: “Sitting there staring at the blue distorted child she seemed to have been on a long journey and nearing home . . . she had played . . . a trick on Nature. See, she had said, see what I am giving you! A line she had memorised from her lesson books as a child came back to her: and the elephant said to the flea: don’t push” (125). This last line is
also the novel’s epigraph and serves as a metaphor for Ruth’s exceptional feminist agency: she is pushing back against seemingly overwhelming social forces that insist she fulfill the reproductive imperative to be a good wife and mother. Her conception of herself both as a head without a body and a body without a head leads her, in the novel’s final line, to finally feel that, “She no longer reproached herself” (128).

Here Ruth takes part in what McRuer calls an “uneven biopolitical incorporation — an awareness [ . . . ] of disabled subjects who in certain times and places are made representative and ‘targeted for life’ even as others are disabled in different ways, or crippled, or targeted for death” (“Disability Nationalism” 171). While Ruth redeems herself and rejects her feminine incapacity through creating new aesthetic domains out of disability, at the same time she targets and symbolically disables both Joan Agnew and her own son as “monstrous.” She simultaneously finds a kind of queer/crip agency for herself, based in her exceptional capacity to embody wholeness in disfigurement. This new agentic capacity is specifically defined against what she constructs as her son’s immobility, unproductiveness, and debility. When she disavows Richard, she is cutting herself off from his eugenically determined ties to immobility and incapacity that “target” him for death.

My reading of Spleen supports the work of others who call for more attention to how modernist form is rooted in disability aesthetics, while at the same time insisting that disability as a formal quality is not autonomous from eugenic articulations of disability as a symbol for degeneracy. As Davidson argues, in modernism, “aesthetic discourse is underwritten by bodies whose imperfections become the limping meters, fatal flaws, castration complexes, and nervous disorders by which literature is known” (Concerto 5). Experimental literature utilizes and depends on disability in ways that require more attention from modernist scholars; we need to be more alert to the modernist practice of positing the disabled body as that which must be escaped. Garrity argues that Moore attempts “to accept the historically and culturally saturated idea of women's damaged materiality and use it as an imaginative resource to reformulate the relation between innovative form and embodiment” (312). But as my argument about Spleen demonstrates, the modernist feminist practice of dismantling the able body and claiming disability, while it may produce new and provocative versions of embodiment and agency, does not necessarily dispense with the sedimented values of capacity and debility that fundamentally structure modern biopolitics. In fact, the novel forcefully demonstrates how these aesthetic practices relocate capacity and debility elsewhere, in bodies such as Richard’s, shoring up the distinction between gender and sexuality as social constructions versus disability and race as supposedly immutable modes of embodiment.
Acknowledgements

This article grew out of a conference paper given at the Modernist Studies Association Conference in Buffalo, NY, on October 8, 2011. I would like to thank those in attendance for their helpful comments and feedback.

Notes

1. For a comprehensive account of suffragette art vandalism, see Fowler, “Why Did Suffragettes Destroy Works of Art?”

2. Perhaps not incidentally, Moore was involved with (and perhaps married to) the Serbian sculptor Sava Botzaris (Spleen 132).

3. The tiny amount of biographical information available on Moore is included in her Collected Writings (421–25).

4. Garrity has also discussed Moore briefly in her earlier scholarship. See Step-Daughters 68–69; as well as Doan and Garrity, Sapphic Modernities, 3–4.

5. While Garrity focuses on how Richard exemplifies “Spleen’s deformation of narrative” (291), I am more interested in how Ruth uses her son to articulate her own exceptional capacity in opposition to his debility.

6. See Kevles for the most widely used account of positive and negative eugenics.

7. A few examples of foundational work in disability studies that demonstrate the social construction of disability are Oliver, The Politics of Disablement; Davis, Enforcing Normalcy and Bending Over Backwards; Mitchell and Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis and Cultural Locations of Disability; and McRuer, Crip Theory.

8. For a discussion of contemporary art vandalism, see Siebers’s chapter on disability and art vandalism in Disability Aesthetics.

9. See also Puar, “Prognosis Time,” for a discussion of contemporary debility/capacity biopolitics, specifically in relation to McRuer’s term “compulsory able-bodiedness” (165).

10. For a definition and analysis of reproductive futurism, see Edelman’s introduction to No Future.

11. While Garrity argues that Richard’s disability and immobility “puts him at odds with the chain of associations that link Ruth to images of flight and mobility,” my argument is that the relationship is one of appropriation and exceptionalism, rather than opposition.

12. Garrity makes a similar connection, but rather than reading Ruth’s use of atavism as simply indicating her “ambivalence toward groups of people” (293), I argue that her aesthetic practice is founded on her own exceptional ability to transcend temporality in contrast to those around her who she characterizes as primitive.

13. See Michael Bérubé’s reading of Benjy, which, although brief, touches on the contradictory implications of Faulkner’s use of a disabled narrator, which contrasts with Ruth’s (and Moore’s) refusal to allow Richard to narrate anything in Spleen.

14. See Doan and Garrity’s introduction to Sapphic Modernities for an argument about the lesbian as an ideal and exceptional figure for modernity in early twentieth-century literature.

15. Ruth’s image of a statue without a body parallels Davidson’s reading of Winnie, another immobile head, in Samuel Beckett’s Happy Days: see Davidson, Concerto xxii.
Works Cited


